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2 Iran moving in from the
cold By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
security and economic support, and
pushing for a timetable for the withdrawal of
foreign forces.
Simultaneously, Tehran
sees the meeting as an explicit US admission of
Iran's importance, which could have tangible
benefits for Iran's regional diplomacy,
particularly if Baghdad is followed by an even
higher-level meeting in Turkey in April.
The Baghdad meeting is at the
sub-ministerial level and officially
is
designated as a preparatory meeting to set the
agenda for a ministerial meeting in Istanbul,
tentatively set for some time in April. Ideally,
this could generate a new level of intervention by
the United Nations in the "post-conflict" Iraq
dreamed of by everyone (see Toward a new UN security role in
Iraq, Asia Times Online, January 27).
A number of Iranian politicians have
called for the release of five Iranian diplomats
kidnapped directly or indirectly by the United
States, as a gesture of goodwill, and it would be
prudent of the US to do so before the Baghdad
meeting. The question, of course, is what exactly
the US seeks to generate from this meeting called
for by the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki.
One of Iran's main concerns is
that the US might exploit the occasion for its
stated objective of wresting Syria away from Iran,
which is why a successful summit from the United
States' point of view does not necessarily mean
the same thing in Tehran or Damascus.
Indeed, US-Syria dialogue on the meeting's
sidelines does not bode well for Tehran, unless it
too sets aside its hesitation for direct dialogue
with Washington. A great deal of pre-meeting
communication between Tehran and Damascus is under
way and, according to an Iranian analyst in
Tehran, the goal is to make sure that they "speak
in one voice".
However, all the
participants will bring their own set of concerns.
The Syrians are alarmed by the rising tide of
refugees from Iraq - well over 700,000 - and Iran
is concerned about a discrete "de-Shi'itification"
of the Iraqi government. This in view of Maliki's
announcement of plans for a major cabinet shakeup
in the near future and the US-Iraqi army campaign
against Shi'ite militias in Baghdad and elsewhere
in Iraq.
One can speculate whether Maliki
is digging his own grave by depriving himself of a
major pillar of support in the Mehdi Army, the
militia of Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that is
in the United States' crosshairs.
Given
that the much-touted Baghdad security plan has so
far failed to protect Shi'ites from Sunni bombs, a
better approach might be one of trying to
integrate the Shi'ite militias into the plan
instead of trying (in vain) to disarm them.
This issue aside, the Baghdad meeting also
has the potential to turn into a bickering match
as the outgoing US ambassador to Baghdad, Zalmay
Khalilzad, has already said that the US intends to
raise the issue of Iran allegedly smuggling arms
into Iraq. And if Iran pushes for a timetable for
the withdrawal of US troops, the fur could fly.
Such divisive issues could overtake shared fears,
especially as US-Iran tensions already transcend
Iraq.
According to an Iranian Foreign
Ministry spokesperson, Iran is studying several
proposals to be put on the table in Baghdad,
without elaborating on them. The arduous task of
agenda-setting is a key challenge for all parties.
And the fact that it is intermixed with vigorous
public diplomacy by both Tehran and Washington
(which insists there is no policy change on Iran)
only adds to the complexity, not to mention the
timing coincidence with the escalating nuclear
row.
Concerning the latter, as a clue to
the varying voices on Iran within Saudi Arabia,
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal has
raised alarms by saying that Iran's nuclear
program has "added to the burdens" facing the
region.
And Saudi Arabia and other members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council have declared a
new policy of pursuing nuclear technology in
response to Iran's program. The specter of a
costly new arms race bedevils the oil region, and
that is yet another agenda for those searching for
an Islamist solution to the crises of the Muslim
world.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD,
is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview
Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's
Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs,
Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa
Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear
potential latent", Harvard International Review,
and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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