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    Middle East
     Mar 21, 2007
Page 1 of 3
Sleeping with the enemy
Interview with Fareed Sabri
By Mahan Abedin

Fareed Sabri was born in Baghdad in 1963. He joined the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) unofficially at the age of 15 and then officially at the age of 22. He left Iraq in the mid-1980s to escape a clampdown on Islamic political activists. He served on the IIP's leadership council in the late 1990s. Sabri is currently the spokesman for the IIP in the United Kingdom.

The IIP is the largest Arab Sunni organization in Iraq. It is also one of the oldest political organizations in the country, having



been founded in 1960. The IIP evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood but it has increasingly adapted to the local conditions in Iraq. The party is committed to transforming Iraq into an Islamic state.

Although fiercely opposed to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the IIP joined the Iraqi Governing Council, where it was represented by Mohsen Abdel Hamid. Subsequently, the party joined Iyad Allawi's interim government, where it had one minister - Hajim al-Hassani - who has since left the party. In November 2004, the Islamic party withdrew from Allawi's government in protest over the US-led assault on Fallujah. Having boycotted the January 2005 elections, the IIP decided to endorse the proposed Iraqi constitution just two days before voting took place in October 2005. The party has since participated fully in both the Ibrahim Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki governments.

Mahan Abedin: What is the real aim of the US "surge" in Baghdad?

Fareed Sabri: It is to create a space of security in Baghdad in order to safeguard the political structure. They want to clear Baghdad of militias and terrorist groups. Remember, 40% of Iraq's population is in Baghdad; lack of security in the capital inevitably affects every aspect of national life in Iraq.

MA: It seems that you are optimistic about this operation.

FS: Well, there are signs that this operation is having some success. Many of the militia leaders have left Baghdad; they may have even left the country. Also, some of the terrorist groups - in particular al-Qaeda - have scaled down their operations. There is some understanding between all the communities - including people in the Iraqi resistance - that this plan has to succeed, otherwise Iraq risks dissolution.

MA: In that case the Americans have won, haven't they?

FS: The Americans have manipulated the differences between Iraqis to win some respite and breathing space. I guess you could call this a tactical victory. But it would be a mistake to think the Americans are going to emerge victorious from Iraq. On the contrary, they have failed to achieve any of their original objectives. They are only winning in this case because Iraq has stopped deteriorating into complete chaos, at least for now.

MA: Do you think the Americans have engineered much of the conditions we see in Iraq?

FS: There is no doubt that they engineered some of it at the beginning. But then the situation acquired its own dynamics and evolved naturally. The Americans sparked the fire that is now consuming Iraq.

MA: You mentioned earlier that militia leaders had left Baghdad. Were you referring to the Mehdi Army?

FS: Yes, that is by far the biggest militia.

MA: Is there any truth to reports that the militia leaders - including Muqtada al-Sadr himself - have gone to Iran?

FS: We don't know where Muqtada Sadr is right now. If he is in Iraq he is lying very low.

MA: But Muqtada stayed in Iraq during the reign of the Ba'athists, even after his father was killed, allegedly by Saddam Hussein loyalists. In fact he takes pride in this and accuses other Shi'ite leaders of fleeing to the safety of Iran and the West. Do you think it is plausible he would leave Iraq for Iran during a time of crisis?

FS: During Saddam's time Muqtada was not in the spotlight, and contrary to some reports, the pre-occupation Iraqi government was not targeting Muqtada.

MA: The Americans claim the surge is targeted equally at the mostly Sunni insurgents and the mostly Shi'ite militias. Do you believe them?

FS: The problem is that the operations started before the Americans could position much of their new forces in Baghdad. Therefore, at the beginning the new operation seemed like the old ones, targeted mostly at the terrorist groups and the legitimate Iraqi resistance in western and southern Baghdad. Many of these operations were spearheaded by the Iraqi army and security forces, which tend to be dominated by ethnic and sectarian interests. But we in the Iraqi Islamic Party - as well as other political forces - talked to the Iraqi government and the Americans, and I think we have managed to sort out most of the problems. So now for the first time the Americans are setting up command posts and checkpoints in Sadr City, something that would have been unthinkable just a few months ago.

MA: Who do you mean by terrorist groups?

SF: I am referring to al-Qaeda and splinter groups from legitimate resistance organizations which do not care about civilian casualties. I mean when they target the occupation and its infrastructure in Iraq they don't seem to care if a lot of innocent Iraqis are killed in the process.

MA: And what about the Iraqi resistance - are they lying low at the moment?

SF: The Iraqi resistance have understood that many of the operations that target civilians are carried out in their name, which of course badly damages their credibility. They have also understood that the sectarian conflict is stretching the country's centrifugal forces to breaking point. Based on this understanding, the Iraqi resistance have been conducting negotiations with the Iraqi government and the Americans. It seems that the resistance

Continued 1 2


Billboarding the Iraq disaster (Mar 20, '07)

 
 



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