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2 The elusive winning strategy for
Iraq By Ehsan Ahrari
Most Americans believe that the United
States is losing the war in Iraq. That was one of
the findings of a poll conducted by the Washington
Post-ABC News poll on Tuesday. They also want the
administration of President George W Bush to shift
its focus from combat to diplomacy. That was also
one of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group
(ISG).
The poll has underscored the fact
that US voters have grown sour on the Iraq war and
are getting increasingly critical of the
leadership of President Bush.
His own approval rating is at 36%, second-worst of
his presidency. What is helping Bush is that
people still have a high level of confidence that
America's generals will find a winning way out of
the Iraqi quagmire. But even those top generals do
not agree on the issue of troop enhancement in
Iraq, and they have yet to come up with a "winning
strategy".
As Bush struggles to put
together his brand-new strategy on Iraq - an
announcement of which will now only be made next
month - the question that is being asked in many
circles is whether he is
really listening to
advice that is being given to him, or is he
indulging in an exercise of "hearing with a closed
mind".
That may not be an unfair question.
But it is a fact that he is almost fixated with a
"winning strategy", while such a strategy might
not even exist. Even if such a strategy indeed
exists, no one has proffered its modalities.
In preparing the groundwork for that
strategy, Bush met on Monday with three retired
army generals - Barry McCaffrey, Wayne Downing and
Jack Keane - and two academics - Elliot Cohen of
Johns Hopkins University and Steven Biddle of the
Council of Foreign Relations. Their advice was
that he should increase the troop strength in
Iraq.
He also met with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq two weeks ago, and on Tuesday he met with
the Sunni vice president of Iraq, Tariq
al-Hashemi. He has already met with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair. Also on Tuesday he had a
video teleconference with Zalmay Khalilzad, US
ambassador to Iraq, and America's top military
commanders in that country. He is also expected to
go to the Pentagon to hear its version of
recommendations.
Bush and Vice President
Dick Cheney also met with the chiefs of the four
armed services - the nation's top uniform
officers. About the only significant change that
they offered was a recommendation that the US
change its military mission from combating
insurgents to supporting Iraqi troops and hunting
terrorists. However, they did not support adding a
significant number of US forces to Iraq, but
favored strengthening the Iraqi army.
When
all is said and done, what is Bush's new strategy
for Iraq going to look like? There are several
variables that would be an integral aspect of his
new strategy.
First, he is likely to
increase troop strength in Iraq. On this issue, it
should be noted that while the three retired army
generals mentioned above have recommended it,
General George Casey, the top US commander in
Iraq, and General John Abizaid, commander of
Centcom (Central Command), oppose it. The
opposition of the latter two generals is based on
their conclusion that there are a sufficient
number of US troops currently deployed in Iraq.
However, they are reportedly reconsidering their
previous position.
As much as the American
people have a high level of trust in their senior
military leaders - and they are quite right in
their trust - there is little doubt that having
more troops or staying with the current size of
force remains a judgment call.
Second, the
ISG's recommendation about focusing on training
Iraqi forces and the embedding of US military
advisers in Iraqi battalions and brigades is
likely to be accepted by Bush. However, having
more or fewer troops is not likely to have much
impact on the level of insurgent and terrorist
activity or sectarian violence.
At the
same time, it can be argued - and those who oppose
inserting more US troops have already done so -
that having more troops is likely to create a
permanent (if not a long-term) dependency on the
part of Iraqi forces on the fighting capabilities
of US forces. More to the point, having more US
troops in the streets of Iraq will also expose
them to increased attacks.
Third, there is
little doubt that Bush will opt for some sort of
linkage between the capabilities of the Iraqi
government to stabilize Iraq and a phased
reduction of US forces over the next three or more
years. This remains a sticking point because Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki has already rejected any
discussion of linkage between such a timetable and
the capabilities of his government to stabilize
his country.
However, between the time he
had a public spat on that issue with US officials
in Iraq and now, Maliki's own political standing
in
really listening to
advice that is being given to him, or is he
indulging in an exercise of "hearing with a closed
mind". 
