At the time, Iran reciprocated and
Khamenei sanctioned the proposed dialogue, only to
be disheartened when the US balked, failed to make
an official written request for such a meeting
and, what is more, ratcheted up the accusations of
Iranian meddling in
Iraq.
Mindful of that experience, Khamenei is
taking no chances this time. In a major speech in
the holy city of Mashhad, he spoke of Iran's
"logical and 100% defendable position in negating
dialogue with the United States" and, in the same
breath, put his seal of approval on the coming
meeting in Baghdad by insisting that it will focus
only on "the responsibility of the occupiers
toward Iraq's security".
Khamenei's speech
ignited lively debate in the Iranian press, with
the conservative daily, Kayhan, interpreting it in
a front-page display as "dialogue with the US,
never". The more liberal press put the accent on
Khamenei's blessing of the approaching dialogue,
hoping that it will be the harbinger of much hoped
for normalization. According to some Tehran
analysts, the administration of President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad will be able to reap several domestic
and foreign dividends from the dialogue,
reportedly favored by most Iranians, who yearn for
tranquility in their external relations.
For one thing, no matter how insistent on
a "limited to Iraq only" agenda by both sides,
these talks have the potential to develop into
broader, follow-up dialogue that could conceivably
tackle outstanding issues on the US-Iran plate,
including the nuclear standoff. For the moment,
the less this potential, and the related
possibility of a full normalization resulting from
such initiatives, is talked about, the better.
This in light of past experiences, particularly
during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami when the
stiffened reaction of Iran's hardliners torpedoed
any chances of a meaningful breakthrough.
Iraq's Sunni Vice President Tariq
al-Hashemi has attacked the dialogue as "damaging
to Iraq's sovereignty", a biting criticism that
has put the Iranians on the defensive. "There is a
con side to this dialogue and that is the image
problem. Tehran may appear as Washington's junior
partner in Iraq and that does not bode well for
Iran's relations with the Arab world," says a
veteran Tehran political analyst who foresees no
major agreement between the US and Iran and sees
the talks' impact mostly on the level of
"political psychology" and "symbolic politics". In
other words, don't expect the reopening of the US
Embassy in Tehran any time soon.
This is a
conclusion shared by a number of US pundits, such
as Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, who has rightly stated:
"Simply going from dual-track diplomacy to
official dialogue is in itself a step forward,
even if it has no immediate benefit. In the longer
term it may lay the groundwork for much better
understanding and at least more official
negotiations between the United States and Iraq."
Ideally, a vigorous diplomatic push by
both sides could muster a major breakthrough in
stalemated relations. Currently, the US's
interests in Iran are handled by the Swiss
Embassy, but there is no consular office and
Iranians seeking US visas have to travel
elsewhere, chiefly Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates. Their chores can be substantially
reduced if Iran consents to the opening of a US
consulate on one of its Persian Gulf islands, such
as Kish, presently propped up as a tourist hub in
the region.
The advantages of such a
mini-initiative are multifold. First, recalling
how the British ambassador to Iran played a key
role in diffusing the crisis over the 15 British
sailors and marines detained by Iran in March, the
presence of some US diplomats, even below the
ambassadorial level, can be similarly important in
keeping the channels of communication between the
two countries constantly open.
Second, a
US consulate away from the center of political
intrigue in Tehran provides a relatively safe
alternative, for example with regard to potential
demonstrations. Third, with both the US and Iran
agreeing on the need to enhance cultural and
artistic exchanges, this would mean easier access
to US visas by Iranians traveling to the US.
In conclusion, there is a protean value in
dreaming about stepping up the ladder of US-Iran
normalization, no matter how difficult, or slow,
the climb. One thing past experience shows is the
inadvisability of trying to jump the steps and
somehow short-circuiting the arduous process, or
dreaming of perfect harmony not buffeted by myriad
differences. But, as the experience of both
countries with other nations - the US's relations
with Russia and Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia
- clearly show, the sine qua non of
diplomatic relations is not the resolution of all
disputes, but rather making them "manageable". And
that, certainly, is something for which the
Iranian and American leaders can, and should,
strive.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD,
is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview
Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's
Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs,
Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa
Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear
potential latent", Harvard International Review,
and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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