The British story in Iraq is written
By Ronan Thomas
LONDON - As the British government announces that Prince Harry - third in line
to the throne - will be deployed to Iraq for a six-month tour, it is also
heralding phased troop withdrawals. Just as US forces ramp up in problematic
Baghdad and its lethal 50-kilometer radius with a "surge" saturation strategy,
London now says it has the freedom to draw down forces.
Last Wednesday, Prime Minister Tony Blair told Parliament he intends to order
home (or redeploy) up to 2,100 British soldiers from the current total of 7,100
now operating in southern Iraq. In coming months 1,600 will leave, followed by
a further 500 by late
summer. Three bases in Basra - heart of British military operations in Iraq -
will be handed over to Iraqi government control by next year.
A core of about 2,000-3,000 British troops will remain in two heavily fortified
garrisons in Basra. To protect the investment, as it were. This "brigade plus"
rear guard will remain as a strategic reserve, train Iraqi government forces,
and watch the border with Iran. The retained troops will also provide cover for
the coalition in case successful US pressure in Baghdad causes an exodus of
Shi'ite insurgents seeking to regroup in Basra.
Blair also signaled that all four provinces in southern Iraq - overseen by the
British since the coalition's invasion in 2003 - should be technically under
Iraqi government control by next year.
Of these four, sparsely populated al-Muthana and Dhi Qar, further north, have
already been handed back to the Iraqi government. Under the plans just
announced, the remaining two, Maysan (bordering Iran) and Basra provinces are
set to be handed over this summer.
But the British story in Iraq is far from over. The proposals hardly amount to
a calling of the legions home. Only 29% of British troops will leave. The union
flag will continue to flutter in Basra well into 2008 and most likely for years
to come. This is not a "mission accomplished" moment. Britain envisages no
final withdrawal from Iraq until the United States begins its withdrawal.
The plans are described by Blair as a "new chapter to be written for Iraqis"
and entail a phased British withdrawal contingent on insurgent response and
Iraqi government capability to accept new security burdens. They have been an
open secret for the past six months. In August, the United Kingdom's Ministry
of Defense published a transition plan calling for an ambitious 50% reduction
in British forces by mid-2007. The latest, more modest, proposals reflect the
British government's reassessment that handover to the Iraqis may be more
problematic than first thought.
The signs have not been good. In August, when UK forces handed over their base
at Camp Abu Naji, al-Amarah (Maysan), to Iraqi government forces, it ended in
shambles. The base was quickly seized by Muqtada al-Sadr's Shi'ite Mehdi Army.
In October, when the British handed over Amarah itself to the Iraqi government,
vicious street fighting erupted between the Mehdi Army and Badr Brigade
factions loyal to the Iraqi government. The British had to step back in. Senior
British commanders now acknowledge that their handover track record has not
been a smooth one.
Ever since Britain committed 46,000 troops for the March 2003 invasion, British
soldiers have controlled southern Iraq - the linchpin of the coalition's
Multi-National Division South East. Their main responsibility: security and
reconstruction in these Shi'ite-majority areas covering the key Iraqi cities of
Basra, Amarah and Nasiriyah.
The British have operated from five main bases centered in Basra. These are the
principal base at the Shat al-Arab Hotel (home to two infantry battle groups),
the Shaibah logistics base, the old Basra state building, the Presidential
Palace (the UK's expensively fortified consulate), and the Basra airport. Under
the latest plans, the British will hand over all but these last two by next
year.
The British government is spinning the planned withdrawals as a good-news
story, of security delivered, above all in Basra. It points to the positives
since 2003. Saddam Hussein and Ba'athism removed; 55% of Basra police stations
now "satisfactory" after root-and-branch reform, up from only 20% in 2006;
kidnappings in Basra down 50%; the murder rate in Basra down from 139 last June
to 29 in December. British commanders also claim success for "Operation
Sinbad", a vigorous security sweep launched in Basra in October designed to
tackle police corruption and smooth the city's handover to the Iraqi
government.
Now for the negatives on the balance sheet. After an initial local welcome in
2003, popular consent for British control has drained remorselessly away.
Hospitals, utilities provision and reconstruction generally are all in a sorry
state. Some (Shi'ite) locals complain that the city was better under Saddam in
2002. Basra is not Baghdad, but even without the capital's sectarian conflict
the port city cannot be said to be safe. British troops face daily, intense and
deadly attacks in Basra and elsewhere in their southern sectors.
The current British death toll is 132 (101 killed in action) with at least 346
wounded. Roadside bombs, particularly of the latest shaped-charge variety
(rumored but not proved to be imports from Iran) have taken a growing toll of
soft-skinned Land Rovers and foot patrols. Attempts to counter the roadside
threat by innovations such as new Bulldog vehicles (basically older AV432
vehicles with extra armor) have yet to prove effective against the insurgents'
more powerful explosives.
Frequent rocket and mortar attacks on British bases exact an additional price.
And with news that the British are planning troop drawdowns, the various
Shi'ite militias in Basra are positioning themselves as patriots hastening
Britannia's departure in 2007-08. Then there is the prospect of a power vacuum
emerging as the British slim down their commitment.
Britain's former army chief of staff (1997-2001), Lord Guthrie, has pointed to
the dangers of local and regional destabilization that might result from a
mismanaged pullout: "If we go and Iraq really descends into the abyss, there
could be killing on a scale which hasn't been seen before. And there are other
nations in the region, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran. Destabilization here could
make things even worse."
Add in the cost and political fallout and the balance-sheet deficit increases.
Since 2003, British commitment to Iraq has cost the taxpayer more than 4
billion pounds (US$7.85 billion), with an extra 544 million pounds still to be
spent on reconstruction. Meanwhile, British popular support for the war has
hemorrhaged. YouGov polls last year suggested only 31% of Britons felt "Blair
was doing a good job in Iraq".
Blair's critics further claim he is more concerned with his legacy, painting
his achievements with a glossy finish in his final months in office. Having
announced his departure as prime minister this year, the consensus among most
political observers is that Blair will be gone by May-September. And, critics
claim, Blair feels he must show positives in Iraq while he still can.
Finally, there is the worry of military overstretch. With British forces
engaged in fierce fighting against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, fears
of a dangerous regional overextension of men and materiel are being voiced in
senior military and political circles. This comes as a further, major
reinforcement to British forces in Afghanistan (anticipating a Taliban spring
offensive) has just been announced.
Britain may now be downsizing in Iraq, but expect it to be a drawn-out process.
An endgame for Britain in Iraq is not yet in prospect. Blair has signaled that
Britain is not about to cut and run from Iraq. He spelled it out in an
interview last Thursday: "Troop numbers can always increase again if needed. We
are trying to support the democrats against the terrorists."
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