Iran's UN
Ambassador Javad Zarif soberly evaluates the
United Nations Security Council resolution leveled
on his country last month. In an interview with
National Interest Online editor Ximena
Ortiz, the ambassador says he does not exclude
the possibility of further sanctions, claims that
unlike the United States, Iran does not consider
the use of force a legitimate foreign-policy
option, and rebukes Washington for approaching the
people of the Middle East as somehow less than
human. The resolution orders all countries to stop
supplying Iran with materials and technology that
could contribute to its nuclear and missile
programs. It also freezes
assets of related Iranian companies and
individuals.
National Interest
Online: Was Iran surprised by the vote?
What is the significance of the resolution for
Iran and how will Iran now respond?
Javad Zarif: Whether we were
surprised can be responded [to] on two different
levels. Of course we expected the Security Council
to issue a resolution. That did not come as a
surprise. We knew that the Security Council was
not even interested in listening to Iran. It is
astonishing that in the three sessions of the
Security Council it adopted a presidential
statement and two resolutions - 1696 and 1737- and
it did not allow Iran to speak until after the
meeting. And so there was no way for the council
to have first-hand information about Iranian
positions.
It wasn't a surprise for Iran
that, having not heard Iran's positions, they
would adopt a resolution based on a line that has
been presented to them. On the other hand, we were
surprised because the resolution ostensibly seeks
to initiate a dialogue, but we believe that the
resolution actually impedes dialogue. In the past
three years, Iran has had no problem with dialogue
and with finding a solution. But all through the
three years of negotiation with the Europeans, the
insistence has been on suspension, and if you see
this resolution and the previous resolution, you
see that the main crux of the resolution is a
request for a suspension of Iran's [uranium]
enrichment activities.
Now, if
"suspension" is a euphemism for Iran abandoning
enrichment activities - that may be one reading.
But if they mean suspension, then suspension
should be interpreted as a temporary measure in
order to allow time to find a solution.
We
have to see whether the council will even listen
to possibilities that were offered by Iran, by
experts, on a multitude of technical and legal
possibilities, so that Iran could exercise its
rights, could have enrichment facilities, but at
the same time every concern of proliferation could
be allayed.
NIO: When you
say that this resolution impedes dialogue, could
you clarify that? Does that mean that Iran will
withdraw from negotiation?
JZ: Iran is always ready for
dialogue. We have to see whether tactics followed
by one or another side of this dialogue in fact
helps the dialogue or creates obstacles. But I can
tell you that from the beginning of the
negotiations between Iran and Europe, that the
Security Council was used as a threat so that the
dialogue could only have one outcome.
If
one party in a discussion is always confident that
it can resort to an extremist instrument with the
dialogue, then the propensity to do whatever is
possible and useful in order to achieve a mutually
acceptable solution becomes more distant.
That is why I say the resolution impedes
dialogue, because it gives an artificial
mechanism. The Security Council sanctions will not
be able to stop the Iranian program. The sanctions
that are requested will not satisfy proliferation
concerns. Proliferation concerns - if there are
any real, sincere proliferation concerns - can be
addressed through mechanisms that would bring
about transparency, international monitoring and
other possibilities that would provide the
assurance that Iran's program will always remain
peaceful. The Security Council can impose
sanctions but that does not provide that
assurance.
NIO: What is the
impact, then, of sanctions on Iran, if they indeed
turn out to have no impact on the nuclear program?
JZ: Because Iran has been
denied technology over the last 27 years and this
resolution only officiates what has been the
policy and practice, Iran has had to be discreet
in its acquisitions of peaceful nuclear technology
to the point that today Iran's nuclear program has
been localized. Every element of that program is
produced locally and our own scientists have
developed the scientific know-how in order to be
able to sustain the program without any external
support.
That was not always the case. Our
desire was to have international cooperation in
order to have access to technology. But the option
that was provided to Iran throughout the past 27
years - and now more officially in this resolution
- is to either accept being deprived of this
technology - which is assuming greater and greater
significance - or to try to develop it based on
our own. Between these two options, we certainly
choose the latter.
If the option were to
be provided to Iran to develop this technology
through cooperation, we have suggested an
international consortium: other countries,
including Western countries, could own jointly
with Iran the facilities, and also jointly operate
them. That would give the greatest assurance that
these programs are not diverted into any illicit
activities.
NIO: You
mentioned also that Iran did not have the
opportunity to give a presentation ahead of the
Security Council decision. Why do you think the
council countries supported the revolution,
particularly Moscow and Beijing? Is it your
feeling that they supported the resolution out of
proliferation concerns, or is it your sense that
there were broader, geopolitical considerations in
terms of wanting to oblige Washington? What does
this mean for Tehran's relationship with Moscow
and Beijing?
JZ: All
countries have their own bilateral relations to
consider. They have their own interests. They have
to define their own national interests. They might
have other concerns - a desire to prevent
Washington from taking a unilateralist approach.
All of these may be reasons or excuses that
various countries may employ in order to vote one
way or the other. I think ultimately their own
perception of their national interest and
bilateral relations are considered in deciding how
to vote for these resolutions.
In the past
we have seen influence exercised unduly by the
United States. Studies have been done on how the
United States tries to use its various means,
including financial means, in order to bring about
decisions that are to its liking in the Security
Council.
Iran also has bilateral relations
with many countries. A number of considerations go
into our decisions about the nature of our
bilateral relations. And certainly the way they
act in the Security Council is one of those
considerations, but not the only one.
NIO: Do you expect the
Security Council to take further action in regard
to Iran's nuclear program? And could you please
specify what Iran's red lines are? Is there a
particular action that the Security Council or
other parties could take that would trigger a
substantive Iranian response, say of discontinuing
working with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, or taking oil off the market, or even
resorting to force?
JZ:
Unlike the US, we never say that we don't take
force off the table because the UN has taken force
off the table. We believe that the threat of the
use of force has no place in international
relations and anybody who assumes otherwise is
violating basic principles of international law.
But hypothetical responses will not help anybody
at this point. But what I can say is that
resolutions by the Security Council will not help
the cause of non-proliferation.
NIO: So you do think it's
possible that you will see further actions by the
Security Council that will be more comprehensive
in terms of sanctions than what Iran now faces?
JZ: We don't exclude that,
we don't think it's useful, we don't think it's
advisable, we don't think it's prudent.
NIO: Do you perceive any
change in the US attitude toward Iran since the
release of the Baker-Hamilton Commission (Iraq
Study Group) report? And how would you identify
Iranian goals for Iraq? What can the US offer Iran
and ask from it in discussions regarding Iraq, in
order to gain Iran's utmost cooperation in
attempting to restrain the sectarian fighting?
JZ: Well, Iran has every
reason to want stability, national unity and
democracy in Iraq with representation of all
Iraq's communities in the governing structure.
That is our objective and that is what we believe
would ensure security for Iraq and stability in
the region. We have supported the government of
Iraq and we will continue to support the Iraqi
government. When the United States goes about
arresting Iranian diplomats who are in Iraq on the
invitation of the Iraqi government, and are there
to help the government with security, that
indicates that the US might not share these
objectives with Iran.
As far as US polices
are concerned and the aftermath of the
Baker-Hamilton report, what is needed is a change
in the approach of the US towards Iran, towards
Iraq, and towards the region. What has brought all
these miseries to the region is that the US has
dealt with the region based on wrong perceptions
and a totally erroneous approach. The US must come
to realize that other countries have interests,
have concerns, have anxieties. The US must deal
with these anxieties, concerns and interests, and
not be concerned with only its own. Of course, any
country in any situation will try to maximize its
national interest. That's a given. But you have to
address any situation based on a recognition that
the other side also has these similar national
interests.
If you deal with the other side
as less than a human society, then don't expect to
have multiple outcomes. What I'm saying is that in
Western terminology, concepts are used that would
infuriate the other sides. Even the terminologies
used by the United States in the liberal realist
tradition - such as "carrot and stick" - are not
meant for humans, but rather for donkeys. In
studies of Orientalism, the Eastern part of the
world is dealt with as an object rather than as
serious, real human societies with longer, older
civilizations with concerns and needs that have to
be dealt with.
NIO: Going
back to this idea of impeding dialogue, is it your
view that the Security Council resolution could
impede negotiations regarding Iraq?
JZ: There is no dialogue
regarding Iraq. The US has not done, is not
interested in, a serious dialogue on Iraq. The US
State Department and the White House have
officially said: "We will engage in dialogue when
it suits us and on issues that are of concern to
us." That is a non-starter. And that is why there
has not been a dialogue and why the dialogue that
has been attempted has failed miserably.
NIO: How would Iran respond
if it witnessed Iraq's neighbors becoming involved
in sectarian warfare?
JZ: We
believe that to define sectarian divisions in Iraq
was the strategy that was followed by [Abu Musab
al-]Zarqawi. You remember that last year he made
it official that his strategy in Iraq was to
define the sectarian divide and create a serious
antagonism between communities inside Iraq. In the
past the various Iraqi communities lived together
and had intermarriages, they didn't have a history
of sectarian clashes. Zarqawi wanted to define
these sectarian divisions.
I think these
scare tactics are extremely dangerous, and that is
why Iran believes in a democratic Iraq and not a
sectarian Iraq and we will not do anything to
exacerbate the sectarian divide.
NIO: What is your perception
of the significance of the most recent local
elections in Iran?
JZ: Well,
elections in societies where the populace has the
possibility of participation in national life
usually go through cycles. And these cycles are
very clear in other democratic societies and the
same cycles are in force in Iraq. You see that if
you compare various elections within Iran. You see
that the people who voted have gone through these
cycles expressing their dissatisfaction with
certain policies and then moving to replace them
with another group. I think this is only natural.
You should not give it more significance than it
deserves.
But it shows that the population
has opted for a plurality of various elected
bodies in Iran. It did not believe that a single
vision should be dominant in various elected
bodies. And that is why in all these elected
bodies, there is a plurality, and I think that is
necessary to achieve to provide checks and
balances that have been foreseen in the
constitution.
