Page 1 of 2 In cold blood: Sunnis feel the heat
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Surprisingly, few in the West took the assassination of Rahim
al-Hasnawi, a senior Shi'ite cleric who was close to Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, very seriously when it occurred in Iraq last month.
Hasnawi, Sistani's representative in the Jazeera neighborhood, north of the
holy city of Najaf, was murdered in a drive-by shooting. Apart from mourning
Iraqi Shi'ites, many wrote off the
murder as just another sectarian killing, something that has become common on
the streets of Iraq since at least February 2006.
Alarms went off this week, however, when another of Sistani's men - the holder
of his purse strings, Sheikh Abdullah Falak - was knifed to death in Najaf. He
was killed in one of the supposedly safest districts of Iraq, the compound of
Sistani, known as the offices of the marjiia - that is, guarded by
Sistani's loyalists and officials from the Iraqi government who operate under
the watchful
eye of the United States.
The murder caused an uproar in Shi'ite circles. They questioned how Sistani's
premises could be penetrated, pointing either to treason from within his
entourage or faulty security measures. Investigations led to the arrest of one
man who, according to the Ministry of Interior, was a member of the compound's
security. These men are usually hand-picked with great care after proving their
unwavering loyalty to the ayatollah. The accused had received funds, the
ministry said, from "an outside force".
Hasnawi and Falak were not controversial figures. They were not involved in
paramilitary activities nor were they party to any business deals, murky
financial transactions or illegal sexual activity.
The only thing that can be said about them is that they were loyal to Sistani,
a loner in Iraqi politics and a peaceful voice among the warlords of post-2003
Iraq. They paid a high price for their affiliation, being murdered in cold
blood for supporting a Gandhian leader who abhors violence.
Observers of the Iraqi scene argue that Hasnawi and Falak were not in fact the
real targets. By murdering them, the killers were sending a message to Sistani,
hoping to silence his moderate voice. The obvious questions are, why would
anybody want to harass or silence Sistani, and who are the "usual suspects" in
a country such as Iraq?
From the US perspective, two suspects would spring to mind. The first is
al-Qaeda, for its outspoken venom against Muslim Shi'ites; the other is Shi'ite
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
The latter name might raise some eyebrows, as it's difficult to imagine Muqtada
even thinking of harming Sistani. The veteran grand ayatollah saved Muqtada
from the hangman's noose in 2004 when he was waging war against the Americans
and then-prime minister Iyad Allawi.
But since then, Sistani has expressed his displeasure at Muqtada's wild
political maneuvers, criticizing him for tolerating sectarian violence and
being unable to control the Mahdi Army that fights in his name.
Last year, Sistani's men said he would resign from political life because he
was being sidelined and overshadowed by younger, more popular (although not
more respected) Shi'ites, a clear reference to Muqtada. It was only natural for
someone of Sistani's caliber to feel neglected. But the harsh reality is that
in times of war, Iraqis need protection (something Sistani cannot provide), not
wisdom. They need an angry young rebel like Muqtada, not a wise old man like
Sistani.
When a young Shi'ite walks up to Sistani and complains that his brother has
been killed for being a Shi'ite, Sistani reads him a verse from the Holy Koran,
then tells him to take the matter to the police. That's not what grieving
Iraqis want to hear. On the other hand, Muqtada, when confronted in such a way,
asks for a grace period and then brings the petitioner news of vengeance,
having killed the brother's assailants.
All of this, however, shows Sistani's frustration with Muqtada, not the other
way around. Muqtada, a man brought up to respect religious authority, has the
utmost admiration for the grand ayatollah. He respects his political stance and
ultimate religious authority, although he may be critical of Sistani's Iranian
origins and his support for Muqtada's main rival in politics, Abdul-Aziz
al-Hakim of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC).
It was Sistani's endorsement that led to the grand legislative victory in
December 2005 of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) that is headed by Hakim's
SIIC. At the same time, if it were not for the UIA, Muqtada would not be in
Parliament today (he recently ordered his 30 deputies to end their boycott).
On the ground, Sistani poses no real threat to Muqtada, given that he does not
operate a private militia. He cannot end Muqtada's influence in the slums of
Baghdad, nor has he ever tried. On the contrary, beneath the layers of
differences, the two men complement each other within the Shi'ite community.
Sistani provides the religious leadership and cultivates ties with upper-class
Shi'ites and rich businessmen within the community, while Muqtada leads the
poor, the uneducated and the frustrated. Sistani sees Muqtada as a son - a
mischievous one, perhaps, but a son nevertheless.
To point the finger of guilt at Muqtada, then, over the assassination of
Sistani's colleagues appears misguided.
The other suspect is al-Qaeda. No other "outside force", as the Ministry of
Interior said, is interested in or able to pull off such an operation. For a
variety of reasons, this argument sounds more reasonable. The radical Islamic
group is becoming more powerful in Iraq, contrary to all predictions that said
it would be weakened after the killing of its "prince", Musab al-Zarqawi, in
June 2006.
Al-Qaeda has also created a multitude of new enemies for itself, from both the
Sunni and the Shi'ite camps. And one of its loudest critics is none other than
Muqtada, who accuses the group of instigating violence against Shi'ites and
spreading sectarian strife, rather than fighting the Americans.
On Monday, Muqtada's office rejected all US claims drawing parallels between
his Mahdi Army and al-Qaeda. And recently, seven Sunni-led insurgent groups
united to work for two objectives: a US withdrawal from Iraq and a war on
al-Qaeda. They said they would continue their armed resistance operations
against the US but, echoing what Muqtada has been saying since 2005, accused
al-Qaeda of being a terrorist operation. This was
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eye of the United States.
