Page 1 of
2 The two 'kings' of
Iran By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - There is an old Arab saying
that two kings - or heroes - cannot live in one
room.
Well, there appear to be more than
two "kings" in Iran. The obvious one - who
ironically is seemingly least in control - is
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The second is the
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader
of the Islamic
Republic.
Both
"kings", however, are members of the same radical
establishment, the "hawks" of Iranian politics.
The other group of "kings" is headed by the
so-called pragmatists, led by ex-president Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who now heads the
Expediency Council, and former reformist president
Mohammad Khatami. Fate - and Ahmadinejad's
policies - brought the two former presidents, who
traditionally represent opposite ends of the
political spectrum, into alliance. They are the
"doves" of Iran.
Riding the wave of the
hostage crisis One of the signs that the
Iranian president is not as powerful as the world
believes he is can be found in the crisis over the
15 British sailors and marines taken hostage by
Iran, and then freed by Ahmadinejad, in
March-April.
The Islamic Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC) engineered their capture, under
orders from the president, claiming that they had
ventured into Iranian waters. Ahmadinejad needed
the crisis for a variety of reasons. First, it
would be great for local consumption and boost his
image in the eyes of ordinary Iranians. Second, it
would serve as a reality check for the West,
showing Washington and London that he was a man
who lived up to his word and should be taken
seriously when he challenges the superpowers.
Third, Ahmadinejad may have wanted to
strike a deal with the United States through
Britain: we free the sailors, you lift the
sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear
program. A formula along these lines, which
included suspension of Iran's nuclear program, was
even being discussed with Iranian leaders at the
United Nations.
So the IRGC went ahead
with the arrest of the British, having no clue how
the rest of Iran - and the world - would react.
One immediate indicator was that the Iranian press
did not mention the crisis until it was leaked by
the British, and even then tried to play down the
event in the hope of minimizing the damage caused
by the IRGC.
This clearly shows that not
everybody agreed with the president - and
certainly not everybody wanted to use the crisis
to boost Ahmadinejad's image in the Iranian
street. The Iranian newspaper Aftab e Yazd wrote:
"If we wanted, as the president says, to pardon
them while we had the authority to try them, why
did we not release them before [British Prime
Minister Tony] Blair's ultimatum or three days
after it?"
This is where other power
brokers came into play to overshadow the Iranian
president. They included reformers such as Khatami
and Rafsanjani, and hardliners who nevertheless
see Ahmadinejad's bravado as childish adventurism.
Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme
Council on National Security, said that the
captives would not be tried and that the crisis
would be resolved peacefully. An ally of Khamenei,
Larijani was right, and the hostages were
released.
Although Khamenei made no
comment, it is believed that he was categorically
opposed to the staged arrest and the decision may
have been made without his knowledge. But an even
more important decision - setting them free -
needed his approval. It could not have been done
without Khamenei and it is his constitutional
right as Supreme Leader to issue pardons and to
overrule any decision taken by the president.
Denis Ross, a veteran US diplomat in
charge of Middle East affairs under the Bill
Clinton administration, argued, "Khamenei ordered
the sailors released but allowed Ahmadinejad to do
it - giving him a platform to weave his own public
story and to bestow medals upon the IRGC soldiers
who seized the sailors."
He argued that
the pragmatists in Iran, who opposed the hostage
crisis from Day 1, are the officials that the US
must engage to get Tehran to suspend its nuclear
program. They are the ones, he believes, who can
be talked to because they see more danger than
benefit in the continuation of Ahmadinejad's
defiant attitude toward the Western world. He
said, "It may not be easy to stop or suspend the
program, but if we could convince those who agreed
to cut Iran's losses on the British sailors that
Iran's interests can be served better by
abandoning their nuclear efforts, it's not
impossible."
But if Khamenei was so upset
by the hostage crisis, why did he let Ahmadinejad
get full honors and publicity for their release?
The reason, simply, is that Iran's leaders do not
like to show the world that they are in
disagreement - even if they are.
They want
the Islamic Republic to project unity, given its
standoff with the international community and the
United States. They may bicker among themselves,
and even try to eliminate each other politically
in internal politics, but they will seldom come
out and publicly let the US gloat at their
differences.
It is very un-Iranian (at
least since the revolution of 1979) to flash
internal disputes before the outside world. Within
Iran, however, there is increasing talk about a
complete divide between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.
Originally, the grand ayatollah supported
Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of 2005,
explaining why and how he managed to defeat the
veteran and well-established Rafsanjani (whom
Khamenei then dreaded). The grand ayatollah could
control a nobody like Ahmadinejad, while it was
very difficult to control someone like Rafsanjani.
A change at the top? That
control today, two years later, has almost
snapped, although Ahmadinejad has never - at least
not in public - challenged Khamenei. Some in Iran
are even starting to discuss replacements for the
president, saying that early elections may be on
the horizon and that Ahmadinejad may not even
complete his term, which ends in 2009 (ironically
the same year as President George W Bush's).
Ahmadinejad promised much in 2005 and has
been unable to deliver. He promised a share of the
country's oil with ordinary Iranians, more bread
on their tables and more jobs. The Iranian economy
is still under sanctions from the US, inflation is
high, and so is unemployment. Disappointment,
frustration, fear and animosity from power centers
in Iran all combine to make the
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
