When a readiness 'crisis' is a real
crisis By David Isenberg
Curiously enough, defining military
readiness, or the lack thereof, is more difficult
than one might think. For example, during the US
administration of president Bill Clinton,
Republican opponents tried very hard to convince
the public that the military was in the midst of a
grave "readiness crisis". In reality, the charges
were as dubious and politically motivated as were
the Cold War-era bomber and missile "gaps".
Most of the so-called readiness
deficiencies in late 1994 and early 1995 were
confined to a few military units that had already
been
earmarked for demobilization.
The remaining problems largely reflected temporary
cash-flow difficulties arising from unanticipated
missions in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. Now it is
increasingly apparent that the US military really
is in trouble, but even the new Democratic
Congress has yet to recognize all the trouble
signs.
In fairness, defining readiness is
far easier than measuring it, an inherently
subjective process. The US Government
Accountability Office reported in 2003 that since
1998, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made
some progress in improving readiness reporting,
particularly at the unit level, but some issues
remain. For example, DOD uses measures that vary
10 percentage points or more to determine
readiness ratings and often does not report the
precise measurements outside the department.
DOD now includes more information in its
Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress. But
quality issues remain in that the reports do not
specifically describe readiness problems, their
effect on readiness, or remedial actions to
correct problems. Nor do the reports contain
information about funding programmed to address
specific remedial actions.
One of the
newest and unreported signs of unreadiness
involves something called C-ratings. Historically,
readiness of US military forces at the unit level
has been measured using the Status of Resources
and Training System. Under SORTS, units report
their overall readiness status as well as the
status of four resource areas (personnel,
equipment and supplies on hand, equipment
condition, and training). These are readiness
indicators based on the comparison of the
resources that units have with the levels
prescribed for wartime. The lower the number, the
higher the state of readiness.
The
readiness status of a unit is reported by
assigning capability, or "C", ratings as follows:
C-1 Unit can undertake the full wartime
missions for which it is organized or designed.
C-2 Unit can undertake the bulk of its wartime
missions.
C-3 Unit can undertake major portions of its
wartime missions.
C-4 Unit requires additional resources and/or
training to undertake its wartime missions, but if
the situation dictates, it may be required to
undertake portions of the missions with resources
on hand.
C-5 Unit is undergoing a service-directed
resource change and is not prepared to undertake
its wartime missions.
It has not been
widely publicized that US units being deployed to
Iraq that are rated at C-3/4 levels are being
elevated to C-1/2 after only a couple of weeks in
Kuwait, the functional equivalent of a military
miracle.
Last December, CQ Weekly reported
that US Army planning assumes that 37 of its 70
combat brigades are ready for deployment under its
C-1-to-C-5 rating system. But the article noted,
"A recent army document showed that all combat
brigades [including both army and reserve] in the
United States, even those next to deploy, are
unready."
According to a briefing chart,
19 brigades that were next to be deployed were
assumed to be at a C-1 or C-2 level, when they
were actually C-3 or C-4.
It should take
several months for a low-readiness unit to become
ready for any combat. According to Winslow
Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform
Project at the Center for Defense Information in
Washington, "The entire CONUS [Continental US]
Army is in the crapper."
It is no great
secret why US military units are increasingly
unready. All their problems are the consequence of
overuse. Last month the Center for American
Progress in Washington released a report detailing
that overuse. It found that of the army's 44
combat brigades, all but the one permanently based
in South Korea have been deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan.
Of those 43 brigades, 12 have
been deployed once; 20 have been deployed twice;
nine have been deployed three times; and two have
been deployed four times. It also found that army
readiness doctrine mandates that after a unit is
deployed for one year, it should receive one year
of recuperation followed by a year of training
before being redeployed to theater.
Because of the US administration's
mismanagement, the army has been forced to ignore
its own guidelines. Of the 43 brigades deployed to
Iraq or Afghanistan, nine have been deployed one
year or less at home and 25 have been deployed
with less than two years at home.
On
Monday, the Pentagon announced additional major
units scheduled to deploy to Iraq. These include
the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, 1st Armored
Division Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division
Headquarters, and the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain
Division. The last has already been deployed three
times to Iraq or Afghanistan. It has also,
contrary to army policy, been deployed with less
than two years at home since its previous tour.
Last June the army tacitly confirmed the
readiness problem, when a memorandum circulated on
Capitol Hill by the House Armed Services
Subcommittee chairman, Republican Congressman Joel
Hefley, suggested the army has already deployed
units to Iraq and Afghanistan officially rated at
the lowest levels of readiness.
An army
spokesman said that although some units arrive in
theater at less than top preparedness, they
receive additional equipment and training before
undertaking missions. In the Persian Gulf, for
example, army units typically fall in on equipment
in Kuwait and undergo weeks of additional training
there before moving into Iraq.
According
to retired army Colonel Doug Macgregor, "Nobody is
going to give you a truthful account. Many of the
returning units have soldiers who are
psychologically traumatized, previously wounded,
or newly recruited. And many of those recruited
are of a quality that would not have been taken
back before 2003."
Macgregor says it is
silly to think US military units can upgrade their
readiness from C-3 or C-4 to C-2 or C-1 levels
after only a couple or few additional weeks of
training in Kuwait before arriving in Iraq.
According to Macgregor, a decorated combat
veteran and now an independent businessman, "We
are at an all-time low in soldier and unit
readiness in the army." Why isn't this a topic of
discussion? He thinks the reason is that there is
enormous pressure on generals to say things are
going well. "How much truth has been heard on the
military side since the start of the war? There is
no real accountability on the military side."
David Isenberg is a senior
research analyst at the British American Security
Information Council, a member of the Coalition for
a Realistic Foreign Policy, a research fellow at
the Independent Institute, and an adviser to the
Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for
Defense Information, Washington. These views are
his own.
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