Page 2 of 2 Turkey: Islamists pay a price
for victory By M K Bhadrakumar
ultra-conservative Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) in the elections is to be
understood also in terms of the tensions in
Turkey's relations with the US and with the EU.
The hard reality is that in 2002 when
Erdogan took power, roughly half of Turkish people
viewed the US favorably. But Pew Research Center
poll this year saw that the United States'
favorability had declined to just about 9%. Turks
now view the US as the single biggest threat to
their national security. Graham Allison of
Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government recently wrote, "The Bush
administration has conducted the war in Iraq with
no regard for Turkey's interests. A US-backed,
autonomous, and increasingly emboldened Kurdish
Regional Government poses an existentialist threat
to nationalists in Turkey. Failure to address the
reality of a sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan for
members of the PKK - a Turkish-Kurdish terrorist
group - enrages even moderate Turks."
But
healing US-Turkey wounds will not be easy. It will
depend on Washington's preparedness to disengage
from Kurdish militant groups, which in turn is
linked to the US policy toward Iran as well as to
the war in Iraq. Much will depend on whether the
US continues to remain in a hostile mode toward
Tehran and will need Kurdish terrorists to act as
proxies in US-Israeli covert operations inside
Iran.
If a need arises for the US to seek
"enduring bases" in Iraqi Kurdistan, the
US-Kurdish blood alliance is bound to thicken even
further. Washington is keeping all options open in
northern Iraq. A week ahead of the July 22
election in Turkey, Ankara made a specific
allegation that weapons had been delivered in US
Army vehicles to Kurdish elements based in
northern Iraq, who were involved in cross-border
terrorism inside Turkey. Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gul said he sought an explanation from Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice.
Meanwhile, what
complicates the situation further is that the
AKP's mandate in Sunday's polls is also
significantly due to the electoral support it
garnered in the southeastern Kurdish majority
provinces. A reliable estimate is that at least
100 AKP members of Parliament (out of the party's
tally of 340 seats) in the 540-member legislature
could be of Kurdish origin. Add to that the
contingent of 20-25 Kurdish nationalist
parliamentarians who were elected as
"independents", and they will constitute an
important ally in Parliament whenever Erdogan
presses ahead with any reform program.
In
short, by sheer force of circumstances, the
Erdogan government will now have an impetus to
address the Kurdish problem in political terms.
But this involves not only coming up with
innovative ideas but also prevailing over the
rival views and ideologies of the
ultra-conservative MHP and the "Kemalist"
Republican People's Party (CHP).
And this
path needs to be navigated all the time with an
eye on Washington's true intentions. The journey
is going to be extremely tricky. The MHP leader
and former deputy prime minister, Devlet Bahceli,
is on record that his party will play a
"constructive role" in the new Parliament and
hopes to be the "home of compromise, tolerance and
dialogue", but will resist if the AKP resorts to
unilateralist policies.
Bahceli does not
accept Sunday's election as the final verdict on
how Turkish national policies must be crafted. He
attributes the AKP's success to a variety of
passing factors. At any rate, the MHP's future
lies in nibbling away at the AKP's extreme right
flank, which may become rather vulnerable even as
the party gravitates further toward the political
center.
Behind all this stands the Turkish
Army, which is yet to signal how it takes the
AKP's victory. Even though Turks ignored the
army's aversion toward AKP rule, they hold the
army as an institution (and as the ultimate
guardian of the nation's security), in high
esteem. Clearly, the army will not simply roll
over and allow the Erdogan government a free hand
on the Kurdish problem. The crunch comes if the
government moves toward opening dialogue directly
with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership of Massud
Barzani and Jalal Talabani, even though such a
move may seem sensible.
Compromise the
only way In a way, therefore, the
possibility of a Turkish military intervention in
Iraq may have actually increased in the
post-election phase. On the whole, the potential
for conflict is high in the coming period over
foreign-policy issues. There is a wide rage of
issues where the CHP's "Kemalist" platform and the
MHP's ultra-nationalist platform overlap, and they
will have the army's tacit backing. It can so
happen that the enthusiasm projected by the United
States and the European Union over the AKP's
magnificent election victory proves short-lived.
The heart of the matter is that democratic
reform in Turkey is tied to the country's EU
membership. Reform stalls if Turkey lacks the
political will, which follows from the Turkish
public's growing "Euro-skepticism". Only one-third
of the Turkish public today roots for EU
membership. Der Spiegel recently commented, "How
forcefully Turkey now continues on its path
towards Europe depends on Europe too. How long can
Turkey be strung along when it is increasingly
becoming clear that, at the end of the day, Europe
doesn't want it to join the EU? After all,
Turkey's real dilemma has far more to do with its
path to Europe than it does with the debate over
headscarves and miniskirts."
Besides,
Erdogan has a bitter pill to swallow if he is to
revive Turkey's EU accession talks. The present
impasse arises out of Ankara's refusal to open
Turkey's ports to Cyprus, which is an EU member.
This is an issue that easily arouses nationalist
sentiments within Turkey. The Turkish Army aspires
to play a major role in the making of Ankara's
Cyprus policy.
All in all, having secured
roughly 46% of votes and 60% of the seats in the
new Parliament, the AKP faces the prospect of
ruling through consensus. That is bound to keep
the political scene in a state of animation. There
could be a flashpoint any time, which may happen
by accident or by design. In essence, the AKP and
the Turkish military know they can barely tolerate
each other. The military will continue to view the
AKP's Islamist credentials with great suspicion.
The military can be expected to play an even more
decisive role in the period ahead. After some
hibernation, in all likelihood, the military will,
as the Turkish liberal daily Milliyet put it,
"make itself felt" in national politics, rather
than "roll the tanks out".
Erdogan seems
to appreciate that the political atmosphere
remains highly charged. In his victory speech in
Ankara, therefore, he gave two messages: first,
the AKP is a centrist party; and second, "we
understand the message of the 54% of Turkish
electorate who didn't vote for us". He implied
that he realizes the need for consensus.
Erdogan's pragmatism will be put to the
test in the coming days, as the Parliament sets
out to elect Turkey's new president by the end of
next month. He may have to settle for a compromise
candidate. If he doesn't, he may upset the apple
cart. He must pretend he doesn't hear the voices
from the streets.
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years,
with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd.
All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
