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3 Surge and destroy in
Iraq By Michael Schwartz
If you are trying to figure out how US
President George W Bush's new strategy is
progressing, or just trying to figure out what is
happening in Iraq, here is a diagnosis and a bit
of a prognosis.
Bush has promised three
prongs to his new strategy: (1) attacking and
neutralizing Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army militia;
(2) confronting Iran; and (3) a new offensive
against Sunni insurgents.
Neutralizing the Mehdi Army:
Since 2004, cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has been the
Shi'ite the Bush administration has most loved
to
hate. Early in the war, occupation officials tried
to have him arrested and fought three large
battles (two in Najaf, one in the vast Baghdad
slum of Sadr City) in an attempt to suppress his
guerrilla militia, the Mehdi Army. Each time, he
and his forces, deeply entrenched in Sadr City,
have bounced back stronger and more popular than
ever. In its fourth manifestation, the intention
to dislodge, disrupt or destroy the Mehdi Army
appears guaranteed to fail. It is just a matter of
what sort of failure the US will choose.
As the new strategy has so far been
implemented, US military tactics seem designed to
yield a relatively modest failure, though one that
may prove indirectly responsible for significant
Iraqi civilian casualties. US troops have begun
operations in Sadrist strongholds (notably Sadr
City), which were, until late last year, US "no-go
zones".
But they are not trying to pacify
them, as they have been attempting with Sunni
neighborhoods in the capital. Instead, they are
mounting raids designed to arrest specific Sadrist
leaders, while leaving the rest of the community
alone. So far, Muqtada's men have decided to lie
low and not resist the US intrusions (though the
targeted individuals are frequently gone when the
Americans arrive, often resulting, evidently, in
the arrest of any fighting-age man in the
vicinity). There are even rumors that Muqtada is
cooperating with at least some of the arrests,
allowing the Americans to apprehend "rogue" Mehdi
Army leaders who have not been following his
orders.
Whatever the story may be, this
strategy will leave the strength of the Mehdis -
who are not just a militia but, like Hezbollah in
Lebanon, a social movement with deep and complex
ties to, and support from, poor Shi'ite
communities - unimpaired. It cannot generate
sufficient arrests to decapitate the militia; nor
can its "hit and run" tactics undermine the
political and military domination exercised by the
Sadrists in these neighborhoods. At best, it is a
kind of ongoing harassment, a symbolic denial of
Sadrist power.
It will not be surprising,
therefore, if the US escalates these raids into
larger-scale attacks on Sadrist strongholds. If
this were done, it would involve the sort of
brutal invasions currently being undertaken in
Sunni neighborhoods. Typically these attacks begin
when US troops close off an area, demand that all
women and children leave, and then initiate a
house-to-house sweep, treating the community, in
essence, as a "free-fire zone". Each house is
inspected for lurking insurgents or other
suspicious characters (sometimes simply any men of
fighting age) and searched for arms caches (which
are plentiful). Anyone who evades the invaders,
hinders their search, or offers any sort of
resistance may be considered an enemy combatant.
The level of destruction can be quite awesome.
If the US tries this in Sadrist
strongholds, the Mehdis will have no choice but to
fight back; they will not sit by while their
communities are savaged. This could trigger a
guerrilla confrontation in Shi'ite communities
much like the ferocious fighting that has been
seen in Sunni areas. The battle of Tal Afar, which
in 2005 turned parts of that city into ghost
neighborhoods and reduced a quarter of it to
rubble (still not cleared away), has been
explicitly mentioned as a "model" for these sorts
of offensives.
It is one thing to mount
such attacks against Iraq's Sunni minority. Used
against the 60% majority Shi'ite community, these
tactics would likely spur a response that would
spread around the country and prove disastrous for
US plans, which are already in tatters. The Mehdis
would certainly retaliate in other neighborhoods -
wherever, in fact, the Americans are vulnerable.
If the US military is already almost drowning in
the Sunni insurgency, imagine the predicament of
US troops should they suddenly have to fight any
significant number of Shi'ites as well.
Such a development would have two clear
consequences: an exponential growth in the strain
on an already overstretched US military, and a
dramatic increase in the use of air power to back
up embattled troops on the ground. Together, these
could result not just in massacres, but in the
rubble-ization of significant parts of Baghdad and
possibly other Iraqi cities.
If the US
military stays with its current strategy of
surgical incursions, it might escape with only a
modest defeat. If it escalates, it is courting
unmitigated disaster in the wake of unprecedented
brutality.
Confronting Iran:
There are all sorts of symptoms of the new
approach to Iran, including the (mostly trumped
up) accusations about that country supplying Iraqi
insurgents with advanced weaponry, the arrests of
accused Iranian infiltrators and their Iraqi
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