Page 1 of
3 Shi'ite power bloc in Iraq takes
shape By Babak Rahimi
One of the oddest developments in the
recent history of Iraq has been the growing
connection between the young firebrand cleric,
Muqtada al-Sadr, and the highest-ranking Shi'ite
cleric, Ayatollah Ali Sistani. In 2003, the
erratic politics of Muqtada, with his mix of Arab
nationalism and militant chiliastic ideology, was
considered eventually to collide with Sistani's
quietist form of Shi'ism, which advocates that
clerics should maintain a clear distance from
day-to-day state politics.
Since 2004,
however, an unlikely alliance has gradually taken
form between the former adversaries, which is
bound to reshape
Iraqi
Shi'ite politics in the years to come. By and
large, the relationship between the two clerics
has been one of asymmetrical partnership, in which
Sistani plays the superior partner, guiding the
younger and less experienced Muqtada in his quest
for becoming a legitimate leader of the Iraqi
Shi'ite community.
In doing so, Sistani
has tried to tame Muqtada by bringing him into the
mainstream Najaf establishment to form a united
Shi'ite front against extremist Sunnis and the
United States. In return, Muqtada, who lacks
religious credentials, has been using Sistani's
support to legitimize his religious authority and
expand his influence in southern Iraq. The
relationship is mutually opportunistic, but also
pragmatic, since the two clerics have not been
able to ignore each other.
In broad terms,
such an alliance signals two significant changes:
first, a dramatic shift in the balance of power in
Shi'ite Iraq in terms of the revival of the Hawza,
as a cluster of seminaries and religious scholarly
institutions in Najaf, and second, an increase of
tension between Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq.
Moreover, the growing alliance between
Muqtada and Sistani also underlines another vital
feature tied to the Shi'ite ascendancy in Iraq:
the rise of Iran as a regional power. Iran has
been playing a crucial role in the shaping of
Muqtada-Sistani relations, since any alliance
between Shi'ite leaders is intertwined with the
Qom-Tehran nexus and Iranian politics in the
Greater Middle East.
Against the Najaf
Hawza: 2003-04 Since the US-led invasion of
Iraq, the Sadrist movement, mainly dominated by
Muqtada, has emerged as one of the most populist
and grassroots currents in the post-Ba'athist era.
Yet the militant movement has also posed the most
serious threat to clerical orthodoxy and its
conservative and quietist tradition, best embodied
by Sistani.
Much of the "heterodoxy" of
the Sadrist movement lies in its early (2003-04)
rejection of clerical monopoly, led by some young
clerical students and followers of Muqtada who
accused Sistani of transforming the shrine city of
Najaf into a "sleeping house of learning". The
heretical tendencies of the Sadrist movement
entailed rejecting the religious authority of a
living, high-ranking cleric in favor of the
rulings of a deceased marja (religious
scholar), a blasphemous idea according to the
orthodox thinking that Sistani and his Hawza
represent.
Yet there is also the factor of
Arab nationalism. Ideologically, the Sadrists are
Arab nationalists and resent the presence of any
non-Arab cleric in Iraq, especially those of
Iranian descent, such as Sistani, who have been
residing in the shrine-cities for decades.
The origin of the movement dates to the
early 1990s, when ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq
al-Sadr, the father of Muqtada, led an
anti-quietist campaign by accusing Sistani and
other leading clerics in Najaf of abandoning
ordinary people and allowing Ba'athist oppression
to take place. [1] When Muqtada emerged as the
leading figure in the movement four years after
the assassination of his father by Saddam
Hussein's regime in 1999, he continued his
father's legacy and expanded his anti-quietist
movement in the slums of Baghdad and southern
Iraq.
In spring 2003, Muqtada refused to
accept Sistani's leadership and declined his
invitations for a meeting. [2] Tensions between
the outspoken Muqtada and the quietist Sistani
were at their highest when the cleric followers of
Muqtada criticized the grand ayatollah for his
Iranian origin and even urged him and other
quietist clerics to leave Iraq. [3] The conflict
between Muqtada and Sistani culminated in the
August 2004 showdown between the Mehdi Army and US
troops in Najaf, when Sistani saw the clash as an
opportunity for the eradication of his young
rival. [4]
Nevertheless, eventually
Sistani decided to intervene and offer protection
to Muqtada and his followers. After three weeks of
intense fighting between the Mehdi Army and US and
Iraqi forces around the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf,
Sistani was finally able to broker a ceasefire
deal with Muqtada in late August 2004. [5]
Although his change of position was partly aimed
at ending the destruction of the shrine complex
and protecting Najaf's inhabitants, Sistani saw
the Mehdi Army as a major asset in dealing with
anti-Shi'ite Sunni groups and US forces in Iraq.
Because of the encouragement from Hezbollah and
Tehran, the agreement signaled an opportunity to
tame Muqtada and his Mehdi Army, militarily
weakened by US forces, by bringing his troops
closer to the mainstream Shi'ite establishment.
[6]
Post-2005 elections and the Iran
factor The 2004 deal signaled a tipping
point in Muqtada-Sistani relations, bringing the
two leaders closer together with the aim of
advancing Shi'ite interests in the democratic
arena.
Despite a period of tension with
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI) and the Badr Organization, the
largest Shi'ite militia that backed Sistani,
Muqtada finally joined forces with a Shi'ite-led
political party approved by Sistani, the United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), in the December 2005
elections. The move advanced a new stage in
Muqtada-Sistani relations, which underlined how
the two clerics saw the importance of a
centralized democratic government as a way to
solidify Shi'ite power in a country with a long
history of Sunni dominance.
Since 2004,
Muqtada and Sistani have met a number of times to
discuss issues related to elections, including a
major meeting in mid-September 2004 that included
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Muqtada's main rival. [7] In
early September 2004, in a potentially explosive
incident, Sistani helped Muqtada by asking the
Iraqi police to end the siege of his office in
Najaf. [8] Sistani's growing relations with
Muqtada continued to evolve when he appealed to
Abdul al-Saheb-e al-Khoei to delay the search for
his slain brother, Sayyid Abdul Majid al-Khoei,
who was allegedly murdered by Muqtada's followers
in 2003. [9] This was a major move by Sistani,
since it basically excused Muqtada of any
wrongdoing in the case of Khoei's murder.
After the January and December 2005
elections, Sistani refused to call for the
disarming of the Mehdi militia. This decision was
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
