The Los Angeles
Times on Monday reported that a Pentagon official
told the newspaper that the United States was
working on contingency plans in case its surge
policy in Iraq fails. The plans call for a gradual
withdrawal of US troops in conjunction with
increased military training of Iraqi forces.
The contingency plan corresponds with US
Defense Secretary Robert Gates' testimony before
Congress recently, where he stated that a failure
of the surge policy would result in pulling troops
"out of harm's way". These statements demonstrate
that the US is prepared to cut its losses in Iraq
and adapt to a new
security reality in the
Middle East should it become clear that the Iraq
intervention has failed.
The likelihood of
the surge strategy succeeding is slim. It is not
the specific strategy itself that is prone to
failure. Indeed, the current strategy being
employed by General David Petraeus follows classic
counterinsurgency doctrine by protecting areas
already under US control and by clearing and
holding areas of the country that are either under
insurgent control or under insurgent influence.
In having US troops committed for longer
periods to certain towns and villages, they are
better able to maintain security in cleared areas.
Once each area is secured, these troops then
oversee the influx of development aid and projects
that should, according to counterinsurgency
theory, turn each respective population away from
the insurgency. It is a process that takes time
and resources, since the counterinsurgents must
move from section to section until the entire
country is pacified and under control.
The
problem in the case of Iraq is that it is simply
too little, too late. The increase in troops will
add about 21,500 US soldiers to the 141,000
already in the country, yet the total number of
troops is still not enough to push back the tide
of the insurgency effectively throughout Iraq.
In addition to the lack of troops, there
is also the issue of time, which will handicap any
strategy that prolongs a sizable intervention in
Iraq. As Power and Interest News Report warned in
July 2003, just a few months after the invasion,
"Iraqi militants are well aware that when dealing
with democracies, especially ones with prosperous
societies such as the United States and United
Kingdom, it is best to create high casualties in
order to weaken the resolve of the home
populations." This outcome is exactly what
occurred, and with public opinion resolutely
against continued large-scale involvement in Iraq,
there is not enough time to allow an effective
counterinsurgency strategy to work.
Therefore, if it becomes accepted that the
surge strategy has failed, the US will have to
fall back on strategic withdrawal. While that
scenario will affect its interests negatively,
there will be no other options to pursue.
Furthermore, the US will still be able to protect
its interests after it begins withdrawing troops
from Iraq. It can monitor developments on the
ground from secure bases, and work to influence
political developments in the country. Its forces
can continue to monitor the threat from al-Qaeda
and other militant Islamist groups in Iraq and
dispose of these enemies through small-scale raids
and surgical strikes.
It is true that a
withdrawal from Iraq would serve as an ideological
victory for al-Qaeda and radical Islamists,
emboldening the movement. Yet in Iraq, only a
small portion of insurgents are hardcore jihadis
who are solely in the fight to fight the US.
Instead, many of the Iraqi insurgents fighting
with al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups are doing
so purely out of their mutual short-term interests
in removing the occupiers from the country. If
Washington begins to reduce its footprint in the
state, it is likely that many Iraqi insurgents
will turn their guns inward in an attempt to seize
power in Baghdad. This, in turn, could mark a
reduction in the number of fighters involved with
al-Qaeda in Iraq.
As for the hardcore
jihadis, the US will need to continue its
anti-terrorism efforts in monitoring and tracking
these figures, and striking them when possible.
Again, the best scenario for the US would have
been for Iraq to turn into a vibrant, free-market
democracy. That outcome would have served as an
ideological defeat for al-Qaeda. Yet this outcome
appears impossible, and simply delaying withdrawal
is not a realistic strategy, nor one that serves
US interests.
When assessing the
involvement of outside powers in Iraq's
progression, the fact remains that the invasion
opened the door for Iran to achieve its interests
in the Middle East. This was a significant
side-effect of the war, and one that should have
been better anticipated by decision-makers in
Washington. That being said, while Iran can be
expected to increase its influence in Iraq even
further after a US withdrawal, it does not mean
that Iran will be able to use Iraq to increase its
regional power greatly.
The US will still
be affecting the political outcomes in Iraq and
will be employing its military to protect the
regional status quo. A strong US posture in the
region will deter Iran from making excessive
geostrategic gains in the Middle East. Washington
has already begun this strategy, seen through its
January decision to beef up its naval presence in
the Persian Gulf.
The bottom line is that
withdrawing the majority of US forces from Iraq
will not necessarily be a disaster. The failure to
achieve the original mission in Iraq has already
occurred, and the US has already suffered a
significant loss of its interests. Withdrawing
troops from the country may not make matters much
worse.
Instead, upon withdrawal the US can
begin to pursue operations more in line with its
capabilities, using technology to eliminate
potential Islamist threats and using its overt and
covert elements to work toward a stable government
in Baghdad.
As for Iran, it is already
benefiting from the situation, and a troop
withdrawal will not suddenly tilt the chessboard
in Iran's favor provided that Washington takes
adequate steps to contain the country in the
region. Regardless of what happens in Iraq, the US
can be expected to maintain its dominance in the
Middle East and work to prevent Iraq's instability
from spreading outward.
Published with
permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
tocontent@pinr.com.
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