Page 2 of 2 Iraq's Sadrists follow
Hezbollah's path By Mahan Abedin
vast majority of so-called
"Sadrists" are deeply loyal to Muqtada (whom they
regard as the living symbol of the achievements
and sacrifices of the two Sadr martyrs), at an
organizational level substantial segments of the
Sadr movement have fragmented into autonomous
militias, criminal gangs and cult-like millenarian
movements.
The first split in the movement
occurred barely a few weeks after the ouster of
Saddam. A serious dispute developed between
Muqtada and Sheikh Mohammad al-Yaqubi over
organizational
discipline and the
distribution of decision-making in the movement.
Muqtada's inability or refusal to instill more
discipline in the movement led Yaqubi (who was a
close companion of the slain Sadiq al-Sadr) to
break away and establish the Hizb al-Fadila
al-Islamiyah (Islamic Virtue Party).
Although a branch of the Sadr movement,
Fadila has always acted independently. Now led by
Abdel-Rahim al-Husseini, the party holds 15 seats
in the Iraqi Parliament, where it operates under
the rubric of the Shi'ite-led United Iraqi
Alliance. The party's strongholds are in Basra and
the surrounding areas, where they generally
cooperate with the British military and other
British agencies. Indeed, Fadila can be considered
one of the very few British success stories in the
south of Iraq.
But Fadila is very much an
exception in the pattern of fragmentation and
splinter groups over the past four years. Splits
from the Sadr movement since the summer of 2003
have not led to the establishment of credible
independent political organizations (as in the
case of Fadila). Instead, dissident and rogue
elements have opted to create small, autonomous
militia structures while nominally swearing
loyalty to Muqtada and his movement. Others have
degenerated into millenarian cults that see
military power as the most effective method of
challenging the orthodoxy of Najaf's clerical
elite.
Arguably the best example was Dhia
Abdul Zahra's Soldiers of Heaven cult that engaged
Iraqi and US forces in a fierce battle on the
outskirts of Najaf in late January this year. The
Iraqi government alleged that Abdul Zahra's forces
intended to attack the seminaries of Najaf and
assassinate top Shi'ite clerics on the eve of the
Ashura commemorations. Abdul Zahra and more than
250 of his fighters were killed in the fierce
battle.
Another major cult (and a splinter
group from the Sadrist movement) is Sheikh Mahmud
al-Hassani al-Sarkhi's Army of Hussein. Sarkhi's
followers gained prominence after they attacked
the Iranian consulates in Basra and Karbala last
year in response to alleged Iranian "insults"
directed at Sarkhi. Sarkhi calls himself an
ayatollah, a title that the Iranians and a sizable
number of religious Shi'ites in Iraq strongly
contest.
Despite their different
motivations, splinter groups from the Sadrists
tend to have one common denominator: they are all
strongly anti-Iranian. These groups accuse Muqtada
and his close advisers of betraying the Iraqi
nationalist credentials of the Sadr movement by
getting too close to Iran. Ironically, the
continuous splits have had the opposite effect
(insofar as the Sadrist dissidents are concerned)
of drawing Muqtada and the core of the Jaish
al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) closer to Iran. Muqtada now
looks to Iran as the movement's ultimate protector
in the face of numerous and powerful enemies,
which include the British and US militaries in
Iraq, sections of the Iraqi government, al-Qaeda
in Iraq, the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement and
Sadrist dissidents.
At first glance there
is no comparison between Hezbollah's military,
political and socioeconomic organizations and
Muqtada's movement. The former is a highly
disciplined organization that uses the most
sophisticated means and systems to win and hold
support, while the latter is a large and divided
set of components, factions and militias that is
under intense pressure from a wide range of
forces.
Leaving aside Hezbollah's military
prowess (which humiliated Israel in last summer's
war), there is no parallel between Hezbollah's
political and socioeconomic structures and those
of the Sadrists. Whereas Hezbollah is known for
its incorruptibility and a steadfast refusal to
play any dirty games in Lebanon's notoriously
treacherous politics (for instance, Hezbollah
scrupulously avoids assassinating political rivals
in a country where such incidents are all too
common), the Mahdi Army is widely believed to be
the main force behind the sectarian Shi'ite death
squads in Baghdad and elsewhere. Moreover, the
Sadrist movement's religious-charitable
organizations are nowhere near as sophisticated
and prolific as Hezbollah's.
But a direct
comparison is not necessarily the best way to
clarify how Iran can use the Sadrist movement to
advance its geopolitical interests in Iraq and
beyond. Moreover, the Sadrist movement and its
Mahdi Army are young and immature organizations,
whereas Hezbollah has had more than 20 years to
fine-tune its systems and politics. From an
Iranian perspective, "functionality" is the key to
designing and developing non-state actors in
unstable countries where Iran has widespread and
legitimate interests.
In Lebanon,
Hezbollah's military prowess and sophisticated
socioeconomic, political and media infrastructures
have transformed Iran into a Mediterranean power.
Through Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic has not
only inserted itself into the Arab-Israeli
conflict (where it pulls the most important
strings from a safe distance), but it has also
managed to displace a significant amount of
Iranian-US tensions on to the fabric of Lebanese
politics.
In Iraq, the Islamic Republic
can use the Sadrist movement to pursue at least
five strategic objectives. In the short term, the
Sadrists are an effective irritant to both the
British and US occupation forces. Second, they are
an effective counter to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and to a
lesser extent the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement
(which forms the backbone of the Iraqi
resistance). In the longer term, the Sadrists can
be used to balance the power and influence of the
Iraqi government, which will likely remain weak
for years (if not decades). While Iran has
significant influence within the Iraqi government,
it is conventional wisdom that the United States
will be able either to blunt or circumvent this
influence for a long time to come. After all, it
is the United States that ultimately keeps the
fledgling Iraqi government in power.
Fourth, the Sadrists can be used both to
consolidate and contain the power of the Shi'ite
clerical elites in Najaf. Much will depend on the
evolution of the personal relationship between
Muqtada and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (and
his successor - in the event of his death). From
an Iranian point of view, while it is important
for the Najaf clerical elites to gradually expand
their power and influence, it is equally important
that they do not endorse policies that are
antithetical to the interests of the Islamic
Republic in Iraq or elsewhere.
Finally,
the Mahdi Army and its associated militias enable
the Islamic Republic to penetrate and influence
the development of new Iraqi security structures;
a process that has been well under way for at
least three years.
From conversations with
senior Iranian diplomats and other officials
concerned with Iraq policy, four general
conclusions keep recurring.
First, Iraq is
heading toward "failed state" status. Second, a
horrendous - but brief - civil war will erupt once
a sizable number of US troops depart the arena.
Third, no matter how unstable or bloody Iraq
becomes, this is unlikely to affect Iran in any
significant way. Fourth, the al-Qaeda presence in
Iraq is likely to prove permanent. The so-called
"Islamic State of Iraq" (a coalition of
Salafi-jihadist outfits led by the remnants of Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi's network) is not as imaginary or
elusive as it appears. Indeed, Salafi-jihadis will
likely seize and hold large chunks of territory in
western Iraq (once the Americans reduce their
military presence) and will be able to use this as
a base to plot against US and European interests
in the Middle East and North Africa, and possibly
beyond.
As this scenario unfolds, the
Iranians will give more importance to their
relationship with Muqtada and the different
components and factions of his movement. While
Iran would prefer to exert influence in a unified
and stable (albeit weak) Iraq, it can still manage
an extensive network of patronage and influence in
an unstable and bloody situation.
In the
final analysis, the Sadr movement will likely play
an important role in how Iran and the United
States manage tensions and eventually reach some
kind of broad understanding, without necessarily
normalizing relations. While tension is unlikely
to escalate into a shooting war, the Mahdi Army
still gives the Islamic Republic potent leverage
in the increasingly aggressive positioning that is
likely to precede any significant breakthrough in
the Iranian-US cold war.
Note 1. Mahan Abedin,
Dossier: The Sadrist
Movement, Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin, Vol 5, No 7, July 2003.
(This
article first appeared in SaudiDebate.com.
Published with permission.)
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