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2 Saudis nip extremism in the
bud By Christopher Boucek
during their childhood. [3] Most of
the prisoners have been found by the committee to
have an incomplete understanding of Islam, and the
majority have been radicalized through extremist
books, tapes, videos and, more recently, the
Internet. The counseling program, therefore, seeks
to "correct" this misunderstanding by reinforcing
the official state version of Islam.
Moreover, the state is able to marshal its
considerable religious authority to confer
legitimacy on the process. The fact that a
number of former militant
figures have joined the Advisory Committee adds
further legitimacy for some prisoners. The
presence of such figures carries credibility with
a number of participants in the program, as it was
their da'wa (proselytization) that
initially led many to radicalize.
Another
critical component of the Saudi counseling program
is the attention given to a prisoner's social
needs. The Psychological and Social Subcommittee
evaluates each participant to determine how best
the Advisory Committee can assist them and their
family. For instance, once a breadwinner is
incarcerated, the committee provides the family
with an alternative salary. Other needs, including
children's schooling and family health care, are
also provided.
This is intended to offset
further radicalization brought on by the detention
of family members. It is acknowledged by officials
that when the government arrests someone, that
memory lingers, and this social support is
intended to offset that hardship somewhat. The
government further recognizes that if it fails to
do this, then it is possible that extremist
elements will move in to provide this support.
This state support continues upon release.
Prisoners who have successfully completed the
rehabilitation process and have satisfactorily
renounced their previous beliefs are given
assistance in locating jobs and other benefits,
including additional government stipends, cars and
apartments. On release, they are required to check
in with authorities, and are encouraged to
continue meeting with the scholars they were
speaking with while in prison. Many, for instance,
often continue to attend their study circles at
mosque after being released. Furthermore,
rehabilitated prisoners are encouraged to settle
down, marry and have children, in part because it
is understood that it is much more difficult for
young men to get into trouble once they become
obligated with family responsibilities.
The successes of the program are
compounded by the Advisory Committee's application
of these social support programs to a prisoner's
larger family network. The Ministry of Interior
augments this support with the delivery of the
message that a prisoner's larger family network is
also responsible for his behavior upon his
release. The use of Saudi social networks,
familial obligations and extended responsibilities
adds an additional dimension to the program.
Success rate Since its
inception in 2004, roughly 2,000 prisoners have
participated in the counseling program, and 700
have renounced their former beliefs and been
released. All of the released prisoners have been
men, according to Muhammad al-Nujaymi, a doctor
with the Advisory Committee. About 1,000 prisoners
remain incarcerated.
According to
published reports, about 1,400 prisoners have
refused to participate in the program. Saudi
authorities have acknowledged that some prisoners
have sought to work against the program. These
prisoners are individuals who know they will not
be able to get out and feel they can do the most
good for the cause by attempting to frustrate the
authorities' attempts to turn prisoners. In many
respects, their desire to work against the
counseling program from the inside demonstrates to
some extent the successes of the Advisory
Committee.
Thus far, the program has
produced results, with Saudi authorities claiming
an 80-90% success rate. Admittedly, it is
difficult to measure the relative success of the
counseling program, especially only several years
into it. However, according to Saudi authorities,
only nine individuals have been re-arrested for
security offenses since their release through the
counseling program, equating to a recidivist rate
of between 1% and 2%. [4]
Criticism Support for the counseling program is far from
universal in Saudi Arabia. Some within the
establishment have expressed the opinion that
several sudden executions would do more to
demonstrate the state's resolve to fight extremist
ideology than the counseling program. [5]
The Advisory Committee and the counseling
program have also come under criticism in the
press. They have been accused of not producing
results and of conducting their activities in
secret. Since the late April announcement by Saudi
authorities of a series of security arrests, the
counseling program has been criticized for the way
in which it operates, with commentators calling
for more force to be used in the kingdom's
counter-terrorism efforts.
It has been
argued that prisoners will say anything to be
released from prison, and therefore the
affirmations of militants to renounce their
takfiri beliefs cannot be trusted.
While the counseling program is far from
perfect, the use of psychological assessments,
social support and religious belief has helped to
weed out disingenuous participants. In only
several years, Saudi Arabia's counseling program
has generated some very intriguing results.
The problem posed by extremism is not one
that can be addressed by hard security measures
alone, and the counseling program demonstrates the
benefits that can come through critical engagement
in the "war of ideas". This understudied program -
and other similar programs in Yemen, Egypt and
Singapore - warrants greater attention in the West
as the successes being generated hold applicable
lessons for other countries struggling with
extremism.
Christopher Boucek is
a post-doctoral researcher at Princeton University
and recently returned from research in Saudi
Arabia. This article is part of a larger ongoing
research project on Saudi re-education,
rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
Notes 1. Data in the
section are based on author interviews and
research in Saudi Arabia this March, including
interviews with Dr Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, adviser
to HRH the assistant minister of interior for
security affairs and Major-General Mansour
al-Turki, official security spokesman, Ministry of
Interior, Riyadh. 2. Interviews with Hadlaq
and Turki, Riyadh, March. 3. Author interview
with Hadlaq. 4. These data are based on the
author's interviews in Saudi Arabia in March and
therefore before the major arrests announced in
late April. It was subsequently reported in the
Saudi media that one of the cell leaders arrested
in that sweep had been released through the
counseling program, bringing the number of
re-arrests to 10. Thanks to Greg Gause for
providing this citation. 5. Based on author
interviews, Saudi Arabia, March.
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