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2 Iraq's good terrorists, bad
terrorists By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Aides at the office of Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recently said that
"people at the US Embassy" had informed them that
the United States will withdraw support from the
Iraqi premier if benchmarks are not met by June 3.
Only Zalmay Khalilzad, the outgoing US
ambassador, could have delivered such a message.
During his 21-month tenure in Iraq, Khalilzad has
tried to get Maliki to court Iraq's Sunnis and
bring
them
into the political process. Courting them, showing
them respect and making them share power, he has
argued, would also make them share in
responsibility for a stable Iraq, and use their
influence to curb or end the Sunni insurgency.
Neither Khalilzad nor Maliki has been able
to bring order or stability to Iraq. The Baghdad
security plan, which started in February, was
their brainchild. When Khalilzad arrived in Iraq,
the death toll of US troops stood at 1,324. It has
now reached 3,234. Over the past 12 months, nearly
35,000 Iraqis have been killed, at a rate of about
100 per day. More testimony of their failure was a
suicide bombing this weekend in which 47 people at
a Baghdad police station were killed.
Not
only have security conditions deteriorated in the
Khalilzad-Maliki era, so have social and
humanitarian conditions. According to research by
Dr Nadje al-Ali of the University of Exeter in
England, "Everyday survival is a priority in a
context where lack of security goes side-by-side
with incredibly difficult living conditions." She
refers to electricity shortages, a lack of clean
drinking water, malfunctioning sanitation systems
and a deteriorating health system. Iraq has also
witnessed a rise in vaccine-preventable diseases,
and the mortality rate for children under five,
which was 5% in 1990 under Saddam Hussein, is now
12.5%.
But neither US nor Iraqi officials
admit to any failure or take blame for this chaos.
Instead, they speak of ambitious security plans
that to date have not resulted in any material
progress for ordinary Iraqis. The baseless
optimistic talk continues at every level of Iraqi
officialdom. Defense Minister Abdul-Qadir
al-Ubeidi has said that Iraqi troops are "ready"
to take control of Basra from the British in May,
four months ahead of the scheduled date.
According to a report by the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO), more than US$15
billion has been spent on training the Iraqi army,
and the Pentagon says it has trained and equipped
more than 327,000 Iraqi troops. Contrary to the
defense minister's statement, however, the GAO
report adds, "While the Iraqi security forces are
increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations
in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable
to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq."
Saad Yusuf al-Matlabi, a senior official
at the Ministry of State for National Dialogue,
said government efforts to reconcile with the
insurgents "are close to finalization". Sunni Vice
President Tarek al-Hashemi has called for renewed
talks with insurgents from the Sunni community,
saying that everyone is welcome, except al-Qaeda.
He stressed "everyone" in reference to the
armed Shi'ite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, who are
accused of fighting Iraq's Sunnis since February
2006. Hashemi has every reason to be serious about
his call. On Friday, his colleague, Salam
al-Zubaie, a deputy prime minister, was badly
wounded in a suicide attack.
The
Sunni-Shi'ite divide - and more In addition
to Sunni-Shi'ite dialogue, however, there should
be Sunni-Sunni and Shi'ite-Shi'ite dialogue.
Reference to the Sunnis and Shi'ites as cohesive
groups fighting one another is a great
misinterpretation of Iraqi affairs.
The
Sunnis have two fronts that are starting to combat
each other. One comprises tribal leaders and
Ba'athists loyal to Saddam. The other is headed by
al-Qaeda. A third Sunni party actually operates in
Iraq, making use of the chaos to carrying out
attacks against both Shi'ites, fellow Sunnis and
Americans, and blaming it on one of other Sunni
groups.
The same applies to the Shi'ites.
One front is headed by Muqtada's Mehdi Army, the
other by the Badr Organization, the armed wing of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI). They have a common enemy in
fundamentalist Sunnis but often quarrel among
themselves over supremacy in Shi'ite politics.
The Mehdi Army is also at blows with the
Fadila Party, a smaller Shi'ite party that
recently split from the ruling United Iraqi
Alliance that is headed by the SCIRI. Last
Thursday, Sadrists in Basra stormed the Fadila
Party headquarters, then invaded the Fadila-led
Electricity Office, expelling its officials and
arresting its director because he had punished an
employee who is a member of the Mehdi Army.
The Mehdi Army, which is close to Maliki,
is seemingly at odds with everybody. Its leaders
are hated by the Sunnis, the Americans, rival
Shi'ites, the Kurds and even the Iranians because
they object to the increasingly influential role
of Tehran in Iraqi politics.
Sunni Speaker
of Parliament Mahmud al-Mashadani described them
as a threat to Iraqi security, no less serious
than al-Qaeda, saying they were responsible for
the sectarian war that is raging in Iraq. The
Sadrists responded with an official declaration
that Mashadani no longer differentiates between
resistance and terrorism.
The reality,
however, is that Maliki, more than Mashadani, no
longer differentiates between resistance and
terrorism (which is
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