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2 Cracks in the Iran nuclear
stalemate By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
We have been here before many times, with
flickers of hope about an imminent breakthrough in
the Iran nuclear standoff, only to be dismayed by
subsequent developments extinguishing those hopes.
This time it may turn out different.
The
positive signs registering on the radars of both
sides are as follows: Ali Larijani, Iran's nuclear
negotiator, made an encouraging statement last
week about interesting proposals on the table, and
this was immediately reciprocated by the US's
point man on Iran, Nicholas
Burns, who stepped down a couple of notches from
his usual stern messages to Iran and encouraged it
to be more "positive".
What is more, at a
talk at Harvard University, Burns stated that the
idea of putting Iran's centrifuges on "standby"
had been "influential" with policymakers in
Washington, adding, however, that the US was more
interested in the "cold standby" as opposed to
"hot standby" that would allow the centrifuges to
spin dry.
Hot or cold standby? The
differences between the two sides may be narrowing
to this question, in light of certain hints from
Iran that it may be inclined to adopt the "hot
standby" option (See Third Option on Tehran
Asia Times Online, June 22, 2006).
What
gives hope about the possibility of a timely
breakthrough is precisely the keen attention both
sides, Iran and the US and Europe above all, have
placed on the standby option. The Swiss government
has also put forth a proposal that is virtually
identical with the standby option, and
irrespective of the US's misgivings about an undue
Swiss role, that government has been pursuing that
track relentlessly (with some backing by the
European Union).
But, that is not all, and
there are other intervening factors that tip the
balance in favor of hope instead of despair when
it comes to Iran's nuclear crisis. On the one
hand, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
chief Mohammad ElBaradei has discounted news from
Iran regarding "enrichment on the industrial
scale" by stating that the number of Iran's
installed centrifuges is in the "hundreds" and not
"thousands" as claimed rather boisterously by
Tehran. This information lessens the gravity of
the crisis and, in turn, allows diplomats to push
for a solution without the gun of military action
sounding in rehearsal in the background. Many
analysts in Iran have raised the necessity of a
more flexible approach by Iran on the nuclear
issue, some counseling the inadvisability of
ignoring UN Security Council resolutions and the
need to find a creative approach whereby Iran
would not be in violation of the UN mandates while
preserving its rights.
Contrary to
appearances, this is not an altogether moot issue,
and the language and content of the UN
resolutions, 1696 and 1747, particularly with
respect to their lack of clarity on the issue of
suspension of enrichment, not clarifying the time
period, leave room for creative solutions.
There also appears to be a new US
appreciation of Iran's security concerns, which
ElBaradei and others insist must be addressed for
a successful resolution of the crisis. Last month,
a former Iranian nuclear official urged the world
community to pay attention to Iran's security
concerns when dealing with the nuclear issue, and
that message appears to be sinking in slowly but
surely.
Furthermore, within Iran there is
a growing concern about the possibility of a
dangerous, and expensive, nuclear arms race in the
region resulting from the fear of Iran's nuclear
program, prompting Tehran to redouble its efforts,
such as through the recent statement of the
leader's representative, Hassan Rowhani in Doha,
Qatar, regarding Iran's seriousness on security
cooperation with the member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). (For more see Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security
plan Asia Times Online, April 14,
2007.)
But, no matter how assiduous, or
sincere, Iran's confidence-building steps, Arab
fears of Iranian nuclear proliferation run rampant
and have been driving a greater push by Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and others to possess nuclear
technology. Of course, concern over the depletion
of oil reserves and investment for the future is a
source of this drive, but so is the fear of
proliferation and the need to not lag behind.
In turn, this raises an important
question: What can Iran possibly do to stop this
unpredictable and potentially dangerous momentum,
when no matter how closely the IAEA inspects its
facilities, there is never enough trust by the
outside world of Iran's peaceful intentions? Can
Iran really ignore the proliferation tendency of
its neighbors? How can the cause of
non-proliferation in the Middle East be
successfully advanced under the unfavorable
current circumstances?
Doubtless, there is
no simple answer to any of these questions and may
never be as long as Israel continues to harbor
nuclear weapons and enjoy international immunity.
The hypocritical double standards applied to
Israel and to other Middle East nations is a root
cause of the problem and, yet, there is no
prospect of any movement, by the US or the
European Union, on that front, as if proliferation
in one corner of the volatile region is unrelated
to other corners.
And then there is the
issue of fear of US power. John Pilger writes in
the Guardian of London, "We cannot look from the
side as we are led toward a crisis with Iran,"
urging the Europeans to look
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