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    Middle East
     Jan 3, 2007
Page 3 of 4
Iran and the US: An unbreachable divide

By Mahan Abedin

region. The electoral victory of Hamas in the January 2005 Palestinian elections is the best case in point.

The Islamic Republic's commitment to Hamas should not be underestimated. This is often overlooked in Western and Arab analysis, which tends to focus on Iran's influence in Iraq and Lebanon. In many respects the Islamic Republic's leverage over Hamas is greater than its influence over its Shi'ite Islamist allies



inside the Green Zone in Baghdad.

This has been particularly the case after the imposition of crippling financial sanctions on the Hamas-controlled Palestinian authority. Hamas has not only gained a dominant position in the resistance against Israel, but it is also slowly Islamizing the entire Palestinian narrative, something Iranian leaders had aspired to achieve at the outset of the Islamic Revolution.

More broadly, the Islamic Republic is completely at odds with America's "democratization" drive in the region. There is an element of hurt pride in the equation, not least because the Americans do not acknowledge the democratic credentials of the Islamic Republic. For all its faults, the Islamic Republic has a far more sophisticated democracy than even America's more enlightened allies in the region, not least the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt.

But much more important, the two sides are completely at odds over the geopolitical and cultural/civilizational consequences of democracy. The Iranians see Islamic movements as the key to national sovereignty and genuine long-term democratic reform in the region. Meanwhile, the Americans see "safe" forms of democracy as the most effective device to guarantee Israel's long-term security. The so-called "war on terror" (now conveniently called the "Long War") is an important part of this generational US strategy.

The two sides are now even on a collision course in Iraq, where there was some convergence of interests at the beginning of the occupation.

The Islamic Republic has an abiding interest in the failure of the United States in Iraq. This interest overrides its commitment to the security and long-term political positioning of its Shi'ite Islamist allies in Baghdad. But this fundamental reality has not stopped Iraqi Shi'ite Islamists from mediating between the two sides. The latest of these initiatives was Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's recent trip to Washington, where he had a meeting with President Bush.

As the leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Hakim is arguably the most powerful man in Baghdad. It is also well known in informed circles in Tehran that Hakim has been the unofficial international envoy of the Islamic Republic's intelligence community at least since the late 1980s.

While the Iranian intelligence services send confusing signals to the US president, the Islamic Republic is now publicly asserting its opposition to the entire US project in Iraq. "Iran's position is to oppose occupation and help the Iraqi people defy the occupiers," stated Dr Mohammad Jaafari of the Supreme National Security Council (the country's highest national-security body). [1]

As the Americans steadily retreat from Iraq, Iranian leaders gradually clarify their true position and intentions. There is nothing in this position that can be harnessed by the Americans to prepare conditions for an "elegant" exit from Iraq. Iran's fear of civil war in Iraq is nowhere near as great as its fear of US success anywhere in the region.

The new Islamists
While much of the conflict between Iran and the United States can be reduced to geopolitical rivalry, there is a growing ideological dimension to the deep divide. This revolves around the Islamic Republic's outspoken president and his supporters. Mahmud Ahmadinejad is not only striving to revive the ideological spirit of the 1980s but he is also transforming the Islamic Republic in the process.

While Ahmadinejad has a diverse political constituency, his most committed supporters are what can perhaps be best described as the neo-Islamists. On the domestic front the neo-Islamists want to generate conditions more conducive to social justice and economic equality. This has inevitably put them on a collision course with the conservatives led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Islamic Republic's most influential power-broker.

While the neo-Islamists share some common objectives with the reformists (not least the desire to diminish clerical dominance in the Islamic Republic), they strongly object to the reformists' long-term plan to transform the Islamic Republic beyond recognition, in effect fundamentally and irrevocably changing the balance of power between the system's democratic and Islamic components in favor of the former.

While Ahmadinejad and his supporters are deeply loyal to Ayatollah Ali al-Khamenei (the Islamic Republic's supreme leader), they look beyond his reign and are planning accordingly. They want to prevent a leadership deficit in the event of Khamenei's death. This may require seriously altering the institution of velayat-e-faqih (rule of the jurisconsult), the

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