Page 3 of 4 Iran and the US: An
unbreachable divide By Mahan
Abedin
region. The electoral victory of
Hamas in the January 2005 Palestinian elections is
the best case in point.
The Islamic
Republic's commitment to Hamas should not be
underestimated. This is often overlooked in
Western and Arab analysis, which tends to focus on
Iran's influence in Iraq and Lebanon. In many
respects the Islamic Republic's leverage over
Hamas is greater than its influence over its
Shi'ite Islamist allies
inside the Green Zone in
Baghdad.
This has been particularly the
case after the imposition of crippling financial
sanctions on the Hamas-controlled Palestinian
authority. Hamas has not only gained a dominant
position in the resistance against Israel, but it
is also slowly Islamizing the entire Palestinian
narrative, something Iranian leaders had aspired
to achieve at the outset of the Islamic
Revolution.
More broadly, the Islamic
Republic is completely at odds with America's
"democratization" drive in the region. There is an
element of hurt pride in the equation, not least
because the Americans do not acknowledge the
democratic credentials of the Islamic Republic.
For all its faults, the Islamic Republic has a far
more sophisticated democracy than even America's
more enlightened allies in the region, not least
the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt.
But
much more important, the two sides are completely
at odds over the geopolitical and
cultural/civilizational consequences of democracy.
The Iranians see Islamic movements as the key to
national sovereignty and genuine long-term
democratic reform in the region. Meanwhile, the
Americans see "safe" forms of democracy as the
most effective device to guarantee Israel's
long-term security. The so-called "war on terror"
(now conveniently called the "Long War") is an
important part of this generational US strategy.
The two sides are now even on a collision
course in Iraq, where there was some convergence
of interests at the beginning of the occupation.
The Islamic Republic has an abiding
interest in the failure of the United States in
Iraq. This interest overrides its commitment to
the security and long-term political positioning
of its Shi'ite Islamist allies in Baghdad. But
this fundamental reality has not stopped Iraqi
Shi'ite Islamists from mediating between the two
sides. The latest of these initiatives was Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim's recent trip to Washington, where
he had a meeting with President Bush.
As
the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, Hakim is arguably the most
powerful man in Baghdad. It is also well known in
informed circles in Tehran that Hakim has been the
unofficial international envoy of the Islamic
Republic's intelligence community at least since
the late 1980s.
While the Iranian
intelligence services send confusing signals to
the US president, the Islamic Republic is now
publicly asserting its opposition to the entire US
project in Iraq. "Iran's position is to oppose
occupation and help the Iraqi people defy the
occupiers," stated Dr Mohammad Jaafari of the
Supreme National Security Council (the country's
highest national-security body). [1]
As
the Americans steadily retreat from Iraq, Iranian
leaders gradually clarify their true position and
intentions. There is nothing in this position that
can be harnessed by the Americans to prepare
conditions for an "elegant" exit from Iraq. Iran's
fear of civil war in Iraq is nowhere near as great
as its fear of US success anywhere in the region.
The new Islamists While much of
the conflict between Iran and the United States
can be reduced to geopolitical rivalry, there is a
growing ideological dimension to the deep divide.
This revolves around the Islamic Republic's
outspoken president and his supporters. Mahmud
Ahmadinejad is not only striving to revive the
ideological spirit of the 1980s but he is also
transforming the Islamic Republic in the process.
While Ahmadinejad has a diverse political
constituency, his most committed supporters are
what can perhaps be best described as the
neo-Islamists. On the domestic front the
neo-Islamists want to generate conditions more
conducive to social justice and economic equality.
This has inevitably put them on a collision course
with the conservatives led by Hashemi Rafsanjani,
the Islamic Republic's most influential
power-broker.
While the neo-Islamists
share some common objectives with the reformists
(not least the desire to diminish clerical
dominance in the Islamic Republic), they strongly
object to the reformists' long-term plan to
transform the Islamic Republic beyond recognition,
in effect fundamentally and irrevocably changing
the balance of power between the system's
democratic and Islamic components in favor of the
former.
While Ahmadinejad and his
supporters are deeply loyal to Ayatollah Ali
al-Khamenei (the Islamic Republic's supreme
leader), they look beyond his reign and are
planning accordingly. They want to prevent a
leadership deficit in the event of Khamenei's
death. This may require seriously altering the
institution of velayat-e-faqih (rule of the
jurisconsult), the