Page 2 of 4 Iran and the US: An
unbreachable divide By Mahan
Abedin
found its strongest expression in
Khomeini's reference to the US as the "Great
Satan". The message of the Iranian revolution was
simple: the United States - on account of its
heritage, values, power and ambitions - posed the
greatest threat to the security and prosperity of
the global Muslim community.
In the 1980s
this conception of the United States as a "Great
Satan" and the pinnacle of "global arrogance" was
limited to militant Shi'ites only. The Sunnis did
not initially respond to this
message for three reasons.
First and foremost, the conditions for
anti-American Islamic militancy had not yet
developed in Sunni Islamist circles. Second, Saudi
propaganda was effective in countering the message
of the Iranian revolution. And last but not least,
the Afghan jihad not only consumed much of the
energies of Sunni Islamists but it also
neutralized much of their anti-American feelings
on account of the fact that their "jihad" was
partly bankrolled by the United States.
Two developments transformed the
situation. The fading of the Afghan jihad marked
the end of detente between the United States and
Sunni Islamic militants. But more important
perhaps, Islamists began to dominate both the
discourse and practice of the Palestinian
resistance to Israeli occupation. The rise of
Hamas in the late 1980s was a truly strategic
development that has transformed not only the
Palestinian resistance but also some of the basic
features of Palestinian society.
While
Hamas is firmly rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood,
it is nonetheless a complex organization. At its
extreme right-wing fringe there are elements close
to the so-called Jihadi Salafis. At the other end
of the spectrum lie elements that are
indistinguishable from Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), which to date is the only Arab Sunni
Islamist organization that professes strong
loyalty to Iran's Islamic Revolution. But Hamas as
a whole is close to the Islamic Republic. It is
unfortunate that while Western commentators
usually exaggerate Iran's influence over Lebanon's
Hezbollah, they tend to play down the Islamic
Republic's significant leverage over Hamas.
Both the PIJ and Hamas were instrumental
in spreading the idiom and long-term strategic
vision of Iran's Islamic Revolution to Arab Sunni
Islamist movements. This includes al-Qaeda and the
broader Jihadi Salafi movement. While on the
surface the Jihadi Salafis are dismissive of Hamas
(on account of its participation in elections and
the increasingly "nationalist" nature of its
resistance to Israel), they have been influenced
by its methodology and success. More broadly,
while the Jihadi Salafis express deep contempt and
hatred toward Iran's Islamic Revolution, they are
parasitic on its rhetoric, heritage and long-term
geopolitical vision.
Ironically, as the
Sunni Islamists adopted its language and vision
(if not the model itself), the Islamic Republic
moved away from ideological anti-Americanism in
the 1990s. This not only reflected the cooling
down of revolutionary fervor but was also
indicative of Iran's growing geopolitical weight.
The conclusive defeat of Saddam Hussein's armies
in the Gulf War of 1991 was a turning point for
post-revolutionary Iran and once again positioned
the country as the foremost power in the region.
But the erosion of ideological fervor did
not lead to any cracks (let alone a breakthrough)
in the deep freeze that characterized Iranian-US
hostility. In fact as the hostility assumed
greater geopolitical (as opposed to ideological)
dimensions, the rift widened and deepened. This is
best exemplified by the Bill Clinton
administration's persistent efforts in frustrating
Iran's legitimate geopolitical aspirations in
Central Asia, the Caspian region and Southwest
Asia throughout the 1990s.
Badly bruised
by the Iranian revolution (and the 444-day hostage
crisis that soon followed), successive US
administrations have nurtured an obsessive hatred
toward the Islamic Republic. America's irrational
fear of Iran is best understood in the context of
geopolitical loss (ie, the downfall of the shah)
and the politics of humiliation that followed.
After all, the Islamic Republic sponsored the most
successful anti-American organizations in the
Middle East in the 1980s, not least the nascent
Hezbollah, which can claim most of the credit for
driving US and other Western forces out of Lebanon
in the 1980s.
A wall of mistrust Iranian leaders often describe the obstacles
to a breakthrough in their hostile relationship
with the United States as a "wall of mistrust".
This captures the essence of the problem, as the
two sides are on a collision course over all the
strategic issues in the Middle East and the wider
Muslim world.
While the steadily
developing crisis over Iran's controversial
nuclear program is dominating analysis on
Iranian-US relations, this issue is not the most
important divide between the two sides. It is the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict that fundamentally
divides Iran from the United States in the Middle
East. While America's primary long-term objective
in the Middle East is the survival of Israel, the
Islamic Republic is committed to the very
opposite.
Every other US goal in the
region (with the exception of energy security)
flows from its long-term and seemingly
unconditional commitment to Israel. This includes
the half-hearted project to spread democracy in
the region. But to their dismay, the Americans
have discovered that far from producing "safe"
forms of democracy, even modestly free and fair
elections tend to empower organizations that
challenge US hegemony in the
