Page 2 of 2 Basra tears itself
apart By Babak Rahimi
force, which has been blamed for
political assassinations since 2005.
In
reality, the followers of Muqtada also operate in
the oil-smuggling business, controlling Abu Flus
port, which is a major center for the export of
crude oil sold on the black market. Amid such
rivalry, Wa'ili's provincial government faced a
major defeat when in April the provincial
parliament - which included smaller
Shi'ite groups such as Master
of All Martyrs and Hezbollah (an offshoot of the
Da'wa Party)- almost unseated him and challenged
Fadhila authority in the local parliament. The
blow to Fadhila's power has allowed Muqtada to
increase his influence in Basra's provincial
parliament and expand his popularity among the
urban poor, who view Fadhila as corrupt.
As Muqtada attempts to widen his influence
in Baghdad, the two rival factions have grown more
confrontational in Basra. In March, after British
forces departed the city, the headquarters of the
Fadhila party was destroyed, later leading to
urban clashes between the Mahdi and Fadhila
militias. The two parties have tried to play down
their differences, but in reality the Sadrists
will continue to push for domination over oil
commerce and Fadhila will most certainly fight to
retain its tenacious hold on the Southern Oil Co.
Seen in this context, the
Fadhila-SIIC-Muqtada feud has been largely over
control of local politics. Provincial politics,
especially in terms of control over territorial
domination in what can also be called the politics
of "fiefdom", have been central to the balance of
power between vying Shi'ite militia groups. Basra
is now undergoing a militarization of local
politics as a weakened Baghdad government loses
control of its southern provinces. Such
militarization processes, however, are also linked
to oil trafficking, as profit made from smuggling
helps the militias and preserves the factional
politics of the city.
Other factors
destabilizing Basra Other major factors
will play a role in the destabilization of Basra.
One problem concerns tribe-militia relations. Many
tribes face major challenges from urban militias,
especially formerly exiled Shi'ite groups such as
the SIIC, as competition over territorial
domination and oil trafficking grows with the
expansion of militia power.
The increase
in Shi'ite-Sunni conflict also represents a major
factor. Since the Samarra bombing in February
2006, Sunni communities continue to face the wrath
of Shi'ite militias. This May, for example, nearly
170 Sunni mosques were closed for security reasons
in response to the assassinations of a number of
Sunni clerics. With a long history of religious
movements, Basra is also witnessing the rise of
new millenarian currents, namely the movement led
by Karbala-based Ayatollah Mahmud al-Sarkhi
al-Hassani, who has gained support from
disgruntled Sadrists. All of these developments
could trigger further instability in a city devoid
of a functioning government.
What is
Iran's role in this complicated political
landscape? For the most part, Iran's influence in
Basra has been significant yet limited. Since the
1950s, Basra has been a major hub for Iraqi
nationalism (mainly the version advocated by
non-Ba'athist nationalists such as Abdul Karim
Qasim), and many Shi'ites (including nativist
parties such as Fadhila) are highly suspicious of
any Iranian presence in the city. As numerous
attacks on the Iranian consulate in the city
indicate, anti-Iranian sentiments run high in
Basra despite Tehran's efforts to create new
alliances with local Shi'ite factions, especially
with the Sadrists.
This does not mean,
however, that Iran is absent from Basra's
socio-economic life. Cultural and economic ties
between Basra and Iran have grown strong since
2003. Farsi is now spoken as a second language,
and many Iranian goods are sold in the Basra
markets. The Iranian toman (10 rials, equivalent
to 1.4 Iraqi dinars or about one-tenth of a US
cent) is a major currency in the Basra banking
system, and many use it in the open markets of the
city.
As for oil, the importation of
Iranian (refined) oil has increased from 8 million
to 11 million liters a day, and some Iraqi crude
oil is also refined in the Abadan and Kermanshah
refineries. As for military operations, Iranian
intelligence officers are reported to reside in
the city (some of them have dual citizenship), and
they travel freely between the two countries
through the Shalamcheh border crossing. [8]
Implications Although Iran's
impact on the daily life of Basra cannot be
ignored, the internal politics of Basra remains
critical to the stability of the city. Overall,
the problem in Basra is a localized conflict with
ties to Baghdad's political process. The rapid
recovery of Basra from militia politics would
require the following:
1. On immediate
terms, the Basra oil industry (production and
distribution) should come under the direct control
of Baghdad, ideally under the supervision of Basra
natives who have no links to any of the militia
groups. This move is crucial, as militia
jurisdiction over the production and distribution
of oil plays a central role in the consolidation
of militia power in the city.
2.
Accordingly, the containment of militia politics
will depend on the strong presence of an Iraqi
force trained in Baghdad and composed of
non-militia forces with no ties to local militia
groups. Although a major undertaking, this could
help bring some stability to the city by replacing
officials linked to militia with non-militia
officers who would receive their orders directly
from the prime minister.
3. Baghdad should
not only rely on the clerical circles in Najaf to
contain the militias, since much of the infighting
between militant factions in Basra regards the
control of local politics. Although Najaf may
influence the SIIC and the Sadrists (although not
necessarily enough to disarm the militias), it
will most likely fail to persuade Fadhila, which
is suspicious of the "quietist" school of thought
advocated by leading Najaf clerics.
In a
significant sense, the Basra Shi'ite religious
community, a major part of which is composed of
Fadhila, can be described as largely
regional-nationalist in contrast to the
conservative orthodoxy based in Najaf or the
transnational Islamists led by Tehran. This point
should be kept in mind as anti-Najaf millenarian
movements continue to grow in southern provinces
(especially in Karbala) and anti-Iranian
sentiments remain strong in Basra.
The
opinion regarding the US and British role in the
political order of Basra is clear: it is dangerous
to become involved. One of the gravest mistakes
made by the British since 2003 was their
overwhelming reliance on the Badr Corps to impose
order on the city and its suburbs.
By
taking sides, Britain has (unintentionally)
shifted the balance of power by allocating too
much authority to the Badr Corps. Although British
forces have contributed to most of the security in
the city since 2003 (despite the argument that
they have also failed to do so because of their
inability to quash the militias), the stability of
Basra will largely depend on a multi-sectarian
Iraqi Army administrated from Baghdad, not an
occupied force or a militia faction.
Furthermore, the main problem with overtly
(or clandestinely) strengthening or arming one of
the factions is that it could entail unintended
consequences that most likely would harm the
country rather than contribute to its stability.
Conclusion For the time being,
Baghdad remains Basra's worst enemy. The lack of a
stable and relatively centralized government, at
least in this transitional stage, is at the heart
of the problem. Without a stable government, Basra
is destined to experience the sort of violence
that Beirut suffered two decades ago.
A
major civil-militia war in Basra seems imminent,
and the consolidation of a centralized Iraqi
government (including administrative and
non-sectarian federated features) may be the
country's best solution. Basra's meltdown could
well foretell the future of Iraq as a failed
state. Even worse, it could mean the unraveling of
a dysfunctional city that may threaten the
stability of the Persian Gulf region and beyond.
Babak Rahimi received a PhD from
the European University Institute, Florence,
Italy. Dr Rahimi has also studied at the
University of Nottingham and London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK. He was a
senior fellow at the United States Institute of
Peace from 2005 to 2006, where he conducted
research on Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shi'ite
politics in post-Ba'athist Iraq. He is currently
an assistant professor at the department of
literature, program for the study of religion,
University of California, San Diego.
Notes 1. For a recent
study of Basra that argues this point, see
International Crisis Group, "Where Is Iraq
Heading? Lesson from Basra", No 67, June 25, 2007.
2. The alliance was never formed, perhaps, as
a follower of Muqtada suggests, because of Haeri's
close ties to the Iranian government. Author
interview, Najaf, Iraq, August 7, 2005. 3. See
Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of
Conflict, edited by Markus E Bouillon, David M
Malone and Ben Rowswell. London, Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Press, 2007. 4. Ibid. 5. Including
al-Amarah, some of the Basra branch of the Mahdi
Army is based in this northern district, where Abu
Qadir, a major officer in Muqtada's militia, was
killed early last month by British forces. Baztab,
June 5, 2007. 6. Reider Visser, Basra, The
Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in
Southern Iraq. Munster, New Brunswick: Lit
Verlag, 2005. 7. In fact, he comes from an
affluent family of oil merchants. Author
interview, Basra, Iraq, August 13, 2005. 8.
Author interview, Basra, Iraq, August 13, 2005.
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