Page 2 of 2 SPEAKING
FREELY An
uphill battle on Baghdad's mean
streets By Brian M Downing
troops, force US firepower to
devastate Baghdad at least as much as it did
Fallujah, and attempt to cause Iraqi army units to
disintegrate or at least balk.
They will
create diversionary uprisings elsewhere in the
Sunni Triangle, strike into Shi'ite neighborhoods
of Baghdad, and attempt to cut off the city from
fuel and food supplies.
Insurgents will be
bolstered by the expectation that high US
casualties and the devastation of large parts of
Baghdad will
decisively transform US
opinion into wide and intense opposition insisting
on a rapid withdrawal from Iraq, however graceless
that might be.
The battle of Baghdad will
be furious, and because of its proximity to the
Green Zone it will be televised. It will be
watched with keen interest throughout the Arab
world, which sees in these events the possibility,
perhaps now the likelihood, of a long-standing
hope - Arabs strategically defeating Americans.
Rallying Sunni support to the largely
Shi'ite government constitutes another hurdle.
Counterinsurgency doctrine assumes that much of
the local populace can, through entreaties and
services, be won over to the government. Whatever
empirical evidence from other wars there is for
this, it is necessary to assess the
counterinsurgency's prospects in Iraq by specific
potentials in that country, not those drawn from
past applications. Baghdad is not the Mekong
Delta; Iraq is not Malaya.
Sunni Arabs
believe that the US invaded their country under
false pretenses, stripped them of their deserved
positions in the state and army, and intentionally
humiliated them. They had, over the course of many
decades, built a modern, prosperous nation, only
to see it turned over to Shi'ite fanatics, in
league with foreign powers, determined to expel if
not extirpate them. They have suffered hundreds of
thousands of casualties and endured arbitrary
roundups and imprisonments. Two million or so have
fled the nation and many have been tortured (a
dark, largely unmentioned part of
counterinsurgency); some have been killed during
torture.
It remains to be seen whether
Iraqi Shi'ites, who have long despised the
country's Sunni Arabs and now predominate in
government, will demonstrate munificence toward
them or use the battle of Baghdad to crush them.
One might also wonder whether US troops - not the
generals, the troops - are inclined to treat Sunni
Arabs justly, those increasingly hated
hadjis who for almost four years now have
waged a savage and pitiless war.
A further
aspect in gauging a counterinsurgency's prospects
is the sophistication of insurgent organizations.
The Ba'ath Party, through which Saddam Hussein
ruled, provides important organizational
strengths. It had existed clandestinely for many
years since the 1940s and, either out of paranoia
or astute assessment of domestic and foreign
dangers, retained, even while in power, the
ability to flee underground and fight its way back
to power. The redoubtable Ba'athist cell network
now serves as a basis for clandestine operations.
The old Iraqi army figures too. Former
officers bring organizational skills, an extant
command structure and expertise in weaponry,
especially in infantry tactics, mortars and
explosives. Disgraced by the seemingly invincible
US military twice and dishonored by unceremonious
demobilization after Baghdad fell, they burn for
vengeance. Guerrilla forces, more suitable to
their society and culture than conventional
formations, are making vengeance look attainable.
Tribal and religious networks also provide
organizational patterns and impart moral energies
to guerrillas.
In the absence of strong US
congressional opposition, a counterinsurgency
program, with Baghdad its starting spot, seems
inevitable. The outcome might be as well. To be
successful, US and Iraqi forces must accomplish
most if not all of the following: deliver serious
damage to insurgent organizations; inflict heavy
and daunting casualties on insurgents; avoid
suffering casualties that cause already weak US
support to collapse or the fledgling Iraqi army to
disintegrate; bring government services to Sunni
Arab people and win them over; avoid losing ground
in adjacent cities during the battle of Baghdad;
and retain sufficient military and governmental
resources to replicate the program outside
Baghdad. A tall order, to be sure.
If
successful, counterinsurgency will undermine the
Sunni Arab guerrilla movement and elicit - or
force - greater cooperation between Sunni and
Shi'ite groups. If not, it will worsen sectarian
conflict and strengthen the insurgency. In the US,
it will underscore the impracticality of the Bush
administration's goal of transforming the Middle
East into a Western-oriented region and lead to
powerful if not irresistible public and
congressional demands to withdraw expeditiously.
The heretofore pliant US generals themselves may
call for the same. The administration stands at
the Tigris - the die is cast.
Brian
M Downing is the author of several works of
political and military history, including The
Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in
America from the Great War to Vietnam. At the
age of 18, he was awarded a Pentagon grant to take
part in Vietnamese history. He can be reached
at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
(Copyright
2007 Brian M Downing.)
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