Page 2 of
2 IRAN AND THE US TALK
Now, that
wasn't so bad ...
By Kaveh
L Afrasiabi
matters. Iran's "sphere
of influence" politics and the United States'
interventionist policies collide in parts, just as
they coincide in parts, and as a result, the best
hoped-for scenario is controlled cooperation and
competition for the foreseeable future.
The regional milieu, featuring tense
Shi'ite-Sunni relations, is not
particularly conducive to
full US-Iran harmony either, in light of new
accusations by Yemen of Iran's pro-Shi'ite
meddling and new al-Qaeda-linked troubles in
Lebanon; both the US and Iran support the Lebanese
government in its current fight against Fatah
al-Islam. Both Iraq and Lebanon are in dire need
of national unity, and in both cases Iran can play
an effective role - although the Arab world has
reacted negatively to the latest ideas of Iran's
national security adviser, Ali Larijani, about
Lebanon as tantamount to "interfering in Lebanon's
sovereignty". Larijani is proposing a four-point
project for Lebanon that might ease the pressure
on Syria and see a revived role for France.
Trilateral security
mechanism After Maliki's opening speech at
the US-Iran meeting, expressing the hope that it
would prove "a good chapter and an important step
for the region", Iran reportedly put on the table
the idea of a trilateral security mechanism. The
US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, stated that
the US would study Iran's proposal.
Another Iranian proposal is to get
directly involved in the training and equipment
supply for the Iraqi Army and police. Iran's
ambassador to Iraq, Kazemi Qomi, formerly a top
consular official in Afghanistan, told a
post-meeting press conference that Iran wonders
why the equipment for the police and army should
be "inferior to those of the terrorist groups.
What is the purpose of not equipping the Iraqi
Army and police?"
The facility with which
the US and Iran have arrived at a "broad policy
agreement on Iraq" as a result of a four-hour
closed meeting may have come as a minor shock to
some Iran hardliners, in light of an editorial in
the conservative daily Kayhan on the eve of the
meeting. It predicted that "it will take a long
time before the framework for the US-and-Iran
dialogue becomes transparent. It is unlikely that
the two sides can reach an agreement at their
preliminary meeting."
But more important
is the reaction of various groups, including the
religio-nationalist Shi'ites of the Mahdi Army,
who are increasingly turning insurgent toward the
US. Their consent to any US-Iran security
cooperation in Iraq is necessary. Yet it may not
be forthcoming as long as the US rejects their
demands for a timetable to exit Iraq.
Thus
there are certain risks and "side effects" to
Iran's Iraq - and regional - policy as a direct
result of its dialogue with the US. That might
cause disproportionate headaches both at home and
in the region. Iran's politicians standing behind
this new approach have their job cut out and need
to show that the tangible, short- and long-term
benefits outweigh the risks.
For instance,
if the US releases the Iranians it has kidnapped
in Iraq, then it will be an easier sell for
Tehran. Yet according to a Foreign Ministry
spokesperson, Iran has not been allowed a meeting
with its nationals in the United States' custody
and the US has not yet allowed a family visit,
either.
"If the US does not follow up with
baby steps to build Iran's confidence about its
intentions toward Iran, then we should not expect
any meaningful progress," a Tehran
political-science professor told the author.
Perhaps the best course of action is to adopt an
experimental, trial-and-error approach whereby
mutual trust can be built gradually but firmly on
concrete steps toward making the Iraqi government
more stable and powerful.
After the
historic meeting, Iraqi National Security Adviser
Mowaffak al-Rubaie, who was the sole Iraqi
observer at the talks, stated that with respect to
his country, there is a broad agreement between
the US and Iran.
Another Iraqi official
went even further by citing "goodwill, agreement
and commitment" between the US and Iran. Clearly,
significant ice in the frigid US-Iran environment
has been broken, portending a substantive thaw.
Iraq's security is, after all, about the
security of both Iran and the US, and the common
threats of neo-Salafi terrorism is the chief glue
that binds Tehran and Washington together. Strange
bedfellows or not, the US and Iran are now on the
path toward reconciliation.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with
Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's
nuclear potential latent", Harvard International
Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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