Page 3 of
3 Shi'ite power bloc in Iraq takes
shape By Babak Rahimi
recognized Fayadh as one of his
most trusted and loved students, and it is likely
that Sistani will soon appoint him as his
successor. As a successor, Fayadh is more
likely to deal directly with the United States and
get involved in the transition process; however,
he is also likely to antagonize the Sadrist
nationalists, who view him as an Afghan foreigner
who should not have a say in Iraq's
politics. Two other
Najaf-based clerics, Grand Ayatollahs Bashir
Hussein al-Najafi and Muhammad Said Hakim, are
also potential candidates. It is unlikely that
they will be the successors, however, because they
are considered lesser scholars than Fayadh, who is
highly respected by many Shi'ite Iraqis,
particularly by the tribal chieftains of Najaf.
With the vacuum of authority in Najaf, new
conflicts between Shi'ite groups will certainly
come to light, especially in the oil-rich province
of Basra, where the SCIRI and the Sadrists,
especially the Fadhila Party, compete for
territorial control.
With spawned
rivalries among various Shi'ite groups (and
subgroups), Iraq may also see an increase of
sectarian conflict as anti-Shi'ite Salafi groups
begin to increase their attacks on Shi'ites with
the aim of creating more chaos in a community
devoid of a central religious authority.
Tehran can also extend its religious
network in Najaf to establish the authority of
Khamenei in the Najaf Hawza. [18] Khamenei's
increase of influence in southern Iraq could
seriously jeopardize the independence of the
Hawza. These scenarios could also cause major
problems for a transitional government in Baghdad
that is seeking to establish authority in southern
Iraq.
Therefore, what are the implications
of a Muqtada-Sistani partnership? First, the US
should be aware of the unpredictable politics of
the Shi'ite community. The swing of alliances
merits serious attention, despite the fact that
sectarian identity will play a central role in
intra-Shi'ite relations in years to come.
Second, the US should also recognize the
enduring authority of the Najaf Hawza and its
sphere of influence in Shi'ite Iraq. This
influence is so significant that even the defiant
Muqtada failed to challenge the establishment, let
alone muster enough support to lead the Shi'ite
community among the poor and the youth for his
anti-occupation and nationalist image.
It
was the common consensus in the academic and
policy communities that after the Samarra bombing
last year, Sistani had become a marginal figure.
Despite his brief diminishing influence as a
result of the rise of sectarian tensions, Sistani
now appears to be back with even greater
authority. He is supported by centuries of
traditional authority and backed by an extensive
financial and religious network that reaches
beyond Iraq and Iran.
Both Tehran and
Muqtada know that Sistani should not be ignored.
The US should certainly do the same.
Babak Rahimi received a PhD from
the European University Institute, Florence,
Italy. Rahimi has also studied at the University
of Nottingham and London School of Economics and
Political Science. He was a senior fellow at the
United States Institute of Peace from 2005-06,
where he conducted research on Ayatollah Ali
Sistani and Shi'ite politics in post-Ba'athist
Iraq. He is currently an assistant professor at
the department of literature, program for the
study of religion, University of California, San
Diego.
Notes 1.
International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Muqtada
al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabilizer?", pp 3-6. 2.
Ibid. 3. Author interview with Sistani
representative, Najaf, Iraq, August 7, 2005. 4.
Vali Nasr, The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts
within Islam Will Shape the Future, New York:
Norton, 2006, p 194. 5. According to Sistani's
representative in Najaf, Hamed Khafaf, the deal
also included the disarming of the Mehdi Army,
Baztab, "Moafeqat-e Moqtada va Dowlat-e Moaqat ba
Pishnahade Ayatollah al-Sistani", September 3,
2004. The disarmament of the militia was never
fully enforced. 6. Author interview with a
Sistani representative, Najaf, Iraq, August 7,
2005. See also Vali Nasr, p 194. 7. Baztab,
"Jalas-e Moshtarak-e Hakim va Moqtada al-Sadr ba
Ayatollah al-Sistani", September 15, 2004. 8.
Ibid. 9. The reason behind this call was mainly
to show Shi'ite solidarity in the January 2005
elections. See Baztab, "Inetaf-e Marjayat Shi'I
dar Moqableh Al-Sadriha baraye Vahdat-e Shiaan-e
dar entekhabat", November 12, 2004. 10.
Baztab, "Didar-e Moqtada al-Sadr va Ayatollah
al-Sistani", March 29, 2005. 11. Hussain
al-Kabi, "Al-Sadr Yahath Mowaqf al-tiyar al-Sadri
beshan al-Hukumat wa al-barleman ma al-Sistani",
Al-Sabaah, January 9, 2007. 12. Sistani is
reported to have advised Muqtada the following:
"You have two options: bear the consequences, on
you and the Shi'ites in general, or withdraw into
a corner," Rod Nordland, "Silence of the
Sadrists", March 12, 2007, Newsweek, p 38. 13.
Reported by Diyar al-Umari on Al-Arabiya TV,
February 19, 2007. 14. Author interview with a
seminary student of Sistani in Qom, Iran, December
23, 2005. 15. Abdul al-Rahim Aghiqi
Bakhshayeshi, Faqihe Varasteh, Qom: Novid Islam:
2003, p 202. 16. Baztab, "Ayatollah
al-Sistani: Az Amalkard Ahmadinejad Ulgo Begirid",
November 11, 2006. 17. The case of Sadrist and
SCIRI relations since 2003 merits serious
attention. 18. The control of Najaf has been
one of the primary objectives of the Iranian
government in Iraq since the fall of Saddam's
regime in 2003. In the past four years, Khamenei
has established a center in Najaf, which pays the
highest salary to the seminary students in the
city. The extent of Tehran's influence in Najaf,
however, is still limited, as Sistani and three
other high-ranking clerics remain the most revered
and influential religious authorities in the
shrine city.
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