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    Middle East
     Jun 6, 2007
Page 2 of 2
Iran's practical nationalism
By Dmitry Shlapentokh

political and intellectual discourse could be seen in China, whose revolution was directly inspired by the Russian example.

The early Chinese communist regime had a quite skeptical view of the past and its rulers. During the Cultural Revolution, with its slogan "bombardment of headquarters", countless priceless artifacts were destroyed, and spreading the revolutionary wave



was seen as the major goal of the regime.

Mao Zedong encouraged the populace, mostly students, to attack party bureaucracy but give absolute obedience to authorities. But by the end of Mao's rule, the political and intellectual climate had changed completely. The state and its power were once again the focus of attention. So it was not surprising that the great emperors again became objects of respect. This included the first Qin emperor, who, while unifying China after a long period of disorder, wasted perhaps millions of lives building the Great Wall and buried Confucian scholars alive.

Applying the same model to the Iranian revolution, we can easily understand why the Achaemenids have re-emerged in official discourse not as a curse but as objects of veneration.

Persian national Bolshevism
Like the protagonists of the Chinese and, especially, Russian revolutions, the participants in the Iranian revolution discarded nationalism and the historical legacy of the pre-Islamic past.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij shock troops were inspired by Shi'ite Islam, not nationalistic animus. But as the new Iranian state solidified its position, its ideology started to change, especially after Mahmud Ahmadinejad took power. It was discovered that the Iranian revolution was launched not so much to promote a Shi'ite revolution all over the globe as to speed Iran's transformation into a mighty power.

Modernization and the striving to master nuclear power were nothing but a continuation of the shah's policy. Rehabilitating the last shah was out of the question, as no Soviet ideologist would dare cast a positive light on Nicholas II, the last czar, but the glory of all previous rulers was reinforced, especially the Achaemenids.

The Achaemenids, cast by Khomeini in a way quite similar to the images in the movie 300, re-emerged as the founders of a great state. The ancient Persian Empire did not just surpass all others in its military, economic and cultural achievements; it was the first to invent the "Iranian/Persian idea", so similar to the "Russian idea" as the model for humanity to follow. Indeed, an Iranian observer stated that it was the Iranians who put forward and implemented the idea of the brotherhood of all. This, the observer noted, could be clearly seen in the Iranian tradition in dealing with the Jews.

Responding to Western critics of President Ahmadinejad's reported statement that Israel should be destroyed and that the Holocaust did not occur, Iranian pundits noted that Western observers not only misinterpreted his statements but also demonstrated an absolute inability to understand Iran's approach to the Jews.

One observer noted that Cyrus the Great - founder of the Achaemenid dynasty - brought the Jews from Babylonian captivity and appointed the Jewish prophet Daniel to be his adviser. This demonstrated clearly that the Jews were not discriminated against and could occupy any position in Iranian society. This tradition continues: Iranian Jews have absolutely the same rights as everybody else and have representatives in the Iranian Parliament. The same holds for other minorities in the Iranian state.

This tradition of benign treatment of minorities, the writer says, can be traced to the time of the Achaemenid Empire. Mardonius, commander-in-chief of the Persian forces that invaded Greece during the Greek-Persian War, was, according to one Persian observer, an ethnic Greek. This once again demonstrates the absolute equality of all subjects of the king. Anyone, regardless of ethnic origin, could receive high and politically sensitive jobs. Moreover, the fact that Mardonius led the Persian army against the Greeks indicated that his loyalty was first of all to Persia/Iran, not to his ethnic kin.

All these appeals to the Achaemenian past, in fact to the entire pre-Islamic history, indicate that nationalistic feeling is as strong as Islamic fervor in modern Iran. In fact, Shi'ism, a creed of universal revolution, has become just an ingredient of nationalistic discourse. But does this mean that the appeal of the early revolutionary era is completely removed from Iran's political/ideological life? To answer this question, we may once again turn to the Soviet regime.

Reinventing revolution
The increasingly nationalistic, state-oriented ideology that motivated the Soviet elite and populace in 1930-85 did not mean that revolutionary ideologies were out of place. The red banner, hammer and sickle, and icon-type pictures of Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Lenin were prominently displayed. The state officially celebrated November 7, the day of Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and was eager to support "revolutions" or "progressive" movements/regimes all over the world.

All this helped promote the geopolitical interest of the state. If there was a problem, the Soviets could easily proclaim that the regimes in the former Yugoslavia and China were "reactionary". And the Soviet regime had to close its eyes when friendly regimes massacred communists, as did Saddam Hussein.

This model holds for the present Iranian regime. Certainly the regime commemorates the Iranian revolution and proclaims that it is ready to help fellow Shi'ites in Iraq. But it apparently also provides support to Sunni insurgents, and according to some reports even to the Taliban, with whom the Iranians have been at loggerheads recently. The reason, plainly, is that these groups create problems for the Iranian elite's claimed arch-rival in the Middle East - the United States.

The US itself has followed the same model. On one hand, the neo-conservative elite supposedly tried to "reinvent" the American Revolution. And the administration of President George W Bush, at least at the beginning of its second term, promulgated that the spread of democracy all over the world was the major goal of US foreign policy, a bequest of the nation's founding fathers. But one can easily discern that not noble slogans but geopolitical pragmatism are what poise the US for possible war with Iran.

It is clear that Iranian foreign policy - like the foreign policy of any great power - is not defined by revolutionary slogans. The belief that Iranians are driven by revolutionary ideology is as naive as to assume that Soviet or US foreign policy has been conditioned by a desire to bring socialism or capitalist democracy to the world. Iranian pragmatic nationalism implies that Iran clearly understands its national interests and will stubbornly defend these interests. The Iranians will not be deceived by sweet talk. And the Iranian elite are not a bunch of fanatics; they can engage in negotiation and compromise if their key demands are satisfied.

Dmitry Shlapentokh, PhD, is associate professor of history, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Indiana University South Bend. He is author of East Against West: The First Encounter - The Life of Themistocles (2005).

(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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