Ali Allawi was
minister of trade and minister of defense in the
cabinet appointed by the Interim Iraq Governing
Council from September 2003 until 2004, and
subsequently minister of finance in the Iraqi
Transitional Government between 2005 and 2006. A
Shi'ite Muslim, Allawi was part of the Iraqi exile
community in London during the rule of Saddam
Hussein. He was one of the organizers of "The
Declaration of Iraqi Shi'ites", a statement
released in 2002. Before being appointed by the
governing council in 2003, Allawi was a professor
at Oxford University. [1] Allawi talks to National
Interest Online editor Ximena Ortiz.
National Interest
Online: What is your opinion of President
George W Bush's Iraq plan, which he promoted on
Tuesday night
in
the State of the Union and announced on January
10? Do you believe that putting some conditions on
the US commitment, based on Iraqi progress towards
reconciliation, will focus the effort or prove
counterproductive? What about the proposed
increase in US troops?
Ali
Allawi: I'm not a military strategist, but
looking at it on the surface, I think 20,000
additional troops to complement the 130,000
already there doesn't seem to be a great boost in
the troop numbers. So I don't think it's purely a
military gesture, and I don't think it will have a
very significant effect on the military equation.
But it's part of a multi-pronged strategy
that basically will ratchet up the pressure on the
Iraqi government, propose an alternative to it,
and at the same time escalate the costs that Iran
may have to bear if it continues to confront or
challenge the United States in Iraq.
NIO: So in your view, the
troop increase is in part intended to ratchet up
the pressure on Iran. Could you elaborate on that?
AA: Well, I think it's clear
- the role that Iran has in the Iraqi crisis. It
is extremely important and significant,
particularly its effect on the Shi'ite Islamist
political parties.
And as much as the
United States, or the Bush administration, has
objected to possibility of negotiations with Iran,
the only alternative course that they have is to
confront it, and to challenge it, and to raise the
cost of its apparent intervention in the Iraqi
crisis.
This of course creates a serious
problem for the Iraqi government itself, which is
to an extent anchored around the Islamist parties
of the United Iraqi Alliance [UIA]. On the surface
it appears to be a contradiction. I mean, how can
the United States expect that by confronting Iran
and Iraq it is going to get the support of the
UIA, which is to some extent dependent on Iranian
support - ongoing support - politically and
otherwise?
So it's a way of trying to
break this conundrum. Now, I don't think it's
likely to succeed, because the only thing that can
happen out of this strategy is basically the
breakup of the United Iraqi Alliance. You are
going to get possibly a new governing majority in
parliament, but that would not necessarily reduce
the violence or the instability inside the
country.
NIO: And what about
putting conditions based on Iraqi progress toward
reconciliation?
AA: Well, I
mean the conditions that he's [Bush] talking
about, in many ways they are not really new. They
seem to be a way of pressuring what is supposed to
be a sovereign government by threatening to
withdrawal the support of the United States to the
government. Which makes the entire process of
having a sovereign government somewhat suspect.
NIO: Regarding those
questions about Iraq's level of sovereignty, do
you think that the Iraqi government in Baghdad is
free to establish a relationship with Iran that is
completely independent from US policy towards
Iran? Could Iraq then have a dialogue on its own
terms, and would such a dialogue lead to
neighboring countries, like Iran, restraining the
groups that they have ties with, that they have an
affinity with?
AA: Well, I
mean, the United States has a series of problems
with Iran, ranging from the nature of the regime
itself (which goes back to the days of the hostage
crisis in the early 1980s), right through the
confrontations they had with Iran throughout the
1990s in the Gulf, and into the issue of nuclear
weapons, which seems to be dominating the agenda
now.
So these are a set of issues and
problems the United States has with Iran. They are
not necessarily problems that the Iraqi government
should take on board, especially given this very
fragile nature of both the government itself and
the society emerging out of decades of
dictatorship.
So it is not normal, let's
say, that Iraq should adopt the US security agenda
as it relates to Iran and make it its own. Iran is
a neighbor - we can't really overlook the fact
there are links of geography, of history, of
common religion, and so on. The relationship that
Iraq needs to have with Iran has to be an
independent, neighborly relationship based on the
mutual interests of both countries, not
necessarily subject to the strategic imperatives
of the US government.
But we have now, I
think, been confronted with the Iraqi government
having the support of the United States being
withdrawn if it does not, as it were, toe the line
when it comes to Iran, and especially if it does
not toe the line with the administration's
interpretation as to Iranian meddling in internal
Iraqi affairs.
So this, I think, creates a
very complex problem for the Iraqi government,
because either you accept the American security
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
