The following is
the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) [1]
released on Tuesday by the US Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which
serves as the head of the US Intelligence
Community, overseeing and directing the
implementation of the National Intelligence
Program and acting as the principal adviser to the
president, the National Security Council and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence
matters.
Key judgments We
judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and
evolving terrorist threat over the next three
years. The main threat comes
from
Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially
al-Qaeda, driven by their undiminished intent to
attack the Homeland and a continued effort by
these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their
capabilities.
We assess that greatly
increased worldwide counter-terrorism efforts over
the past five years have constrained the ability
of al-Qaeda to attack the US Homeland again and
have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland
as a harder target to strike than on 9/11
[September 11, 2001]. These measures have helped
disrupt known plots against the United States
since 9/11.
We are concerned, however, that this level of
international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes
a more distant memory and perceptions of the
threat diverge. Al-Qaeda is and will remain the
most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as
its central leadership continues to plan
high-impact plots, while pushing others in
extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts
and to supplement its capabilities.
We
assess the group has protected or regenerated key
elements of its Homeland attack capability,
including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational
lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we
have discovered only a handful of individuals in
the United States with ties to al-Qaeda senior
leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qaeda will
intensify its efforts to put operatives here.
As a result, we judge that the United States
currently is in a heightened threat environment.
We assess that al-Qaeda will continue to enhance
its capabilities to attack the Homeland through
greater cooperation with regional terrorist
groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qaeda will
probably seek to leverage the contacts and
capabilities of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), its most
visible and capable affiliate and the only one
known to have expressed a desire to attack the
Homeland.
In addition, we assess that its
association with AQI helps al-Qaeda to energize
the broader Sunni extremist community, raise
resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate
operatives, including for Homeland attacks. We
assess that al-Qaeda's Homeland plotting is likely
to continue to focus on prominent political,
economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal
of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic
destruction, significant economic aftershocks,
and/or fear among the US population. The group is
proficient with conventional small arms and
improvised explosive devices, and is innovative in
creating new capabilities and overcoming security
obstacles.
We assess that al-Qaeda will continue to try
to acquire and employ chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and
would not hesitate to use them if it develops what
it deems is sufficient capability. We assess
Lebanese Hezbollah, which has conducted anti-US
attacks outside the United States in the past, may
be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland
over the next three years if it perceives the
United States as posing a direct threat to the
group or Iran.
We assess that the spread
of radical - especially Salafi - Internet sites,
increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and
actions, and the growing number of radical,
self-generating cells in Western countries
indicate that the radical and violent segment of
the West's Muslim population is expanding,
including in the United States. The arrest and
prosecution by US law enforcement of a small
number of violent Islamic extremists inside the
United States - who are becoming more connected
ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical
sense to the global extremist movement - points to
the possibility that others may become
sufficiently radicalized that they will view the
use of violence here as legitimate.
We
assess that this internal Muslim terrorist threat
is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe,
however. We assess that other, non-Muslim
terrorist groups - often referred to as
"single-issue" groups by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation - probably will conduct attacks over
the next three years given their violent
histories, but we assess this violence is likely
to be on a small scale.
We assess that
globalization trends and recent technological
advances will continue to enable even small
numbers of alienated people to find and connect
with one another, justify and intensify their
anger, and mobilize resources to attack - all
without requiring a centralized terrorist
organization, training camp, or leader.
The ability to detect broader and more diverse
terrorist plotting in this environment will
challenge current US defensive efforts and the
tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will
also require greater understanding of how suspect
activities at the local level relate to strategic
threat information and how best to identify
indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of
legitimate interactions.
Note 1. NIEs are the
Intelligence Community's most authoritative
written judgments on national-security issues and
designed to help US civilian and military leaders
develop policies to protect US national-security
interests. NIEs usually provide information on the
current state of play but are primarily
"estimative": - that is, they make judgments about
the likely course of future events and identify
the implications for US policy.
The NIEs
are typically requested by senior civilian and
military policymakers, and congressional leaders
and at times are initiated by the National
Intelligence Council (NIC).
Before an NIE
is drafted, the relevant national intelligence
officer is responsible for producing a concept
paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates
it throughout the Intelligence Community (IC) for
comment. The TOR defines the key estimative
questions, determines drafting responsibilities,
and sets the drafting and publication schedule.
One or more IC analysts are usually assigned to
produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to
critique the draft before it is circulated to the
broader IC.
Representatives from the
relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate
line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working
with their agencies, representatives also assign
the level of confidence they have in key
judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality
of sources with collectors, and the National
Clandestine Service vets the sources used to
ensure the draft does not include any that have
been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.
All NIEs are reviewed by the National
Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI
and is composed of the heads of relevant IC
agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the president and senior policymakers.
The whole process of producing NIEs normally takes
at least several months.
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