SPEAKING
FREELY Dialogue is not a dirty
word By Ryan Carr
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
After decades of
neglect, the US military has spent the past few
years feverishly trying to relearn some of the
counterinsurgency lessons from its past. Arguably,
the most discussed lesson concerns the ultimate
"prize" in insurgent conflicts - winning the
hearts
and minds of an indigenous population.
In
Iraq, increasing attention has focused on how to
improve America's politico-military policies in an
effort to garner the support of Iraqis. However,
Iraq also reminds us of another critical lesson -
the role and impact external supporters can have
with regard to successful insurgencies.
The focal point for such external
assistance in Iraq is Iran. The United States has
consistently argued that Tehran is providing
military, financial, and operational support to
the Iraqi insurgency. However, US policymakers
continue to express some surprise as to why Iran
is supporting the Iraqi insurgency. In recent
discussions about Iran's presumed role in Iraq and
Afghanistan, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
commented, "What [Iran's] motives are other than
causing trouble for us, I don't know."
This statement implies a lack of
rationality behind Iranian actions. US civilian
and military leaders continue to tie this
"irrationality" to Iran's fundamentalist nature,
based on either a co-religionist or aggressive
narrative. Such a characterization has fueled
fears about a Shi'ite revival throughout the
region, and this fear, coupled with Iran's nascent
nuclear programs, has spurred the US to increase
its military support of its traditional Middle
Eastern allies, particularly via Sunni stalwarts
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Similar
threat characterizations also fueled the
calculations of US policymakers during the Vietnam
era, with a "fundamentalist" China being looked on
as the driving force behind that insurgency.
Unfortunately, such narratives discount the notion
that Iran's role in Iraq, as was China's role in
North Vietnam, is largely attributable to a
balancing response targeted against the
counterinsurgent (read US) - which is a natural
byproduct of the security-insecurity paradox.
It is clear that Iran is not looking to
take the US on militarily. Iran is willing to bear
some costs, including the possibility that the US
might take some direct action against it, to
balance against America's influence in the region
so that it can secure its own position as a
regional player.
As was the case with
Vietnam, to justify continued support, the US has
worked to build a consensus for the Iraq war by
framing it as a struggle between good and evil.
While this helps to generate support at home, it
also fuels a psychological conceptualization of
the insurgency as ideological, aggressive, and
fundamentally committed. While these motivations
may certainly be true of many Iraqi insurgents,
they do not reflect the state-centric motivations
behind Iran's actions. Yet by conflating the two,
the US has absolved itself from having played any
part in provoking a balancing response from Iran.
US desire to understand the "other" should
not stop at the Iraqi borders. Unlike conventional
conflicts, the motivations tied to insurgent
relationships are of the utmost significance,
including those of their external supporters. For
the US, the absence of such an understanding
leaves it in a dangerous position - predisposed to
widening an already unforgiving conflict.
The US should not rely on an "us versus
them" construct; it must consider how its actions
are being perceived abroad. With respect to Iran,
it is imperative that US policymakers, from the
administration to the military, develop some
self-awareness, and begin to appreciate how US
actions provoke reactions.
This is not to
suggest that the US should acquiesce to Iran's
support of the Iraqi insurgency, or ignore its
attempts to develop nuclear weapons. We Americans
must appreciate that geopolitical considerations
are principally driving these events, and not let
our emotions get the best of us. The
often-mentioned carrot-and-stick approach has
utility, but to create meaningful incentives and
expectations we must first engage Iran in open and
honest discussions. Dialogue is not a dirty word.
While nuclear and regional concerns are of
the utmost importance, it is time the US realized
that every situation does not have to default to a
zero-sum calculation. The fear-mongering allusion
to the Munich Agreement has lost its utility - the
US must rediscover its realist roots before it
finds itself on the verge of a wider conflict.
Iran is and will continue to be a major
player in the region, and the differing ideologies
and motivations between it and the US will almost
assuredly mean that each will come down on a
different side of almost all equations. However,
that should not prevent the US from accepting
reality and working toward achieving a pragmatic
solution.
Through dialogue, the US reached
understandings with both the former Soviet Union
and China, two vastly more dangerous states than
Iran. While the US must appreciate the threat Iran
poses, it should not resign itself to believing
that this problem is radically different from
those it has encountered and bested in the past.
Ryan Carr is a PhD candidate at
the University of Maryland, focusing on
transnational threats and the dynamics of
insurgencies.
(Copyright 2007 Ryan
Carr.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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