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2 A Turkish puzzle over
Iraq By M K Bhadrakumar
Russian President Vladimir Putin must be
the only other leader in contemporary politics who
faces a predicament like Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's. Both are charismatic
figures who enjoy immense popularity, but are
still hesitant to seek a further term in office.
In Russia's case, an elected president
simply cannot by law seek a continuous third term.
But Erdogan has a choice in the matter. Only, he
must reveal his mind: Will he or won't he be a
candidate
for the presidential
elections due next month? By April 16, he must
speak out.
Turks, with their notorious
passion for political gossiping, are certain that
he wants to be president. Such political ambition
is logical. Turkey's executive president holds
enormous reserve powers, comparable to France's in
some ways. At any rate, it is a riveting saga when
an extraordinary political career like Erdogan's,
who sat in a dingy Istanbul prison cell hardly
five years ago as a condemned "Islamist", lurches
toward the presidential palace in Ankara.
Despite Erdogan's apparent diffidence, he
will have a cakewalk if he contests next month's
election. The ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP), which he heads, enjoys a two-thirds
majority in Parliament that doubles up as the
Electoral College when incumbent President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer's term ends in May.
Within
five months of the presidential elections in May,
Turkey will head for parliamentary elections. A
senior Turkish political observer, Yusuf Kanli,
estimated recently, "Most Turks have been
stressing that under the prevailing conditions,
the only alternative to the AKP is the AKP itself
... unless the AKP makes a big mistake, it may
even boost its vote to over 40% in the next
elections and return with a very high
parliamentary majority."
But Erdogan's
dilemma is that the AKP may also find itself
losing the parliamentary election if he becomes
president. The AKP, formed in 1997, is almost
entirely Erdogan's creation. Its mandate in 2002
emanated as much out of his charisma as the
"protest votes" by a disillusioned electorate
against established political parties. Now, can
the AKP hold together without Erdogan? (Turkey's
elected presidents traditionally severe their
party affiliation.)
There is no
inner-party democracy in Turkish politics. All
political parties are the virtual fiefdoms of the
party leaders. Thus even members of Parliament
representing a party do not represent the
electorate directly but are the personal nominees
of the party leader. If the AKP shows signs of
drift in the weeks beyond May, and if a popular
perception develops that the AKP under a new
leadership may not provide political stability,
then the night of the long knives will begin.
New political groupings could appear to
challenge the AKP's dominance. Or there could be a
"Kemalist" backlash. The polarization of political
opinion along the "Kemalist" and Islamist lines is
already acute. Turkey is also riding a wave of
nationalism, which the parties on the left and the
right are equally adept at exploiting.
While it is difficult to imagine that
Turkey could have another military takeover, the
fact is that beneath such a threshold there can be
back-room intervention by non-political forces. To
sum up, in the words of commentator Derya Sazak of
the leading daily Milliyet, "The silence in the
AKP before April 16, two weeks before the
procedures begin for the presidential election, is
due to this hesitation: Erdogan wants to run, but
cannot see the picture if he's elected."
In Turkey, doubts about political tidings
are to be ultimately clarified in Istanbul.
According to a survey by business daily Referans
among leading experts and financial institutions,
62.5% of the participants do not expect Erdogan to
run for the presidency.
But that is only
part of the story. In a fundamental sense, what
Turkey may gain in political and economic
stability also contains a message for the world of
political Islam. A somewhat similar path has also
been taken by Hamas in nearby Palestine through
its readiness to become part of a national-unity
government.
Al-Ahram weekly wrote recently
in an article titled "Resistance wears new look"
that a "sense of realism" was already apparent in
Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal's discussions with
senior Egyptian officials in Cairo last month. The
article commented, "Neither [Palestinian Prime
Minister] Haniyeh nor Meshaal have changed hearts
or decided to abandon the Islamist approach in
favor of a secular outlook, but it is just that
they decided to realize the facts of regional and
international politics and to work with those
facts in mind."
Evidently, Turkish
Islamists and Hamas alike have changed
considerably after being brought into the system
and having to react to realities. There cannot be
any doubt that Erdogan and his followers are ready
to enter and leave the corridors of power by the
ballot box. This is despite Turkey's political
culture where authoritarianism is still prevalent.
Erdogan realizes that absolute power is beyond his
reach. Therefore, he is accepting the boundary set
by the Kemalist principles of the secular state,
which are inviolable, and is opting for
accommodation. He is rational about the limiting
factors.
The Turkish experience
underscores the importance of viewing with an open
mind the potential of Islamism to influence
political and economic reform positively. The
Islamists are "objectively progressive", to use
Marxian idiom, insofar as they are the most ardent
champions of human rights, social justice, rights
to self-determination, and democratic pluralism.
Without doubt, leaders like Erdogan and Haniyeh
represent the grassroots and are close to the
"neighborhoods", which also explains their
phenomenal popular appeal.
They have high
stakes on regional stability and security while
they grapple with their national priorities of
redressing problems of governance, society and
politics. Besides, they want to take advantage of
the opportunities offered by peace and economic
reforms in the Middle East. They bring the state
closer to the bazaar, and are interested in
spurring growth.
Repercussions in
Iraq This is precisely why Erdogan's
continued leadership in Ankara can help avert a
flashpoint over northern Iraq's
quasi-independence. The overwhelming majority of
Kurds in northern Iraq do not want to remain part
of Iraq. The clock has begun ticking with the
approaching referendum over the status of the city
of Kirkuk.
On March 29, the Iraqi
government decided to compensate eligible Arabs
who would voluntarily leave Kirkuk. (Iraq's
constitution stipulates that prior to the
referendum, the government should reverse Saddam
Hussein's "Arabization" policy that drove Kurds
from their homes and brought in Arabs, mostly
Shi'ites from southern Iraq.) In terms of the
government
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