COMMENT A little bending can
greatly benefit Iran By Kaveh L
Afrasiabi
Instead of flatly rejecting
United Nations Security Council resolutions for
the suspension of its nuclear enrichment program,
the Islamic Republic of Iran must minimally comply
or otherwise face tougher sanctions portended in
last week's Group of Eight joint communique.
A third round of UN sanctions can be
averted if all sides in the Iran nuclear standoff
engage in good faith diplomacy aimed at preventing
a military confrontation, per the recent warning of
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei.
At
this week's meeting of the governing board of the
IAEA, the representatives of the Non-Aligned
Movement once again interceded on Iran's behalf
and urged the resolution of the Iran nuclear
crisis "within the framework of the IAEA". This is
in line with Iran's demand to jettison the UN
Security Council from the negotiations on its
nuclear dossier. Iran's envoy to the IAEA, Ali
Asghar Soltanieh, has made it clear that Iran's
recent reluctance to cooperate with the IAEA was
spurred by the governing board's decision to
dispatch its dossier to the UN. Soltanieh has also
stated that until the negotiations are taken out
of the Security Council's hands, Iran will refuse
to answer further questions about its nuclear
program.
The IAEA's
quandary Caught by the cross-currents of
opposing or contrasting views on Iran, the IAEA is
experiencing a difficult moment that may get worse
as the nuclear crisis drags on in light of
escalated pressure by Israel and hawkish US
politicians calling for a military solution.
The problem is partly due
to the constant juggling act of ElBaradei,
who has retreated a bit from his recent bold
statements at the governing board's meeting that
the international community needs to take a
revised approach to Iran's nuclear progress. His
statements elicited a harsh response from US
officials led by Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice. ElBaradei's softened stance has now fueled
the same "new crazies" thirsting for war with
Iran. In fact, a lot of them are old crazies, ie,
the same neo-conservatives who campaigned for a
war on Iraq, such as Daniel Pipes, who is now busy
churning out articles on why Turkey should allow
its airspace to be used by Israeli jets attacking
Iran.
ElBaradei's and the IAEA's ambiguity
and "double speak" must be resolved quickly, one
way or another. That may necessitate a more
forceful elaboration and a more pronounced version
of his "truth speak" regarding Iran's near-mastery
of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although ElBaradei's
spokesperson, Melisa Fleming, has cast doubt on a
French report on Iran's installation of 8,000
centrifuges by the year's end, the process is
neither reversible nor even stoppable (short of a
prolonged bombing of Iran's facilities that would
mean regional and global disaster). The temporary
"time out" called for by the IAEA is unlikely to
produce any long-term results.
However,
this does not mean that Iran should oppose the
"time out" proposal altogether. Unconfirmed
reports say that in his recent talks with European
Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, Iran's
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani has shown new
signs of flexibility. Larijani's deputy, Javad
Vaeedi, has also indicated some progress in last
week's talks with Solana's deputy and another
round of talks is scheduled soon, amid the growing
skepticism of experts who call it an exercise in
fruitless "circular diplomacy".
"The idea
of suspension is old and Iran welcomes new ideas
without suspension," Vaeedi has stated, echoing
Larijani's call for a "new logic" in nuclear
negotiations on the part of the EU and others.
However, Iran must clearly demonstrate its
willingness to accommodate such new logic by
seriously entertaining the ideas and proposals
currently on or off the table, including the
following:
A temporary, eg, three month,
suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities. This would freeze the momentum for new
sanctions, albeit temporarily, and Iran's
confidence-building initiative would spur new
energies for removing its dossier from the
Security Council. It would also create
badly-needed space for a vigorous diplomatic and
technical search for long-term solutions.
A longer-term, eg, six month, standby
wherein Iran's centrifuges would be operational
without any actual enrichment. This would be
another confidence-building gesture on Iran's part
to give diplomatic talks more room.
A
"slow-down" by Iran in delaying the installation
of additional centrifuge cascades, together with
more transparency and cooperation with the IAEA
regarding "lingering questions", such as the
chronology of the centrifuge program.
Iran
has already made recent progress which has
culminated in revised approaches by ElBaradei,
Solana and others who recognize the virtual
impossibility of halting Tehran's nuclear fuel
program. Building on that progress now requires
increased flexibility by Iran to facilitate the
"return" of its dossier from the security council
to the IAEA - although the dossier has never
technically left the IAEA and has only been
parceled out to the UN.
It is noteworthy
that Iran has normally shown a great deal of
deference towards the UN. An example is the
Security Council's praise for Iran's humanitarian
treatment of Afghan refugees. Iran is also keen to
cultivate good relations with UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon, particularly because Ban reportedly
favors an enhanced UN role in Iraq and, as such,
it is vitally important for Iran to be on good
terms with him.
With the US enjoying a new
honeymoon with a Europe increasingly dominated by
right-wing politicians, Iran's old strategy of
exploiting the US-EU policy gaps is no longer
working. And with both China and Russia on board
with UN sanctions, Tehran needs a new approach..
What price for nuclear
rights? The head of Iran's parliamentary
national security and foreign policy commission,
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, has stated that Iran is
willing to "pay the price" for its nuclear
program. Certainly, that makes sense in light of
the illegal US-led pressures to deprive Iran of
its nuclear technology. It's also reminiscent of a
famous statement by former Pakistani prime
minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that Pakistanis were
willing to eat grass for the country's nuclear
program.
But it is far from clear that
Iran faces the kind of threat that compelled
Pakistan's nuclearization during the 1970s, due to
India's proliferation. With the possibility of
Saddam Hussein's WMD gone and the Persian Gulf
region in no danger of similar risks, it is
difficult for Iran to rationalize a "nuclear
shield". President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has
repeatedly stated that the "era of nuclear bombs"
has passed and pointed at Israel's debacle in
Lebanon and the demise of the Soviet Union as
examples of how nuclear weapons are useless.
Many Iran experts argue that the country
must go nuclear due to the US military build-up
and President George W Bush's demonization of Iran
as one-third of an "axis of evil". But the US has
been mired in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time
and has no reason to attack Iran. Nor is Israel an
imminent threat to Iran, a factor which would call
for the possession of nuclear bombs as a
deterrent. The "regional prestige" argument also
fails, as any Iranian proliferation would simply
ignite a costly counter-proliferation by Saudi
Arabia and set back the relatively cordial
relations of the two countries for a long time.
Thus, the price that Iran should be
willing to pay is not to be compared to Pakistan,
whose arsenal is fixed rather permanently against
India and who is expected to sign the 25-year
natural gas "peace pipeline" contract with Iran
and India soon. Iran's national interests do not
include paying a disproportionate price for the
limited and purely economic purposes of its
nuclear program. However, a measured price is an
entirely different story. With a pragmatic,
flexible approach Iran can avoid paying a high
price that could exact terrible sacrifices.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the
author of After Khomeini: New Directions in
Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and
co-author of "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear
Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume
XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu.
He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential
latent", Harvard International Review, and is
author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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