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2 Iran courts the US at Russia's
expense By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Iran's relations with the Arab world have
taken a dramatic turn for the better, in light of
Iran's overtures toward the Arab states of the
Persian Gulf, as well as in President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad's announcement that Iran is prepared
to resume full diplomatic relations with Egypt.
That announcement was made on Monday as
Ahmadinejad visited the United Arab Emirates and
received a rousing official welcome. Widely
interpreted as Iran's timely response to US Vice
President Dick Cheney's tour
of the region and his warning that the United
States will not allow Iran to develop nuclear
weapons or to dominate the region, Ahmadinejad's
arrival in Dubai coincided with an Iranian olive
branch toward not only Egypt but also the US. This
is illustrated by Tehran's announcement that it
has accepted the United States' invitation for
direct talks between American and Iranian
ambassadors in Baghdad.
"Iran's foreign
policy is moving in the direction of constructive
engagement on all fronts," a member of Iran's
parliament, the Majlis, announced, adding that the
resumption of relations with Egypt will have
"positive effects on the whole region".
It
is now up to Egypt to bury the hatchet and respond
to Ahmadinejad's significant policy announcement.
According to some Tehran political analysts,
however, there are some voices within the Egyptian
government who prefer the status quo, whereby
Egypt can capitalize on foreign assistance as a
result of its role as a counterweight to Iran,
given the growing reliance of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) on "out of area" Egypt.
On
the other hand, Iran's GCC policy, of pushing the
arch of the common or collective security
arrangement by all the Gulf states based on the
principle of self-reliance, undermines Egypt's
attempt to insert itself in the region's security
calculus. Similarly, the US is disquieted by
official GCC pronouncements that echo Iran's call
for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the
region.
Should Iran remain consistent on
the present pattern of regional policy and succeed
in helping with the security nightmare in Iraq,
then the US/Israeli policy of creating a Sunni-led
anti-Iran alliance in the Arab world would vanish
into thin air. The process of confidence-building
between Iran and the GCC states, which are in
dispute with Iran over the three islands of Abu
Moussa and Little and Big Tunb, is a long one,
however, and Tehran must be careful not send any
"mixed signals" that would eradicate the present
gains. The GCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Dialogue with the US and Iran's new
realism Reflecting a new level of
sophistication and diplomatic prowess, Iran's
latest moves show that it has not been unreceptive
of earlier criticisms at home and abroad about the
deleterious impact of a one-dimensional foreign
policy. Steadily moving up the learning curve, the
Ahmadinejad administration may also have a freer
hand to set policy within Iran's complex,
concentric circles of power.
One thing is
becoming clear: Iran's nuclear and non-nuclear, ie
regional and security, policies are gelling
together, and that is a definite step forward and
a sign of qualitative improvement.
Doubtless, that does not mean that all is
well on the foreign-policy front, given the
meetings of the United Nations Security Council's
permanent five plus Germany plotting tougher
sanctions against Iran, perhaps as early as next
month, in response to Iran's defiance of UN
resolutions calling for the suspension of
uranium-enrichment activities.
At a recent
meeting in Vienna on the future of the
non-proliferation regime, after much haggling,
Iran finally managed to create a cognitive "group
think" with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
consisting of some 118 countries. This was by
watering down a final statement that weakens calls
for tighter norms under the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly regarding
non-proliferation and access to nuclear
technology. A mere week ago there was a threat of
a dangerous rift between Iran and NAM countries,
so this is a major foreign-policy plus for Iran
that strengthens Tehran's hand as it prepares to
meet the US face-to-face in two weeks.
In
the context of this coming US-Iran dialogue, both
sides need to agree on a limited agenda that does
not extend to trans-Iraq, eg nuclear, issues, and
an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson has made
this point abundantly clear. Yet even an
incremental improvement in the hostile climate
between the US and Iran is bound to have ripple
effects on the other issues. And, vice versa, a
premature UN move to toughen sanctions on Iran
could torpedo the diplomatic engagement on Iraq.
There is an "indirect linkage between the
issues that forms the background to the meeting in
Baghdad" between US and Iranian
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