Page 1 of 2 Iran's moment of nuclear
scrutiny By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Next week, a high-level delegation from
the International Atomic Energy Agency will visit
Iran in what Tehran's envoy to the IAEA, Ali
Asghar Soltanieh, has called a "decisive" turning
point in the history of Iran's relations with the
United Nations' atomic watchdog agency.
The main purpose of the visit by the IAEA,
led by its deputy director, Olli Heinonen, is to
draw up a 60-day "modality" plan to
resolve all outstanding issues
regarding Iran's nuclear dossier. Iran's message
that it has taken a constructive path in
cooperation with the IAEA has been widely
disseminated, including by the Chinese and various
European governments. They are calling for a pause
on further sanctions on Iran, and this alone
represents a small victory for Iran's nuclear
diplomacy, which is keen on putting the IAEA at
the center stage of negotiations.
The UN
Security Council has imposed two rounds of
sanctions on Iran over fears its nuclear research
and uranium enrichment is geared toward building a
nuclear arsenal, and not simply for energy
purposes. Iran insists it is operating within its
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rights, and
hence refuses to stop enrichment activities.
Much rides on next week's negotiations. A
failed agreement will definitely spur the Security
Council's drive toward tougher sanctions and, most
likely, lead to an indefinite postponement of
Russia's completion of the Bushehr power plant in
Iran.
Concerning the latter, Russia's
nuclear officials have made clear that Bushehr
will not go operational any time in 2007 and, in
reaction, various Iranian parliamentarians, such
as Soleiman Jaafarzadeh and Heshmatollah
Falahatpisheh, have criticized Russia as
unreliable and prone to "bargain with America over
Iran".
In the aftermath of his meeting
with President George W Bush in Maine, President
Vladimir Putin has agreed to cooperate with the US
on "curbing Iran's nuclear program", and many in
Tehran see this as a discrete message by the
Kremlin that it will hold Bushehr hostage to
nuclear diplomacy. This irrespective of the major
dent in Iran-Russia relations it has caused and
the allure of Iran's incentive of two or more
power plants to be built by Russia at a future
date.
That aside, should Heinonen return
with a solid agreement, then not only the US-led
push for sanctions will most likely be put to the
backburner, the issue of present sanctions will
also come under critical scrutiny, particularly if
the IAEA ends up giving Iran a relatively "clean
bill of health".
For the moment, few
people, especially in Western capitals, expect the
latter scenario in light of their convictions,
bordering on an article of faith, regarding Iran's
"nuclear ambitions".
At this important
juncture, Iran appears focused on its priorities
with the IAEA and the need to offset the stream of
various provocations aimed at derailing the
negotiation process. The anti-Iran disinformation
mill is working extra time. For example, Javier
Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief,
has flatly denied a Reuters' dispatch claiming
that he has accused Iran of meddling in Gaza.
Given Solana's key role as Europe's interlocutor
with Iran on the nuclear question, the aim of such
disinformation is self-evident.
With
respect to Heinonen, in his previous reports on
Iran he has shown an uncanny willingness to adopt
certain "information" of dubious value funneled by
the US government. (See The IAEA and the new world
order, Asia Times Online, February 3,
2006.) Open issues are how strongly Heinonen will
press Iran for the "time-out" proposal put forward
by his boss, Mohammad ElBaradei, and how Iran will
respond. Under this proposal, Iran would stop
uranium enrichment expansion in return for a halt
to further UN sanctions.
According to
Javad Vaeedi, a key Iranian nuclear negotiator and
head of the international affairs department of
the Supreme National Security Council, the
time-out proposal "is not even on the table". Yet,
this does not mean that it will not be so next
week, in light of the more positive reaction by
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson. He informed
the world's media just last week that Iran was
considering this proposal, echoing an earlier
reaction of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.
There may be a slight difference of
opinion between the Foreign Ministry and the
Supreme National Security Council on this matter,
as well as between President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
and Ali Larijani, the chief nuclear negotiator.
Come next week, Iran must decide to throw the
chips on the table one way or another, in other
words, it cannot risk singing different tunes by
different branches of the government.
Inside Iran, there is growing sentiment in
favor of the "time-out" option. A case in point is
Sadegh Ziba Kalam, a prominent Tehran
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