Page 2 of
2 Lebanon: Shadow of civil war looms
again By Sami Moubayed
also concentrated on Christian
demonstrators at the strike - particularly those
wearing the Cross - and made sure Sunni religious
leaders and politicians came on TV to defend the
stance of Hezbollah.
In short, Al-Manar
was saying: this is not a Shi'ite rebellion. Last
month Nasrallah had given a speech to the
opposition demonstrators, pointing out that a
Sunni would replace Siniora as prime minister,
showering the Sunni community with great praise.
Al-Manar has run several TV programs and themes
about the lives
and
words of former Sunni leaders, to show the world
that (1) it is not opposed to the Sunnis and (2)
the Sunnis are not only represented by Fouad
al-Siniora.
Programs on former leaders
such as Saeb Salam, Salim al-Hoss, and Riyad
al-Sulh were repeatedly shown on Al-Manar TV.
Sunni anger has been increasing in the Arab world
after all, especially since the war on Iraq in
2003 and the rising power of Iraqi Shi'ites. The
death squads in Iraq, the liquidation of Sunni
notables and burning of Sunni mosques all
contributed to the Sh'ite rebellion. The
anti-Shi'ite tone was silenced briefly during last
summer's war in Lebanon, thanks to the
steadfastness of Hezbollah and the charisma of
Hasan Nasrallah, only to re-emerge, in dramatic
proportions, after the hanging of former Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein on December 30.
Now comes the crisis in Lebanon. The
Sunnis of March 14 want to invest in rising Sunni
nationalism in the Arab world to use it against
Hezbollah. The charisma of Nasrallah, his towering
popularity in the Arab and Muslim world, and
Hezbollah's heroism during the summer war all make
it difficult for March 14 to sell their argument
to the Arab masses. The more the White House
supports Siniora, the more it is easy for
Hezbollah to discredit him.
According to
The Daily Telegraph, the US Central Intelligence
Agency has authorized covert action against
Hezbollah in Lebanon and plans to support and fund
its opponents so that they unite to wipe out the
Shi'ite movement before it spreads Iranian
influence in Lebanon. Reportedly this plan remains
secret and is only known to some US congressmen,
President George W Bush, and certain Saudi
officials, who support it.
The
intelligence report reportedly reads: "There is a
feeling in both Jerusalem and Riyadh that the
anti-Sunni tilt in the region has gone too far."
It adds that "by removing Saddam, we've shifted
things in favor of the Shi'ites, and this is a
counterbalancing exercise", Then, making matters
worse were statements coming from Washington
showing mild enthusiasm about a Saudi-Iranian
rapprochement on Lebanon.
US State
Department spokesman Sean McCormack said: "We
certainly wouldn't support any effort to try to
negotiate something over and above the heads of
the Siniora government." He added, "As for any
political arrangements or accommodations that
Prime Minister Siniora might come to with the
various factions in Lebanon, those are going to be
decisions for him to make. But we won't work with
individual ministers from Hezbollah and we won't
meet with them."
While flying to attend
Paris III, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
an outspoken critic of Hezbollah, said: "What you
saw [Tuesday] was irresponsible in the violence
that erupted." Then topping it all with his State
of the Union Address, President Bush compared
Hezbollah to al-Qaeda, speaking of an "epic battle
between Shi'ite extremists backed by Iran and
Sunni extremists aided by al-Qaeda". He accused
what he called "Hezbollah terrorists" of "seeking
to undermine Lebanon's legitimately elected
government".
Much was said about the
disarming of Hezbollah and the summer war of last
year. One of the most popular theories was the one
given by veteran US journalist Seymour Hersh of
The New Yorker. He wrote that the war was a proxy
war between the US and Iran, fought on Lebanese
territory by the Israel Defense Forces and
Hezbollah. That proxy war failed at eliminating
Hezbollah although it was in the United States'
interest, more so than Israel, to get rid of the
Shi'ite guerrillas.
One reason for wanting
to rid itself of Hezbollah was to prevent the
creation of Hezbollah models in failed states,
Iraq for example. After all, the ingredients for
an Iraqi Hezbollah are there. Think the Mehdi
Army. The soldiers are young, oppressed, angry,
and religiously driven. They have a leader in
Muqtada al-Sadr, and in a chaotic scene such as
Iraq, weapons are plenty. They only need the axis
to Iran, and a new Hezbollah is created in the
region.
Another reason the US hated
Hezbollah is that its secretary of state had
personally endorsed and supported the Siniora
cabinet - a cabinet that was being threatened by
Hasan Nasrallah. The State Department wanted
Israel to finish off its business (explaining why
Rice said no to an early ceasefire) to get rid of
the greatest obstacle to the March 14 regime. The
final reason, and the most significant, is that
the US was planning for a war with Iran and wanted
to test the pulse of Iranian power through the
abilities of Hezbollah.
By all accounts,
Washington was surprised to see how Hezbollah
stood up to Israel. This was only a demonstration
as to how Iran would respond if war were to break
out with the US. And today, the proxy war
continues explaining why to date, both Siniora and
Nasrallah have been so stubborn in their stance.
Tehran and Riyadh are bolstering both leaders, to
see who says "Uncle" first. The situation is
likely to deteriorate further, since neither is
seemingly willing to give in, and Nasrallah
bluntly said that by no means was he or the
opposition backing down from their claims.
Some anticipate further divisions and the
possibility of creating a rival government to that
of Fouad al-Siniora, headed by a Sunni and allied
to Hezbollah and Aoun. Everyone would be happy in
such a scenario: Hezbollah would get rid of the
anti-Hezbollah statesmen, Siniora and Hariri would
get to keep their portions of West Beirut, Samir
Gegegea would reign within his Christian
community, and Aoun might even become president -
his eternal dream - in his parts of Lebanon.
The wiser choice - perhaps - is to revisit
a proposal made by former president Amin Gemayel
in 1986. At the time he proposed the creation of
the post of vice president (which does not exist
in Lebanon) and give it permanently to the
Shi'ites. This would mean the Sunnis get the
premiership, the Maronites get the presidency, and
the Shi'ites get the chairmanship of Parliament
and the vice presidency.
Sounds logical
today because of their numerical superiority, but
it never materialized in 1986. Revisiting it
today, along with the proposal of Amr Mousa
(19+10+1), might prevent the civil war that is
looming on the horizon. This would need, however,
without the shadow of a doubt, the cooperation of
Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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