Iran prepared to fight, if
necessary By Ian Bremmer
The intensified military buildup in the
Persian Gulf poses dangers for escalation, both
inadvertent and deliberate. Last week's Iranian
decision to surround a British naval vessel and
seize 15 sailors and marines directly increases
tensions in the Iran conflict (around both the
nuclear issue and Iran's intervention in Iraq).
It's possible, though unlikely, that the
British sailors were inadvertently in Iranian
territory; though certainly the patrols around
Iraqi offshore terminals and shipping lanes
routinely bring British naval vessels right to the
edge of Iranian territorial waters. (The Iraqi sea
lane is quite narrow in the area of the conflict, with
some
200 meters of navigable water in Iraqi territory.)
Whatever the case, the well-orchestrated
Iranian "surround and seizure" had been planned
for some time. It strikes me as a response to the
United States holding Iranian diplomats taken in
Irbil several months ago - a deliberate and
carefully calibrated escalation, with very limited
risk for an outbreak of hostilities. Hence the
extraordinary and high-level Iranian military
presence quickly marshaled to the scene.
The timing of the event was surely
intentional, a provocation right before the United
Nations Security Council was to vote on further
sanctions against Iran. The decision could only
have been made with the approval of Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad would not have been allowed to take
the lead on such a decision.
The move
further confirms that Tehran is not looking for a
"diplomatic out". Rather, it is sending a message
to the international community that Iran is
prepared for a fight if necessary and that its
only remaining options are increasingly
unpalatable.
The decision to take British
(rather than American) hostages suggests that
Tehran does not intend to release them immediately
(though certainly they will remain safe and well
looked after), but rather to use them as leverage
for negotiations with British diplomats. The lack
of direct channels of negotiations between Iran
and the United States would have precluded this
option with US soldiers and could have led to
significant retaliation against Iran.
The
most likely next step is for Iran to demand the
release of its captured diplomats, and conceivably
of its government property, in Iraqi territory.
That's an unlikely outcome. The incident has the
capacity to cool significantly British willingness
to support efforts at continued negotiations with
Iran on the nuclear conflict, as well as end
Iranian participation in the broader "contact
group" with the United States and Britain (among
others) on Iraq.
Both Britain and the US
will now step up their military presence along the
edge of Iran's territorial waters, with more
frequent and larger-scale patrols. That will
heighten the risk of military miscues but reduce
the likelihood of any surprise Iranian naval
presence.
If anything, the US and Britain
took advantage of the Iranian move to push up the
vote on a second resolution against Iran at the
Security Council. The sanctions remain extremely
limited. And as I've suggested above, they will
have no effect on Iranian decision-making. Still,
it's worth noting that Khamenei last week
expressed Iranian intentions to proceed with
"illegal" nuclear activities after any further
"illegal" sanctions enacted against Iran.
The importance of that statement, given
International Atomic Energy Agency documentation
that Iran's nuclear program is progressing, is
that it provides greater justification for broader
provocative moves against the Islamic Republic and
plays into the Israeli argument for the need for
an attack.
I still see Israeli security
concerns as the most significant driver of any
likely military action. A series of Israeli war
drills last week, including simulated missile
attacks on Israeli urban centers and on the main
Tel Aviv power station, are particularly
noteworthy.
A final point. The US Congress
continues to push a broad spectrum of legislation
against Iran, with strong bipartisan support. The
most recent proposal from the Senate brings Russia
into the fray, threatening to end World Trade
Organization cooperation with any country found to
be engaging in rather ill-defined "nuclear
cooperation" with Iran.
Like other similar
measures in Congress, this one seems likely to
pass - if in amended form. At the least, it
threatens one of the few remaining areas of strong
US-Russian collaboration - civilian nuclear
programs to purchase spent Russian nuclear fuel.
In the January/February issue of The
National Interest, I wrote:
The United States is going to face a
number of challenges and disappointments over
the next two years - Iran, Iraq, North Korea,
China and Russia, among others. The first
reaction of many US politicians is to be
confrontational. Easing tensions with rogue
states and with countries perceived to be
opposing US policies will not win the president
points with those who prefer a muscular
strategy. But decisions need to be made on the
basis of long-term US interests, not short-term
sound bites.
Good advice to be
following now.
Ian Bremmer, a
contributing editor to The National Interest, is
president of the Eurasia Group.
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