Page 2 of 2 Foreign devils in the Iranian
mountains By M K Bhadrakumar
impact on its short-term domestic and
foreign policy choices". He specifically cited a
classified research project sponsored by the US
Department of Defense that is examining the depth
and nature of ethnic grievances in Iran's plural
society.
"The Pentagon is especially
interested in whether Iran is prone to a violent
fragmentation along the same kinds of faultlines
that are splitting Iraq and that helped to tear
apart the Soviet Union with
the
collapse of communism," Bradley wrote.
The
US administration asked Congress for US$75 million
last year for promoting "democratic change" within
Iran. But the main drawback for US policy is that
with the possible exception of the Kurds, none of
Iran's ethnic minorities is seeking to secede from
the Iranian state. Also, it is not a situation
where ethnic minorities are subjected to
persecution or discrimination in Iran. The
majority Persian community and ethnic minorities
alike feel the alienation endemic to the problem
of poverty, economic deprivation, misgovernance,
corruption and lawlessness.
Indeed, the US
policy to light the fire of ethnic and sectarian
strife could well end up creating an "arc of
instability" stretching from Iraq to Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Even right-wing Iranian exile Amir
Taheri, who is usually a strong backer of the Bush
administration's interventionist policy in the
Middle East, has warned that although fanning the
flames of ethnic unrest and resentment is not
difficult and that a Yugoslavia-like breakup
scenario might hasten the demise of the Iranian
regime, it could also "unleash much darker forces
of nationalism and religious zealotry that could
plunge the entire region into years, even decades,
of bloody crisis".
The irony is that
Afghanistan is being put to use as a launch pad by
the US for sponsoring terrorism directed against
Iran, when the raison d'etre of the US
occupation of Afghanistan during the past five
years has been for the stated purpose of fighting
a "war on terrorism". Besides, Iranian cooperation
at a practical level went a long way in
facilitating the US invasion of Afghanistan in
2001. Even Iran's detractors would admit that
during the past five years, Tehran has followed a
policy of good-neighborliness toward the Kabul
government, no matter Washington's dominance over
President Hamid Karzai. In fact, Iran figures as a
major donor country contributing to Afghanistan's
reconstruction.
From this perspective, US
President George W Bush's speech at an AEI
function on February 15 outlining his new Afghan
strategy assumes great importance. The fact that
Bush chose a citadel of neo-conservatism to unveil
the "top-to-bottom review" of his new Afghan
strategy was symbolic. In essence, Bush underlined
the imperative of a long-term Western military
presence in Afghanistan. There was a triumphalism
in Bush's tone that he brought NATO into
Afghanistan - as if that was a strategy by itself.
He couldn't hide his glee that NATO had been
brought by the scruff of its neck into the Hindu
Kush - where it was going to slouch along the soft
underbelly of Russia and China for the foreseeable
future.
Bush summed up his sense of
achievement: "Isn't it interesting that NATO is
now in Afghanistan? I suspect 20 years ago if a
president stood in front of the AEI and said,
'I'll make a prediction to you that NATO will be a
force for freedom and peace outside of Europe,'
you probably never would have invited the person
back. Today, NATO is in Afghanistan."
In
his entire speech, Bush didn't refer even once to
the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan.
Also, Bush's speech completely sidestepped the
urgent need to pressure Pakistan to clamp down on
the Taliban. Actually, Bush ended up praising
Musharraf's "frontier strategy" in the tribal
agencies. To be sure, the Tehran Times was right
in concluding that Washington, with the
"cooperation of regional powers like Pakistan", is
realizing the long-term NATO military presence in
Afghanistan.
Soon after Bush spoke at the
AEI, spin-doctors in Washington began spreading
word in select media that al-Qaeda was back in
business in the Pakistani tribal areas.
Self-styled counter-terrorism officials in
Washington who refused to be named will now have
us believe that the al-Qaeda "leadership command
and control is robust" and "the chain of command
has been re-established".
As the New York
Times put it, "Until recently, the Bush
administration had described Osama bin Laden and
[Ayman] al-Zawahri as detached from their
followers and cut off from operational control of
al-Qaeda." But all of a sudden the picture has
changed. The daily said, "The United States has
identified several new al-Qaeda compounds in North
Waziristan, including one that officials said
might be training operatives for strikes
against targets beyond Afghanistan
[emphasis added].
"US analysts said recent
intelligence showed that the compounds functioned
under a loose command structure and were operated
by groups of Arab, Pakistani and Afghan militants,
allied with al-Qaeda."
In other words, the
"war on terror" in Afghanistan has come full
circle. A few things stand out. First, as Bush
pithily summed up, Musharraf "is an ally in this
war on terror and it's in our interest to support
him in fighting the extremists". The restoration
of democracy in Pakistan will have to wait.
Second, the US and NATO military occupation of
Afghanistan is for the long haul. The specter of
al-Qaeda's resurgence is sufficient to justify it.
Third, the US military presence in the Central
Asian region will also continue for the
foreseeable future, no matter what Russia or China
feels about it.
Fourth, regional powers
must appreciate that it is the United States that
stands between them and the deluge of Islamic
extremism. They must therefore cooperate with the
US (and NATO) and trust Washington to represent
their best interests in the devilishly obscure
Pakistani tribal areas. Finally, this is a
long-term ideological struggle - freedom and
democracy versus extremism and obscurantism. And
wherever there is "democracy deficit" - be it
oil-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan -
the US has a right to intervene.
Meanwhile, what does Tehran do about the
Zahedan incident? Does it retaliate against NATO
in Afghanistan? Should it hold Musharraf
accountable for the covert US operations staged
from Pakistani soil? In chess, this is called a
classic zugzwang - having to choose between two
bad options.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for more than 29 years, with postings
including ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
(Copyright 2007
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
