SPEAKING FREELY A silent revolution in Turkey By A B McConnel
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Here's the latest news from Turkey: there will be no coup. Nor will sharia law
be imposed. Instead, the economy will continue to grow, the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) will most likely consolidate its parliamentary majority
in the July 22 elections, and Turkey's regional clout will continue to
increase.
Sound counterintuitive? Only if one pays excessive attention to reports about
Turkey in the international press or the more
sensationalist or alarmist Turkish publications, and not enough to actual
developments in Turkish society. Turkey is undergoing a silent revolution, but
one that has nothing to do with soldiers or fundamentalists.
According to data included in a recent report by progressive Istanbul
non-governmental organization TESEV (the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation), support among the Turkish population for a government based on
sharia (Islamic) law has fallen under 10%, 77% believe that democracy is better
than any other form of government, and more than 50% believe that democracy can
be preserved without any "support" from the military.
Where has this support for democracy and rule of law come from? The most likely
source is the emergence of a "true" Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie into Turkey's
corridors of power. In fact, it may not be much of a stretch to say that Turkey
is undergoing its own form of French Revolution, the Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie
rising to put an end to aristocratic domination.
Can Paker, the president of TESEV, explained in a recent interview that Turkey
is experiencing the emergence of a "new" middle class composed largely of
recent migrants to Turkey's main urban centers. This new middle class, despite
identifying itself as "Muslim", is worried much more about its standard of
living, the economy and whether or not its children will be educated well than
about imposing sharia law.
As Turkish citizens are aware, the new Turkish-Muslim bourgeois may not look as
one expects: he wears a comfortable Polo, appropriate (but not cheap) belt on
slacks, sensible shoes, fashionable wire-rim glasses, and a mustache; she may
or may not wear a headscarf, but if she does, the mark is most likely
expensive, like Vakko. Their daughter may (or may not) wear a headscarf, and
may be smoking a cigarette as she walks down Istiklal Street, the cultural
heart of Istanbul and Turkey, with her punk-rock friends. Their son dresses
nicely, but not loudly; it's just as likely that he listens to Placebo or
Eminem as to Ibrahim Tatlises, the king of Turkish "Arabesque" music. If he's
not using his iPod, then he's chatting with his girlfriend on one of the most
recently released mobile telephones.
Most probably their roots are in an Anatolian village or burgeoning Anatolian
urban center such as Adana, Denizli, Gaziantep or Kayseri. But they are
thriving in increasingly cosmopolitan Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. Urban
Kemalist-elite Turks constantly complain that they are seeing more and more
scarved women on the streets. But TESEV's numbers show that the percentage of
Turkish women wearing scarves has actually dropped. And only 4% of polled
respondents thought that the headscarf issue was one of the two most important
issues facing Turkey. Apparently, the new bourgeoisie have hit the streets in
Turkey's big cities.
To the new Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie, questions about whether Islam is
compatible with capitalism, or whether Islam is compatible with democracy, are
silly: of course capitalism and democracy are compatible with Islam, and always
have been. In reality, these questions will soon be recognized for the risible
red herrings that they are, put forth by those who fear the writing on the
wall: Turkey is coming, and coming fast, leading the Islamic world as an
example of independently achieved development as well as economic and political
stability.
The changes and statistics described above are the real reasons for the current
tensions in Turkish society, the 100,000-strong marches, the midnight press
releases from the Turkish military, the acts of violence in urban areas
committed by individuals loosely associated with Turkey's "deep state". The
centers of power in Turkey are surreptitiously changing hands. Little by
little, the traditional Turkish pseudo-bourgeoisie of Kemalist soldiers,
bureaucrats and old-guard intellectuals is relinquishing the real political
decision-making to an actual Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie composed of esnaf,
ie, small-to-middle-sized-business people, and industry, represented by TUSIAD,
the Turkish business association dominated by massive Turkish holding companies
such as Koc, Sabanci and Eczacibasi.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the premier and head of the AKP, is a prominent example
of the Turkish-Muslim esnaf. His childhood and formative years were
spent in Kasimpasa, a working-class area of Istanbul, after his family migrated
to that city from the eastern Black Sea city of Rize. Erdogan now has assets
worth millions of US dollars. His son, Bilal, graduated from Harvard and had an
internship at the World Bank, and Erdogan's wife and daughters wear
headscarves. The AKP's parliamentary candidate list, released for the July 22
elections, was described by some commentators as a putsch against its last
Islamically inspired members.
This means that the party's pragmatists, those who have no interest in pursuing
radical political programs, have achieved the upper hand.
But after all, a main goal of the Kemalist elite has always been to create
exactly this Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie. That was the point of such projects as
the infamous 1942 Wealth Tax, which was, in essence, a forced capital transfer
from the Turkish minority bourgeoisie composed of Armenians, Greeks and Jews to
Muslim Turkish business people. But for various political, economic and social
reasons, the true Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie has only recently developed to the
point where it can flex its political muscles. As a result, Turkey has been
making fast headway on the road to economic development.
A last note for those interested in sports. The Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie's
favorite soccer club tends to be the same as that of their most famous
representative, Erdogan: Fenerbahce, Brazilian Roberto Carlos's new team.
A B McConnel is finishing a history master of arts program at Sabanci
University in Istanbul, with a focus on Republican Turkish history and
Turkish-US relations. He has lived in Istanbul since 1999.
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