Page 1 of 2 The struggle for
Kirkuk turns ugly By Sami
Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Over the weekend, the
London daily Al-Hayat published a two-part
interview with Jalal Talabani, the president of
Iraq. Talabani, a seasoned Kurdish nationalist and
Iraqi statesman, spoke of the current conditions
in war-torn Iraq, hardships during his years in
the underground, and made interesting references
to Kirkuk, the oil-rich city that is currently
witnessing much violence and which Iraqi Kurds
want to be
incorporated into Iraqi
Kurdistan.
In 1986, as part of
his Arabization process, Saddam Hussein called for
the relocation of Arab families to Kirkuk, the
center of Iraq's petroleum industry, to outnumber
the Kurds living there. He also uprooted thousands
of Kurds from Kirkuk. Since the downfall of
Saddam's regime in 2003, the Kurds have been
demanding Kirkuk, something that the Sunnis curtly
refuse, and are returning to the city en masse.
Some observers point to the "struggle for
Kirkuk" as the real reason why the Turks are
seemingly so serious about invading Iraqi
Kurdistan. If given to the Kurds, the city would
add tremendous political, geographical and
financial wealth to Iraqi Kurds, which in turn
threatens neighboring country's like Turkey, Iran
and Syria.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki,
in a search for friends in Iraqi domestics, has
allied himself with the Kurds and backed Article
140 which says that a referendum should be held in
Kirkuk to see whether its inhabitants favor
remaining part of Iraq, or being annexed to
Kurdistan.
Given that authorities have
started, under Maliki's instigation, to call on
the 12,000 Arab families brought to Kirkuk by
Saddam to return to their Arab districts, the
referendum will almost certainly come out in favor
of annexation to Kurdistan.
Kurdish
aspirations are becoming serious - and dangerous -
to Iraqi Arabs. The US is seemingly supportive of
these aspirations, complicating matters all the
more for Turkey, Iraqi Arabs and neighboring Iran,
which is also very worried about the future of
Kirkuk.
In his interview, Talabani
recalled that at one point, when he raised the
issue of Kirkuk with former prime minister Tarek
Aziz, the latter told him that in this regard,
"You [the Kurds] have one right: to weep as you
pass through Kirkuk [since it will never become a
Kurdish city]." Talabani replied: "Thank you Abu
Zayd. You are a generous man." Aziz snapped back:
"Are you joking?" Talabani replied: "No. I am not.
There are 15 million Shi'ites who are deprived the
right to weep on Ashura [a holy Shi'ite day]; at
least you give us the right to cry."
Kirkuk came to the world's attention
during the era of Iraq's founder, King Faysal I,
when an oil gusher was discovered in 1927. The oil
field was put into operation by the Iraqi
Petroleum Company in 1934 and has been producing
oil ever since, currently making up to 1 millions
barrels per day (half of all Iraqi oil exports).
By 1998, Kirkuk still had reserves of
10 billion barrels. At the time of the downfall
of Saddam's regime, the city (250 kilometers
north of Baghdad) had a population of 755,700. In
1973, Kurdish leader Mullah Mustapha al-Barzani
laid formal claim to Kirkuk, something that the
regime of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr considered a
declaration of war.
By 1974, authorities
in Baghdad had split the district in two, naming
the area around it al-Ta'mim, and redrawing its
borders to give it an Arab majority. According to
Human Rights Watch, from 1991 until 2003, Saddam
systematically expelled an estimated 120,000 Kurds
from Kirkuk and other towns and villages, to
increase their Arab population. Since coming to
Iraq in 2003, the Americans have never concealed
their interest in oil.
Due to
numerous attacks on Iraqi oilfields in 2003-04,
including the country's 7,000-kilometer pipeline
system, the US set up Task Force Shield to guard
oilfields, particularly in the Kirkuk district. In
January 2004, the Los Angeles Times quoted Kurdish
politician Barham Salih as saying, "We have a
claim to Kirkuk rooted in history, geography and
demographics." If this claim is not acknowledged,
he added, it would be a "recipe for civil war".
Watching all of the above - and taking
sides - is Maliki. The Shi'ites of Iraq are
generally in a dilemma with the Kurds. The Kurds
are overwhelmingly pro-American, with an alliance
with the United States that dates to the 1970s
under secretary of state Henry Kissinger.
The Shi'ites are not particularly pro-American.
One thing that brings part of the Shi'ites
closer to the Kurds is the issue of autonomy.
Certain Shi'ite groups, headed by the Supreme
Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) have
repeatedly called for creating an autonomous
Shi'ite district in southern Iraq, similar to the
Kurdish one in the north.
This leaves the
Iraqi Sunnis, who favor unity and Arab
nationalism, stranded in the middle - where there
is no oil. Maliki, who faces tremendous pressure
for his repeated failure to bring stability to
Iraq and disarm the militias, has one of two
choices. Either he has to reconcile with the
Sunnis, which is difficult given his sectarian
upbringing, or with the Kurds.
Making
friends with both, or continuing to alienate both,
is impossible. Relying on support within his
Shi'ite community is no longer enough, especially
since many parties in the all-Shi'ite United Iraqi
Alliance have started to lose faith in his
leadership. Reconciliation with the Sunnis - in as
much as this is being called for by the Americans
- is difficult for Maliki.
In his heart of
hearts, he does not want it. He wants to punish
the Sunnis collectively because Saddam was one of
them and
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