Page 2 of
2 BOOK REVIEW Close, but not too
close China and Iran by
John Garver
weighed on policymakers in Beijing
while considering association with Iran. A much
more sober assessment of China's commitment ensued
in Iran.
Exchanges resumed after a hiatus
in 1999 and regained their anti-hegemonic tone
with the advent of the George W Bush
administration in the US. Beijing disapproved of
Iran's inclusion in the "axis of evil", but
cautiously avoided terming its relationship
with
Tehran "strategic". Garver remarks that for China,
"The costs of open military links with Iran are
greater than for links with Pakistan. China might
go to war to uphold Pakistan, but not for Iran" (p
127).
Iran's propensity to dabble in the
affairs of China's Muslim communities, especially
in restive Xinjiang, was an additional factor
dissuading excessive closeness. Notwithstanding
Chinese warnings, Iranian diplomatic missions and
Islamic foundations tried recruiting several dozen
Chinese Muslims for study in Qom, and these
suspicious activities were closely monitored by
Chinese intelligence.
From 1985 to 1997,
China was Iran's main nuclear partner,
transferring designs, equipment and fissile
material. The domestic clout of China's nuclear
industry as well as a strategic bid to divert the
US away from East Asia prompted the clandestine
nuclear collaboration with Iran. In 1997, the US
nudged China away from nuclear commerce with Iran
in return for civilian nuclear cooperation between
Washington and Beijing. Interestingly, "while
capitulating to US demands regarding Iran, Beijing
rejected similar demands regarding Pakistan" (p
155).
In 2004, China refused to
accommodate Iran's request to use its veto in the
United Nations Security Council to deter
US-sponsored anti-Tehran resolutions. In 2006 and
2007, China voted in favor of sanctions on Iran at
the UN. Garver notes that "Beijing was willing to
support Pakistan's nuclear challenge to India, but
not Iran's nuclear challenge to the US. Pakistan
plays a geopolitical role in Chinese strategy not
played by Iran" (p 233).
Chinese military
aid to Iran in advanced conventional weapons has
been consistent, offsetting the loss of political
capital suffered by termination of nuclear deals
in 1997. Beijing is today Tehran's third-largest
military supplier, with a niche in ballistic
missiles and naval-warfare weaponry. From the
mid-1990s, China also developed Iran's dual-use
chemical facilities as "a practical demonstration
to the Americans that they did not rule the world"
(p 193).
Beijing tenaciously rebutted US
efforts to restrict this arms trade because it was
being paid for in Iranian oil, and since "a
militarily strong Iran served China's interests by
constraining the US" (p 198). China did not join
the Missile Technology Control Regime until 2003,
as membership would cut short the arms trade with
Iran. Beijing "gives up no more than is absolutely
necessary and always finds alternative ways of
being useful to Tehran" (p 233).
Sino-Iranian entente gives Beijing
leverage with Washington over Taiwan. "If the US
does not like China's relations with Iran, it will
have to pay heftily to end that cooperation" (p
200). For several years, Chinese representatives
have reasserted the Iran-Taiwan linkage as a
bargaining chip with Washington.
Growing
Chinese worries about energy security in the 1990s
are crucial in maintaining strong ties with Iran.
By 2001, Tehran was Beijing's largest supplier of
crude oil. In the event of a US-China war over
Taiwan, Beijing counts on steady oil flows from
Tehran, which is expected to defy US threats. As a
way of locking in Iranian oil supply and expanding
Chinese capital-good exports to Iran, Beijing has
now become a major investor in Iran's energy
exploration and development, including the
US-disapproved Caspian Republics Oil Swap project.
For Iran, Chinese technological inputs are
welcome, since they come with no strings attached.
Clearly, there are tradeoffs between
Sino-Iranian partnership and maintenance of
Sino-US comity. Beijing is also wary of alienating
Arab states and Israel in the process of wooing
Tehran. Garver rates Chinese management of these
contradictions "an impressive diplomatic
accomplishment" (p 284). He predicts that
Sino-Iranian ties will be a durable element of the
evolving Asian structure of power. As Iran is more
comfortable with China's rise than any other major
Asian state, "an Iranian anchor could emerge as a
central element of a post-unipolar China-centered
Asia" (p 295).
While Garver's oracle does
seem plausible for the long run, the more
immediate question is whether the United States
will use force to topple the current government in
Tehran. As long as the US remains essential for
Chinese economic development, Tehran seems
dispensable to Beijing. Should George W Bush
choose to leave office with a bang against Iran,
China may not do much except whimpering.
China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a
Post-Imperial World by John Garver. University
of Washington Press, Seattle, 2007. ISBN:
9780295986319. Price: US$14.95, 401 pages.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
