Page 2 of 2 Turkey not done with the
Kurds By M K Bhadrakumar
functioning in northern Iraq. The
leadership of Massoud Barzani has powerful backers
in the US and Israel. Most important, US
priorities are vastly different from the Cold War
era, or the 1990s.
Turkey refused to
cooperate with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The strain persists, in spite of appearances.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish militia has proved to be a
valuable ally of the US. Kurdistan has since
become the staging ground for US and Israeli
intelligence's covert operations against Iran. It
is a strategic asset
in the
event of any US military strike against Iran.
Over and above all, the fabulous oilfields
of Kirkuk beckon US and Israeli business
interests. Evidently, it is in the interests of
the US and Israel that the region must remain an
oasis of stability. Israel, in particular, would
gain immensely if Kurdistan gained full
independence.
Also, Kurdish nationalism
can be a potent weapon for Washington's
geostrategy. It modulates the complex triangular
equations involving Turkey, Iran and Syria. The
United States' ultimate intentions in Kurdistan
remain obscure. Washington keeps assuring Turkey
of its sympathy in fighting terrorism but does
little to curb PKK activities. Barzani is
diverting US arms supplies to the PKK.
Turkey must wonder what could be
Washington's Plan B if the present "surge" in Iraq
fails. Washington is hinting at a "Korean model"
of a "long and enduring presence" in Iraq. The
motives driving long-term US ambitions in Iraq are
understandable, but Turkey would worry if
Washington's plan of consolidating 14 "enduring
bases" included bases in Kurdistan, as that would
only strengthen its security alliance with the
Kurds. The Kurdish media reported on US plans to
open three huge bases in Arbil, Duhok and
Sulaymaniyah. When tensions began to rise along
the Turkish-Iraqi border recently, two US
warplanes violated Turkish airspace. US diplomacy
is skilled in such balancing acts.
In
short, the escalation of PKK violence; Barzani's
belligerence toward Turkey; the United States'
double standards toward Turkey's "war on terror" -
these form a puzzle that Turkey must figure out.
One of Turkey's best-informed editors, Oktay Eksi,
wrote recently in the establishment daily
Hurriyet, "In short, we are playing a game whose
beginning and end are known to all, because there
is no possibility Washington will green-light
Turkey conducting a military operation in northern
Iraq, and our government lacks the courage and
political will to do so on its own." But the
alignments are not that straightforward, either.
A dozen knots tie the US Army and the
Turkish military, dating to doctrine that took its
name from the late US president Harry S Truman and
which saw the US Congress grant military and
economic aid to Turkey and Greece.
The
Turkish military would feel disoriented if these
close ties were snapped. A similar predicament
holds good for the Turkish political elite,
including serious politicians (both secular-minded
"Kemalists" and "Islamists"), powerful captains of
industry and business, and even much of Turkey's
intelligentsia weaned on Western enlightenment.
The elite in Ankara and Istanbul would also
calculate whether the vibrant Turkish economy
could withstand jolts from the International
Monetary Fund; whether the Turkish stock exchange
or the Turkish lira would remain calm; and, of
course, whether Turkey could afford to forgo its
highly profitable US$10 billion border trade with
northern Iraq.
Experience shows that a
brigade-strength military incursion into the
3.5-kilometer-broad swath of land where Turkey
already maintains half a dozen or so forward
operating/fire bases inside Iraq is something that
the US (and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership) could
live with. The question, therefore, narrows down
to what more Turkey hopes to achieve.
From
the Israel-Hezbollah battle in Lebanon last year,
it emerges that an organized guerrilla force
cannot be vanquished through a sweeping military
operation. The Associated Press quoted Turkish
intelligence as saying that Iraqi Kurdish militias
were preparing defenses against a possible
military incursion. According to Turkish
estimates, up to 3,800 PKK cadres are based inside
northern Iraq, while up to 2,300 operate inside
Turkey. This is a substantial enemy.
Also
in recent weeks, violence has increased between
Arabs and Kurds. Sunni insurgents aim to isolate
the city of Kirkuk, which faces a referendum to
see whether it should be incorporated in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Groups aligned with al-Qaeda claimed
responsibility for the recent bombing of Sarha
Bridge connecting Kirkuk with Baghdad. Thus the
danger that Turkey could be drawn into a
protracted Iraqi quagmire remains palpable. A
Turkish-US confrontation would only advance the
cause of independent Kurdistan.
What can
be expected, therefore, is that in the coming
weeks Turkey will continue to press Washington to
prevail on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to
restrain PKK activities. Ankara has economic
leverage over Iraqi Kurds. For its food and fuel,
consumer articles and construction materials,
Iraqi Kurds depend on Turkish supplies. Turkey
provides 20% of Kurdistan's electricity and water
supplies. Kurdistan's economic dependency on
Turkey will only increase if the security
situation within Iraq deteriorates further.
Turkey has succeeded in highlighting that
there is indeed a "red line" beyond which it won't
brook threats to its security. According to the
editor-in-chief of the English-language New
Anatolian newspaper, Ilnur Cevik, Ankara may in
effect have cornered Barzani. Cevik said, "Iraqi
Kurds are feeling the urgency to respond to
Ankara's demands to deal with the PKK." He said
they are already in urgent consultation with the
Baghdad government "seeking ways to appease Ankara
without actually launching a military operation
against the PKK in their mountains".
Ankara will monitor how the pressures on
the Iraqi Kurds work between now and September,
when Washington's Iraq "surge" is due to be
reviewed. A new government will be in place in
Ankara by then, and a president gets elected. This
is where Shlykov's remarks on military
professionalism count.
The Pashas have a
deep sense of history. Theirs is not an army that
marches on its stomach. They are going to weigh
carefully the pros and cons of a military
intervention in Iraq. A misstep could unravel the
post-Ottoman settlement of the early 1920s, which
was Kemal Mustafa Ataturk's finest legacy to the
Turkish nation.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for more than 29 years, with postings
including ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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