Since the political bloc loyal to Muqtada
al-Sadr abandoned Parliament and Iraqi government
ministries on April 16 - in a move to demand that
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki set a timetable for
the withdrawal of foreign troops - the Sadrist
movement now appears to be tilting toward a more
militant stance, separated from the political
process and, consequently, relying more on the
influence of the Mehdi Army for control over the
Shi'ite population.
This new development
entails multiple factors, one of which is
primarily an apparent increase in the level of
rivalry between Shi'ite
militias in the main urban
centers in southern Iraq. The eruption of violence
in the first week of April in the northern part of
the predominately Shi'ite city of Diwaniya, which
is the administrative center of al-Qadissiya
province, underlines the escalation of competition
for power among militia organizations, as
followers of Muqtada lead the way to claim the
mantle of Shi'ite leadership.
Unlike
previous sporadic clashes in the city, which
mainly occurred between Iraqi police and Ba'athist
forces, the recent fighting testifies to a power
struggle among Shi'ite groups in Diwaniya. The
most notable clash before 2006 was the case of
Hazim al-Shaalan, the former defense minister of
the interim government, whose bodyguards fought
against Iraqi security forces in January 2005
while campaigning for the elections.
Since
the rise of Muqtada's popularity in Diwaniya after
the 2005 elections, the Sadrists are demanding
more power in a city that is largely dominated by
rival groups, namely the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and local
tribal forces. Muqtada has gained considerable
support among the poor and the young in a city of
nearly 500,000 people.
For the most part,
the early-April collision between joint US-Iraqi
forces and the Mehdi Army was a continuation of
months of violence in the city. The origins of the
conflict may be traced back to last September
when, after various explosions and many deaths, US
forces arrested a number of Mehdi militia men and
confiscated Muqtada's computer equipment from his
Diwaniya office. The move was aimed at decreasing
the disruptive activities of the Mehdi Army in the
form of assassinations of members of political
rival groups and the brutal imposition of Islamic
law on the inhabitants of the city.
Muqtada's call for a united Iraqi front on
April 9, which immediately followed the
early-April Diwaniya fighting, revealed a new
strategic tactic. The display of a united Iraqi
front was first aimed at the Sunni-Shi'ite
alliance with an aura of nationalism to oppose
symbolically the presence of US forces. The call
was also, however, aimed at increasing his
legitimacy among Iraqis, both Sunnis and Shi'ites,
in opposition to any form of sectarianism, mainly
led by some Sunni insurgents and, especially, the
militia of the SCIRI, the Badr Organization, which
for the moment controls Diwaniya's police force
and the Qadissiya provincial council.
The
main threat to Muqtada and his Mehdi Army has been
the Badr militia. The Sadrists' recent attempts to
control Diwaniya testify to such ongoing rivalry
between these two Shi'ite groups that seem to be
unwilling to make compromises over the control of
Iraq's southern cities.
There is also
tension among the tribal forces in the city over
the control of khums money, annual
religious taxes of one-fifth, which are levied by
Shi'ites on income to be spent on the Prophet's
family and the poor. For the Sadrists, the tribal
forces have failed to distribute the money fairly
to the people in the city, as required by Islamic
law. As in the case of Karbala, the followers of
Muqtada are interested not only in military
domination, but also in control of major holy
sites and religious practices, hence expanding
their influence in all aspects of Shi'ite Iraqi
life.
There are two possible reasons
behind Sadrist attempts to control Diwaniya. One
can be directly linked to the implementation of
the Baghdad security plan, which since February 14
has forced the Mehdi Army to maintain a low
profile in Baghdad, although it appears to
continue to press for power in other cities like
Basra and Diwaniya.
Second, it is possible
that Muqtada is trying to gain more independence
from Tehran and Najaf, especially Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani, by defying the idea of a united
Shi'ite front against anti-Shi'ite Salafism, which
may seem anti-Sunni to many Sunni Arabs, and the
US presence in Iraq. By doing this, Muqtada is
also attempting to bolster his base and reassert
power by appealing to various splinter groups in
his Mehdi Army who have accused him of treason for
too much flirtation with the Iranians and the
Iraqi government, the latter being perceived as an
extension of the US presence.
Diwaniya is
the powder keg of Iraq. With vying Shi'ite
militias and tribal forces, the city is bound to
become a site of intra-sectarian conflict, namely
a clash between Badr and Mehdi militias in major
cities like Baghdad, Basra and Diwaniya, despite a
surge of troops in Iraq.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
