WASHINGTON - As the dispute over Iran's
seizure of British sailors continues to twist and
turn, what may have been an isolated incident at
the outset is quickly developing into yet another
move in the geopolitical chess game between the
West and Iran.
The incident took place on
March 23 in a disputed waterway between Iraq and
Iran. Fifteen British sailors and marines were
detained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and
after a few short days of quiet diplomacy, both
the British and Iranian governments resorted to
fighting their cases in public - a move
that
significantly reduces the chance of a quick and
smooth resolution to the dispute.
From the
outset, the British authorities have insisted
categorically that the sailors were in Iraqi and
not Iranian waters. Last Wednesday, the British
produced Global Positioning System coordinates to
support their claim, even though the coordinates
were from a helicopter that London says hovered
over the Indian ship that the sailors had
inspected, and not the GPS coordinates of the
sailors themselves.
Iran was quick to
produce its own evidence. The GPS unit of one of
the British sailors, confiscated by the Iranian
authorities, showed that the British were not only
in Iranian waters at the time of the incident, but
that they had crossed over into Iranian waters on
five earlier occasions as well, according to
Tehran.
Whether the British were in
Iranian waters or not - and whether the Iranians
believe the British were in Iranian waters or not
- Tehran seems to be using the incident to regain
leverage over the West in the confrontation over
its nuclear program and its rising power and
influence in the Middle East.
Both Iran
and the US have come to recognize that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to avoid some sort
of diplomatic confrontation between them. This is
particularly problematic for the administration of
US President George W Bush, which for several
years has adamantly opposed the idea of talking to
Tehran.
The sudden realization of the
near-impossibility to avoid real diplomacy caused
much anxiety in the Bush administration earlier
this year. Washington has no shortage of
contingency war plans with Iran - but no
contingency plans for diplomacy, and consequently
no preparation for such negotiations.
So
when the Iraq Study Group (ISG) and Congress
pushed the White House to recognize the need for
diplomacy with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran,
the administration balked. It lacked leverage to
negotiate with Iran, it said.
"Frankly,
right at this moment there's really nothing the
Iranians want from us, and so in any negotiation
right now we would be the supplicant," Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates explained. "The only
reason to talk to us would be to extract a price,
and that's not diplomacy, that's extortion."
If the US lacked leverage over Iran, the
answer lay in gaining that leverage. Instead of
accepting the ISG's recommendation to open talks
with Iran, the Bush White House sought to increase
the pressure on Iran to gain leverage - in any way
possible.
On December 24, US troops
arrested several Iranian officials in Iraq - of
whom at least two were diplomats. A few weeks
later, an office the Iranians say was a consulate
in Iraqi Kurdistan was raided. Another five
Iranians were detained there. They are still held
by the US, and Tehran has had no access to them.
In addition, Ali Reza Asgari, a senior
Iranian official who served in the cabinet of
former president Mohammad Khatami, went missing in
Turkey in February. His family and authorities in
Tehran say he was kidnapped by the Israelis. The
US says he defected.
Whether the arrested
Iranians were diplomats or not and whether Asgari
defected or was kidnapped, in two short months the
detentions of the Iranians, the imposition of
financial sanctions on Iran, and the passing of
two United Nations Security Council Resolutions
have seemingly provided the US with the leverage
it was seeking. Washington is suddenly feeling
confident and is hinting a vague willingness to
talk to Tehran from its perceived position of
strength.
In this context, Iran's holding
of the British sailors may serve as a signal to
Washington that if seizing personnel from the
other side is fair game for the sake of gaining
leverage, then Iran can also play that game.
Rather than an act of desperation
resulting from the onslaught of Western pressure,
as some in Washington have interpreted Iran's
actions, the arrest of the British sailors may
have been a calculated measure to fight fire with
fire - but without targeting the US directly
(which surely would have caused things to escalate
out of control).
The revelation of what
Tehran says is the second letter by the sole
female sailor among the British, Faye Turney,
seems to support this interpretation. The letter
concludes with a call by Turney for British troops
to leave Iraq. "Isn't it time for us to start
withdrawing our forces from Iraq and let them
determine their own future?" it said.
The
letter's linking of the seizure of the sailors
with the larger political disputes in the region
lends support to the interpretation that Iran is -
at least at this stage of the dispute - seeking to
regain the leverage it lost when the US began
targeting Iranian officials in Iraq.
Iran
may feel justified in responding to Washington's
pressure tactics by targeting British troops in
the narrow waterway between Iraq and Iran. But
it's difficult to see an end to this duel for
leverage. If Iran gets the upper hand, Washington
may further raise the stakes and embark on a new
set of provocative actions. And if Washington
regains the edge over Iran, chances are that
Tehran will respond in kind.
As each side
increases the stakes in an effort to gain the
upper hand in a potential future negotiation,
tensions in the region increase, as does the risk
for an uncontrollable escalation. Rather than
improving their negotiation positions, both sides
are closing the diplomatic window through this
risky game of one-upmanship.
Dr
Trita Parsi is the author of Treacherous
Alliances: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and
the United States (Yale University Press,
2007). He is also president of the National
Iranian American Council (www.niacouncil.org).
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