Page 3 of
4 How the Saudis stole a march on the
US By Alastair Crooke and Mark
Perry
Shi'ites in the Arab world,
he felt he had to do something to stabilize the
situation in at least one area."
In many
ways, Abdullah's decision was the result of a
"perfect storm" of events: the disintegration of
the security situation in Gaza, the indifferent
support of Egypt and Jordan for America's
anti-Hamas plan, and his perception that the
position of the Quartet (the US, the UN, the
European Union and Russia) on Hamas was beginning
to unravel. Abdullah's decision was
reinforced by Rice's
stillborn diplomacy.
Rice had pledged that
the US would work for a peace agreement between
the Palestinians and the Olmert government, but
King Abdullah knew that an increasingly large
number of Arab leaders were beginning to question
her leadership. He had also heard reports from
Quartet officials who were angered by Rice's
announcement at a recent meeting that her
"trilateral diplomacy" (among Israel, the US and
the Palestinians) now superseded the work of the
Quartet. These senior diplomats viewed her opening
of "the trilateral track" as an insult to European
and Russian officials who had believed her promise
that the Quartet would lead diplomatic efforts to
recast the Palestinian political environment.
No one was more upset than Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov. In a meeting with
President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on January
29, Lavrov told Putin that the US program of
supplying certain Fatah factions with weapons was
undercutting European and Russian efforts to find
a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
"Efforts to resume the negotiation process with
Israel have stumbled over the threat of a civil
war in the Palestinian territories," Lavrov told
Putin.
The Palestinian territories, he
said, were on the verge of civil war, a conflict
fueled by the United States. Putin was angered by
Lavrov's report. While the Russian president had
met with Hamas officials in February 2006 (a full
year before King Abdullah called Meshaal to
Mecca), in the wake of that meeting he heeded US
warnings that he was undercutting Quartet efforts
to isolate Hamas. No further meetings were held.
Now Putin felt betrayed, and directed his foreign
minister to make his views public. In the wake of
his meeting at the Kremlin with Putin on January
29, Lavrov told the press that "certain
unidentified outsiders" were "instigating internal
Palestinian strife" and "hindering a relaunch of
the peace process between the Israelis and
Palestinians".
While it is not known
whether King Abdullah listened to Lavrov's
statement, he certainly would have agreed with the
Russian foreign minister's conclusions, which
Lavrov made public in a television interview after
his meeting with Putin: "The goal of the Quartet
is to help overcome the standoff between the
Palestinians, namely between Fatah and Hamas, and
stop efforts which unfortunately are being carried
out from outside to provoke conflict between these
groups," Lavrov said. "If their efforts were not
being hindered from abroad, these two main
Palestinian groups could quickly come to
agreement."
The first meeting of Abu
Mazen, Meshaal and King Abdullah took place in
Mecca on the morning of February 6. In truth,
there was little to do - the outlines of a
prospective agreement between the two political
parties had been the subject of negotiations over
the previous months, and little effort was needed
to bring Abu Mazen and Meshaal into agreement. The
foundational principles of the meeting were
already in place: the two factions would end their
fighting and work toward building a unified
Palestinian government. Ismail Haniyah would
remain prime minister and the balance of the
cabinet positions would be filled by Hamas
officials. The more sensitive issues of filling
the government's security and finance portfolios
would be finessed by the appointment of
independents or through a veto from either party.
This would make it easier for wavering
Europeans to increase funding to the new
government. Abu Mazen's delegation arrived
divided, with Mohammad Dahlan adamantly opposed to
the meeting and even more opposed to the
agreement. Accompanying Dahlan was the
ever-present Mohammad Rashid, who was counseling
his client to express his disagreements politely
but firmly, but then remain silent. Dahlan did not
heed his advice. According to Fatah officials,
Dahlan was "aggressive" in his meetings with the
Hamas leadership and, when it became clear that an
agreement would be signed, sulked in his room. He
returned only occasionally to confront the Hamas
delegation. "You think I am the devil, but I view
you as the enemy," he told Hamas leaders at one
point. "I am not responsible for the troubles in
Gaza."
King Abdullah watched this
carefully and told Dahlan that his presence at the
final ceremony was essential. He would be there,
Abdullah said, or he would be sent home. Dahlan,
still sulking, appeared for the signing of the
agreement, but he remained in the back of the
room, behind the press. He thereafter only
reluctantly agreed to appear in photos with Hamas
delegates. Hamas leaders, for their part, agreed
to shake his hand, but would not embrace him.
In the wake of the signing ceremony and as
a way to help seal the agreement, King Abdullah
insisted that both delegations participate in a
"mini-hajj". Visiting Mecca's holy sites,
Abdullah calculated, would symbolize their own
commitment to Palestinian unity. "This was a
brilliant move on the part of Abdullah," an
American official confirmed. "Abdullah made it
clear to them that they were not only giving him
their word to abide by the agreement, they were
pledged to it before God."
King Abdullah's
mediation was personal in other, even more subtle,
ways. He made it clear that it was his belief that
Arab problems should be solved by Arabs, without
the Americans or the West. He also made it clear
that he knew that in coming to Mecca, Abu Mazen
was taking a political gamble that would mean not
only a rejection of the US program, but a
reshuffling of the Fatah leadership. But, Abdullah
told him, he would not stand alone. As a sign of
his commitment, Abdullah also pledged an immediate
transfusion of funding, to pay Palestinian
salaries. The initial pledge was $500 million, but
more would come when necessary. A final figure was
arrived at - an immediate transfusion of some $650
million would be made to the Palestinian Authority
(PA) through the Finance Ministry, but more would
be on the way. Up to $1 billion. The PA no longer
needed US or European money.
The positive
response to "the Mecca declaration" was nearly
unanimous among international diplomats, excepting
those from the US and Israel. Even Quartet members
seemed relieved, announcing that they viewed the
Palestinian accord in a "positive but cautious
manner". As expected, the Russians welcomed King
Abdullah's intervention, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Alexander Saltanov said he
"unconditionally" supported it.
The
Americans seemed confused: "We have not actually
seen the agreement, and it's important that we be
given some time to look at the agreement,
especially at the details of it," White House
spokeswoman Dana Perino said. State Department
spokesman Tom Casey said, "It's a four-paragraph
statement that leaves open any number of questions
about the government's composition, structure,
policy plans and otherwise."
Even the
Israelis seemed taken aback. "We need to see a
government be formed and see what the policies and
practices of that government are," said Miri
Eisin, spokeswoman for Olmert, but she then added:
"Israel expects the new Palestinian cabinet
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