Page 2 of
3 Sleeping with the
enemy Interview with Fareed
Sabri By Mahan Abedin
have
reduced their operations in Baghdad and the
surrounding areas - at least for the time being.
MA: Some American military
commanders have claimed that the "surge" could
last as long as 12 months, and maybe well into
2008. Is this possible?
FS:
I don't think it is viable to sustain an operation
on this scale for such a prolonged period. I don't
envisage this operation lasting
for
more than four to five months. The Americans need
to use the improving security situation to build
something politically. Because if there are no
breakthroughs on the political front, then this
operation will fail, and the Americans will have
to come up with a new strategy.
MA: But I thought you said
this was the last chance to save Iraq.
FS: I meant this is the last
chance for the Americans to stabilize the
situation so as to save the political process
which they established in Iraq after the invasion.
I did not mean this was the last chance for the
Iraqis to work together to save the country. But
if the Americans fail again, they will have to
come up with a radically different strategy.
MA: What do you mean by a
radically different strategy?
FS: If they fail they will
probably reduce their forces, withdraw into their
bases and just let Iraqi society implode. They
will effectively be spectators to a civil war. I
don't think the Americans are going to leave Iraq
any time soon as some people envisage.
MA: Let us discuss internal
Iraqi politics. Briefly explain why the IIP
decided to join the political process in October
2005.
FS: After boycotting
much of the political process for more than two
years, we decided to fully engage because our
absence had provided the Shi'as and the Kurds with
an opportunity to monopolize political power. The
institutions of the new Iraq were being built on a
sectarian foundation and we felt that if this
process continued, Iraq - as we know it - would
simply cease to exist. Historically speaking, the
Arab Sunni community has seen itself as the
guarantor of Iraq's unity and stability - and as
the largest and most effective Arab Sunni
organization in occupied Iraq - we felt we had to
lead the way in reintegrating the Sunnis into
Iraqi politics.
MA: But you
must realize that many people - especially
Islamists both inside Iraq and outside - are
highly critical of the IIP on account of its
"cooperation" with the United States. How do you
respond to these criticisms? Are you
collaborators?
FS: First of
all, you have to live a situation before you
provide a critique. Take a look at Hamas; no one
doubts their patriotism and the sacrifices they
have made for the Palestinian people. However,
Ayman al-Zawahiri (who is not in occupied
Palestine) recently condemned Hamas for its
compromises. The same applies to our situation.
People who live in London, Amman or Cairo have no
right to criticize the Iraqis, since they are not
living the current Iraqi experience, which many
would describe as hellish.
MA: Aside from the
explanations you gave earlier, how do you justify
your cooperation with a political system that has
emerged from what many would consider an illegal
invasion?
FS: First of all,
70% of the Iraqi population are Shi'as, Kurds,
Turkomans or from other ethnic and religious
groups. So 70% of the population has joined the
political process. We can't have a situation where
this 70% decides the fate of the other 30%.
Second, we did not bring the occupation to Iraq.
In fact, our party was the most vocal force
against the sanctions and the invasion and
occupation of 2003. We tried hard to prevent the
illegal invasion of our country. But once it
became a reality and once we saw how other groups
were exploiting this reality, we had to change our
strategy to save both our community and our
country. Third, the struggle against the
occupation continues. This is not a purely
military struggle; it has political,
socio-cultural, media and propaganda dimensions as
well.
MA: On that point, how
can you champion the cause of the Iraqi resistance
while simultaneously participating in the
political process?
FS: Well,
it can be awkward at times! But as I said, this
struggle has several dimensions and we have to
fully engage in all of them.
MA: But how can you be part
of a government while at the same time fighting
it?
FS: We have not been
fighting the government. We are trying to reform
the government from the inside. The foundations of
this government were built in our absence, and we
are still suffering the acute consequences of
this. But our fight against the occupation
continues.
MA: From the IIP
point of view, has Prime Minister Maliki been a
failure?
FS: In the first
few months, his government was certainly heading
for a massive failure. Like the previous
post-Saddam governments, it seemed to be primarily
motivated by the politics of revenge and
sectarianism. However, recently Maliki has taken
strong steps to correct his earlier mistakes. We
are optimistic about the near future.
MA: What do you make of
Maliki's recent visit to Ramadi?
FS: This is an important
step and indicates that Maliki is reaching out to
different groups and factions in Iraqi society. He
has to undertake these trips to show that he is
the prime minister of all Iraqis and is not
motivated by narrow ethnic or sectarian interests.
MA: But if Maliki failed,
what would be the alternative?
FS: If this government
fails, the entire political process would need to
be rebuilt from scratch. The problem with the
post-invasion political process is that it is
structurally flawed. It was built upon a set of
false information and assumptions.
MA: Do you want it to fail?
FS: No, because this process
will be very long and painful. It may
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