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2 The al-Qaeda 'caravan' visits
Algiers By Michael Scheuer
Editor's note: This report was
written before two terrorist bomb attacks in
Algeria's capital Algiers on Wednesday killed at
least 24 people and injured 160, a day after four
suspected suicide bombers and a policeman died in
Morocco as security forces raided a suspected
terrorist cell in Casablanca. Al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb is reported to have claimed responsibility
for the Algiers attack.
The decision
of the leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for
Call and
Combat
(GSPC) to pledge allegiance to Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda has been well covered. The GSPC's proven
combat capabilities, willingness to send fighters
to Afghanistan, Iraq and other Islamist
insurgencies, widespread presence in Western
European cities, connections and working
relationships to criminal enterprises in Europe,
and status as a potential al-Qaeda-related threat
to Western oil and natural-gas supplies emanating
from Algeria are all positive benefits for
al-Qaeda. [1]
Beyond these tactical and
strategic - at least regarding energy supplies -
advantages, the GSPC's decision to join al-Qaeda
is, from the latter's perspective, part of a
bigger, long-labored-for and positive whole.
"The better rule," General Robert E Lee
once said in regard to analyzing enemy intentions,
"is to judge our adversaries from their
standpoint, not from our own." [2]
With
this advice in mind, it becomes clear that the
addition of the GSPC to al-Qaeda's ranks fits
nicely into the primary mission bin Laden has
defined for his organization: instigating and
inspiring Muslims to move their focus toward
Islam's far enemy, the United States and its
allies. [3]
This, it should be kept in
mind, is much easier said than done. One of the
most enduring aspects of 19th-century European
imperialism and colonialism has been the
nationalistic orientation of Islamic resistance
groups. Until bin Laden came on the scene, the
Islamists were exclusively fighting local
tyrannies: the Egyptian Islamists were intent on
destroying the Hosni Mubarak regime; the Yemenis
were bent on overthrowing President Ali Abdullah
Saleh; the Palestinians sought to eliminate
Israel; and the Algerians aimed at the military
junta in Algiers.
This stubbornly
nationalistic focus, bin Laden argued, had to be
broken and redirected toward the United States,
the nation-state that al-Qaeda doctrine holds
responsible for keeping Israel's regime and the
Muslim tyrannies in power.
Success for bin
Laden has been hard to come by. The first break in
the nationalist dam came when Ayman al-Zawahiri
led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) into al-Qaeda
in early 1998. [4] Zawahiri had long argued that
the road to Jerusalem led through Cairo, but he
ditched this deeply held tenet to fight the United
States. (NB: Oddly, there are still those who
argue that bin Laden is the EIJ chief's
mouthpiece, although it is clearly the latter's
views, not the former's, that have drastically
changed.)
The shift of focus of the
Egyptian Islamists was augmented last August when
al-Qaeda announced that at least a portion of
Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiyya - under Muhammed
al-Hakaima - had joined al-Qaeda. [5] The GSPC
pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, then, is the
third major crack in the dam, and with it the two
nationalities who historically have been the most
near-enemy, nation-centric organizations have
sworn loyalty to the concept of destroying the far
enemy as the indispensable prelude to eliminating
the host of near enemies.
This does not,
of course, mean that Algerian and Egyptian
Islamists have stopped or will stop attacking
targets in their own country. What it does mean,
however, and what has begun to occur, is a gradual
shift in targeting toward a focus that complements
al-Qaeda's war against the United States.
In Egypt, the attacks on tourist
facilities have hit the country's foreign-exchange
earner, and Cairo has nowhere else but Washington
to turn to make up for any shortfalls. In Algeria,
the media have reported increasing GSPC interests
in attacking the country's energy infrastructure,
security services, and expatriate workforce.
While these are important achievements for
al-Qaeda, it can be argued that success in getting
only three major Islamist resistance groups to
shift publicly from a near- to far-enemy focus
since 1996 means that bin Laden still has a long
way to go.
Furthermore, while there is an
element of truth in that conclusion, the comfort
the West can take from it is mitigated by the
largely unnoticed success bin Laden has had in
refocusing many more Islamists on the far enemy
than just those belonging to the EIJ, the Gama'a
and the GSPC.
Indeed, bin Laden's success
can be seen not only in his ability to convince
large numbers of individual Islamists, but even
more so in the fact that these individuals appear
to be forming "al-Qaeda" groups of their own in
Europe and across the Arab world.
As
evidence of bin Laden's success in this regard -
and this refers to inspirational and instigating
successes that seldom confer command-and-control
on al-Qaeda - media reporting since January 2005
shows that nearly 40 organizations have announced
their formation and pledged allegiance to bin
Laden, al-Qaeda and their strategic objectives.
Although not controlled by al-Qaeda, they
may have received some logistical, training or
financial assistance from al-Qaeda in their
formation. A non-scientific and non-exhaustive
sampling of the groups reported in the media
follows:
Martyr Marwan Hadid Cell, al-Qaeda in Syria
(Syria).
The Islamic Revenge Cells (Iraq).
Brigades of Kurdistan (Iraq).
Ansar al-Qaeda (Saudi Arabia).
Al-Qaeda in Bilad al-Sham (Syria).
Al-Qaeda Organization in the Levant - Umar
Brigade - Lebanon Province (Lebanon).
The Islamic al-Tawhid Group, al-Qaeda
Organization (Europe).
Al-Qaeda Organization in Afghanistan
(Afghanistan).
Al-Qaeda in Levant and Egypt - Abdallah Azzam
Brigades (Egypt).
Qaedat-al-Jihad in Yemen, Liwa al-Tawid
(Yemen).
Black Leopards-al-Qaeda Military Faction in
Lebanon (Lebanon).
Brigade of Martyr Nasir Bin-Rashid al-Rashid
(Europe).
Saudi Brigades of Sada Tuwayq in al-Zufi
(Saudi Arabia).
Squadron of the Martyr Abu Annas al-Shami
(Saudi Arabia).
Kata'ib al-Shahid Hammudi al-Masri, al-Qaeda
Organization South and East Asia (Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Far East).
Allah's Brigade (Palestine).
Secret Organization Group of al-Qaeda of Jihad
in Europe (Europe).
Abu-ali al-Harithi Brigades (Yemen).
Al-Qaeda Maghreb Commandment (Morocco).
Al-Qaeda Organization in the Island of the
Arabs (Saudi Arabia).
The foregoing list
suggests at least three conclusions that should
encourage bin Laden and sober Western security
services. First, bin Laden's central intention of
having his words and al-Qaeda's actions serve not
only to harm US interests but also instigate other
Muslims to become jihadis seems to have some
traction.
If the above list could only be
built to four or five items, a claim of success
for bin Laden could be debated, but the 20-plus
groups
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