Al-Qaeda's theological
enforcer By Michael Scheuer
In the rising generation of post-September
11, 2001, al-Qaeda leaders, Libyan Abu Yahya
al-Libi seems to be assuming the unique position
of insurgent-theologian.
Since escaping
from US detention at Bagram Air Base in
Afghanistan in July 2005 - with three other
al-Qaeda fighters, one of whom, Faruq al-Iraqi,
has since died in combat in Iraq - Libi has become
a frequent contributor to al-Qaeda journals and
Islamist websites, and he has been the central
figure in several lengthy
videos
produced by al-Qaeda's media production arm,
Al-Sahab. [1]
Little information is
available about Libi beyond his record as an
insurgent, the fact that he was imprisoned by both
Pakistani and US authorities and his own claim to
have studied Islamic law, history and
jurisprudence "for years among excellent and great
scholars" who were in the field with al-Qaeda and
other Islamist insurgent groups. [2]
In
video presentations, Libi is never far from the
weaponry of the mujahideen. In the background
there are often AK-47s, machine-guns and
rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, or footage of
mujahideen training on shoulder-fired missiles or
actually participating in combat. [3]
Libi's subject, not surprisingly, is the
necessity for contemporary Muslims to wage a
relentless jihad against the United States, Israel
and apostate Arab regimes, particularly Saudi
Arabia. Unlike al-Qaeda military commander Sayf
al-Adl and Osama bin Laden himself, however, Libi
offers no tactical military advice or instructions
on how to stymie the US military's use of air
power through dispersal and entrenching.
Rather, Libi is something of an attack dog
who engages those whom the Islamists deem to be
enemies of the concept of jihad - especially those
who are Muslim enemies - on the basis of theology
and the expectations of God and the Prophet
Mohammed.
To date, Libi's main targets
have been Hamas; the worldwide Islamic clerical
and scholarly establishment; the Shi'ites and
their faith; and the government of Saudi Arabia.
This article will discuss Libi's handling of the
first two targets.
Libi has used Hamas on
several occasions to demonstrate that
Western-style democratic elections are detrimental
to Islam in two ways. First, the elections
themselves are un-Islamic because they amount to
the creation and subsequent worship of a secular
"idol", which is the "polytheistic legislative
council" in which the will of the people governs,
rather than the word of God. [4]
Second,
after winning the Palestinian elections, the Hamas
leaders began to speak in words that "sickened"
the mujahideen and made "it hard for people to
distinguish between [Hamas'] language and that of
other non-Islamic Palestinian organizations such
as Fatah and the Popular Front". [5]
Damning Hamas for abandoning "the
methodology of jihad in the battlefields", Libi
scathingly asked, "So, where is your religion, O
leaders of Hamas? [You have gone] from the case of
implementing the sharia [to seeing] all the sharia
which you slaughtered with your own hands when you
agreed to follow the infidel religion of
democracy, which is founded on the basis of the
rule and sovereignty of the people." [6]
Libi also has made an effort to drive a
wedge between Hamas and its military wing - the
"pure young men" and "lions" of Izz al-Din
al-Qassam Brigades - by claiming that its
political leaders ensured that its "activities
were frozen once ... [they] walked into the
legislative dome". Libi urged Hamas fighters to
ignore their leaders and continue military
operations so as to "renew your glory and show us
the enemy's towers collapsing". [7]
In the
first half of this year, Libi has focused his
critiques on Islamic scholars who are lukewarm in
supporting, or who fail to endorse, the
al-Qaeda-led defensive jihad. Too many scholars,
Libi claims, have "disowned the mujahideen,
repudiated their actions and dedicated their
pulpits and mouths to slandering the mujahideen".
Libi is direct in admitting that the
mujahideen have made theological mistakes and
errors in judgment on the battlefield, but adds
that it is the scholars, not the insurgents, who
are to blame because the former "are negligent and
absent from [the mujahideen's] midst". [8] He
warns the scholars that they are at great risk of
losing the respect, honor and obedience that they
have historically received from believers by
claiming that young Muslims have a "choice" about
joining the jihad.
Joining the jihad is
not optional but mandatory on all youth, Libi
writes, and scholars "have degraded it by adding
this ugly word to it and saying (and what a
terrible thing they say) 'the choice of jihad' or
the 'choice of resistance', thus dirtying [the
jihad's] face and fiddling with its meaning. Jihad
is a prescribed, obligatory devotion made
compulsory by the Lord, he who sent down the book
from above the seven heavens". [9]
Seeking
to shame the scholars whom bin Laden describes as
the "clerics of the king", Libi insists that the
scholars do what is essential for the success of
the jihad: they must join it in the field. "So,
rush and go forth" to the mujahideen, Libi writes.
"If you are remiss, who will lead the way ... if
you delay, who will step forward. O scholars of
Islam: the battle awaits you, and the fields of
jihad, preparation and strength await you and look
forward to you. And by Allah, you will find
nothing in them but respect, honor and pride from
your devoted sons, the mujahideen". [10]
The scholar's model for action, Libi
explains, should be the late Taliban
scholar-commander Mullah Dadullah, whose loss of a
leg exempted him from mandatory participation in
the jihad, but who died fighting the US-led
coalition because he was determined to "limp my
way to heaven". [11]
Therefore, Libi is
emerging as a more pointed and acerbic complement
to the comments made by Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin
Laden; indeed, by seeking to divide Hamas leaders
from their military wing, he has done something
bin Laden and Zawahiri have not.
While
both of the latter have strongly criticized the
un-Islamic tendencies of Hamas and many of the
scholars who are in the pay of Arab governments,
Libi has gone much further and has been more
scabrous in both his comments and his effective
wielding of the hammer of shame, a tool that
retains enormous influence in an Islamic
civilization where the idea that a man must
maintain his honor unbesmirched is still relevant.
(When Libi's commentary on Shi'ite Muslims
and the Saudi regime is examined in a subsequent
article, it will be clear that on these two issues
Libi again is much franker and more direct than
bin Laden and Zawahiri, perhaps giving the West a
better look at the core of al-Qaeda's beliefs on
those issues.)
Notes 1.
Abu Yahya al-Libi, Combat not
compromise, November 3, 2006. 2. Interview with Abu Yahya
al-Libi, June 21, 2006. 3. Each of
these martial ingredients can be found in the
video presentation Abu Yahya al-Libi Calling
for Jihad, al-Meer Forums, July 28,
2006. 4. Libi, "Hamas has dug its own grave",
Islamic Renewal Organization, February 1,
2007. 5. Ibid. 6. Libi, "Palestine: Warning
call and caution cry," Al-Fajr Media Center, April
30, 2007. 7. Libi, "Hamas has dug its own
grave". 8. Interview with
Abu Yahya al-Libi. 9. Libi, "To the
army of difficulty in Somalia", Al-Sahab
Productions, February 2007. 10. Ibid. 11.
Libi, "Mullah Dadullah: I pray I limp my way to
Heaven", Global News Network, June 6, 2007.
Michael Scheuer served as the
chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Central
Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center from
1996 to 1999. He is now a senior fellow at The
Jamestown Foundation.
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