Page 2 of 2 Why Iran spurned a US
handshake By M K Bhadrakumar
on
them. There has also been a virtual reversal of
sectarian patterns within Saudi Arabia itself,
with a new line of official anti-Shi'ism,
involving, according to a British scholar
recently, "suppressing Shi'ite cultural
activities, harassing community leaders,
interrupting the observance of religious rituals
and even arresting activists".
Equally,
Tehran apprehended that by angling for a
political-level
exchange
with Iran, even if a casual exchange, Washington
would create misconceptions in the Arab street,
especially within the ranks of the resistance,
which would be keenly watching. Just in case
anyone forgot, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (a
close ally of Tehran) drew everyone's attention to
the criticality of the Palestine issue. On the eve
of the Sharm al-Sheikh conference, Meshaal told
the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, "I warn and say
that I see the current situation is heading in the
direction of the conditions that prevailed in the
late 1990s ... that paved the way for the al-Aqsa
intifada. I warn, and under 'warn' I put many red
lines." (Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the armed
wing of Hamas, has since broken a five-month Gaza
ceasefire.)
Tehran couldn't have
overlooked that it was being assiduously courted
by Washington at a time when conditions in the
Palestinian territories had become virtually
intolerable. What is the reality? Washington has
no interest in pressuring Israel into making any
concessions. On the other hand, during his visit
to the West Bank last month, Louis Michel,
European commissioner for development and
humanitarian assistance, noted that conditions in
the Palestinian territories had never been worse.
Some 60% of the population live below
poverty line (on 2 euros - about US$2.70 - per
day); some 35% of the population is going hungry;
more than half of the children suffer from anemia;
a quarter has no access to drinking water. As
American commentator on Middle Eastern affairs
Patrick Seale put it recently, Israeli security
has reduced the Palestinian population to a
"situation of permanent siege and permanent
terror". Michel asked whether Israel's security
justified such measures.
But, most
important, Iran suspected that the US approach to
it signaling an apparent desire to talk was less
about a long-term shift and more of a tactic to
persuade Iran to attend the regional meeting on
Iraq at Sharm al-Sheikh. US Vice President Dick
Cheney, who has consistently insisted that "all
options are on table" regarding Iran, is scheduled
to visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan this week.
Washington indeed understood that without
Iran's participation, any international conference
on Iraq would look farcical. But no sooner had
Iran confirmed its participation, Washington
changed its tune and began speaking patronizingly.
Bush said on April 30, "Should the foreign
minister of Iran bump into Condi Rice, Condi won't
be rude. She's not a rude person. I'm sure she'll
be polite. But she will also be firm in reminding
the representative of the Iranian government that
there's a better way forward for the Iranian
people than isolation."
Bush further
lectured Tehran that "if, in fact, there is a
conversation, it'll be one that says, if the
Iranian government wants to have a serious
conversation with the United States and others,
they ought to give up their [uranium] enrichment
program in a verifiable fashion. And we will sit
down at the table with them along with our
European partners and Russia as well. That's what
she'll tell him."
In the event, as we know
by know, "Condi" couldn't tell the Iranians
anything. Clearly, weaned on the culture of Cold
War summitry with the Soviet Union, Washington
seems to be on shaky ground about how to talk to
the Persians. Washington should have realized that
the continued detention of Iranian officials
kidnapped in Irbil, Iraq, in January didn't serve
any purpose.
Tehran had made it clear
repeatedly in the recent months that mutual
respect was a basic prerequisite for any
meaningful dialogue with the US to commence. And
it is not as if Washington is entirely incapable
of showing mutual respect to an interlocutor it is
determined to cultivate - as its dealings with
Hanoi in the recent years testify.
The
point is, Tehran is acutely conscious of the
creeping US strategy of dragging the global
community into a large-scale crisis around Iran
while professing the desire to "engage" Iran.
Tehran might have lowered its rhetoric somewhat in
recent days, but it certainly hasn't lowered its
guard about what Washington, especially under the
present administration, is capable of doing to an
indomitable adversary of Israel in the Middle
East. Tehran made a subtle point by detaining a
high-ranking Iranian official in Tehran on
espionage charges on the eve of the Sharm
al-Sheikh conference.
The immaculate
timing of the arrest of former ambassador Hossein
Mousavian, Iran's negotiator on the nuclear issue
during the Khatami presidency, by Iranian
counterintelligence last Wednesday evening in
Tehran is an unmistakable signal to Washington
that it is futile for the Bush administration to
have an Iran policy of "talk-talk, fight-fight".
Bush must make up his mind. Tehran doesn't care,
beyond a point, whether the confusing signals from
Washington are on account of a policy tangle
between Cheney and Rice, as the US media would
have it believe. Tehran will demand greater
transparency from the Bush administration.
But at the same time, Tehran also realizes
that Washington needs better relations with it as
much as, and probably more than, Iran needs them
at this point. Britain's Independent newspaper put
it succinctly, "The result is a complex diplomatic
dance in which the US shuffles around offering
small come-ons to Tehran through intermediaries,
while loudly accusing it of heinous crimes, such
as supplying money and technology to Islamic
militants and trying to develop a nuclear weapon.
When Iran equivocates and then rejects the offers,
Washington turns around and blames it for being
difficult."
The daily continued,
"Washington desperately needs the cooperation of
Syria and Iran if it is to have a chance of
extracting itself from Iraq with even a shred of
dignity. Yet it refuses to countenance any serious
concession on Iran's nuclear program. In trying to
keep the two issues separate, Washington risks
putting itself in the absurd situation of begging
Iran to help it out in Iraq, while threatening
military force against its nuclear installations.
If the US is serious about either issue, it will
have to show more flexibility on both. First,
though, it will have to accept a link between the
two and agree that, in any direct talks with Iran,
everything - including diplomatic recognition -
will be on the table." That is also pretty
much the message that Mottaki left behind for
Rice. The Iranian spokesman confirmed in Tehran on
Sunday that if the US officially asks for talks
with Iran, "it will be considered". But these
should be formal talks - and not an exchange on
the sidelines of a diplomatic event where between
taking sips out of a champagne glass, "Condi"
tells a few facts of life about uranium enrichment
to her Iranian counterpart.
Certainly,
Iranians are savvy enough not to mind even if
Condi were to keep an alluring Russian lady or two
by her side all dressed up in red or green,
provided, of course, that her narrative is serious
and structured, and she conducts herself on an
equal footing with mutual respect with regard to
her Iranian interlocutor - as is indeed expected
of a 200-year-old nation when it talks to a
millennia-old civilization.
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years,
with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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