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3 Rising powers have the US in
their sights By Dilip Hiro
center of force, one center of
decision-making ... It is a world in which there
is one master, one sovereign. And this is
pernicious." His views fell on receptive ears in
the capitals of most Asian, African and Latin
American countries.
The changing
relationship between Moscow and Washington was
noted, among others, by analysts and policymakers
in the hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf region.
Commenting on the visit
that
Putin paid to longtime US allies Saudi Arabia and
Qatar after the Munich conference, Abdel Aziz
Sagar, chairman of the Gulf Research Center, wrote
in the Doha-based newspaper The Peninsula that
Russia and Gulf Arab countries, once rivals from
opposite ideological camps, had found a common
agenda of oil, anti-terrorism, and arms sales:
The altered focus takes place in a
milieu where the Gulf countries are signaling
their keenness to keep all geopolitical options
open, reviewing the utility of the United States
as the sole security guarantor, and
contemplating a collective security mechanism
that involves a host of international
players.
In April, the Kremlin issued
a major foreign-policy document. "The myth about
the unipolar world fell apart once and for all in
Iraq," it stated. "A strong, more self-confident
Russia has become an integral part of positive
changes in the world."
The Kremlin's
increasingly tense relations with Washington were
in tune with Russian popular opinion. A poll taken
during the run-up to the 2006 G8 summit revealed
that 58% of Russians regarded the US as an
"unfriendly country". It has proved to be a trend.
Last month, for instance, Major-General Alexandr
Vladimirov told the mass-circulation newspaper
Komsolskya Pravda that war with the United States
is a "possibility" in the next 10-15 years.
Chavez rides high Such
sentiments resonated with Hugo Chavez. While
visiting Moscow in June, he urged Russians to
return to the ideas of Vladimir Lenin, especially
his anti-imperialism. "The Americans don't want
Russia to keep rising," he said. "But Russia has
risen again as a center of power, and we, the
people of the world, need Russia to become
stronger."
Chavez finalized a $1 billion
deal to purchase five diesel submarines to defend
Venezuela's oil-rich undersea shelf and thwart any
possible future economic embargo imposed by
Washington. By then, Venezuela had become the
second-largest buyer of Russian weaponry. (Algeria
topped the list, another indication of a growing
multipolarity in world affairs.) Venezuela
acquired the distinction of being the first
country to receive a license from Russia to
manufacture the famed AK-47 assault rifle. By
channeling some of his country's oil money to
needy Venezuelans, Chavez broadened his base of
support. Much to the chagrin of the Bush White
House, he trounced his sole political rival,
Manuel Rosales, in a presidential contest last
December with 61% of the vote. Equally humiliating
to the Bush administration, Venezuela was by then
giving more foreign aid to needy Latin American
states than the US was.
After his
re-election, Chavez vigorously pursued the concept
of forming an anti-imperialist alliance in Latin
America as well as globally. He strengthened
Venezuela's ties not only with such Latin
countries as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
debt-ridden Argentina, but also with Iran and
Belarus.
By the time he arrived in Tehran
from Moscow (via Minsk) in June, the 180 economic
and political accords his government had signed
with Tehran were already yielding tangible
results. Iranian-designed cars and tractors were
coming off assembly lines in Venezuela. The
"cooperation of independent countries like Iran
and Venezuela has an effective role in defeating
the policies of imperialism and saving nations",
Chavez declared in Tehran.
Stuck in the
quagmire of Iraq and lashed by the gusty winds of
rocketing oil prices, the Bush administration
finds its area of maneuver woefully limited when
dealing with a rising hydrocarbon power. To the
insults that Chavez keeps hurling at Bush, the US
response has been vapid.
The reason is the
crippling dependence of the United States on
imported petroleum, which accounts for 60% of the
total it consumes. Venezuela is the fourth-largest
source of US imported oil after Canada, Mexico and
Saudi Arabia; and some refineries in the US are
designed specifically to refine heavy Venezuelan
oil.
In Chavez' scheme to undermine the
"sole superpower", China has an important role.
During a visit last August to Beijing, his fourth
in seven years, he announced that Venezuela would
triple its oil exports to China to 500,000 barrels
per day in three years, a jump that suited both
sides. Chavez wants to diversify Venezuela's buyer
base to reduce its reliance on exports to the US,
and China's leaders are keen to diversify their
hydrocarbon imports away from the Middle East,
where US influence remains strong.
"The
support of China is very important [to us] from
the political and moral point of view," Chavez
declared. Along with a joint refinery project,
China agreed to build 13 oil-drilling platforms,
supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with the
state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA
(PdVSA), in exploring a new oilfield in the
Orinoco Basin.
China on a stratospheric
trajectory So dramatic has been the growth
of the state-run company PetroChina that, in
mid-2007, it was second only to ExxonMobil in its
market value among energy corporations. Indeed,
that year three Chinese companies made it on to
the list of the world's 10 most highly valued
corporations. Only the US had more with five.
China's foreign reserves of more than $1.3
trillion have now surpassed Japan's. With its
gross domestic product soaring past Germany's,
China ranks No 3 in the world economy.
In
the diplomatic arena, Chinese leaders broke new
ground in 1996 by sponsoring the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, consisting of four
adjoining countries: Russia and the three former
Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. The SCO started as a cooperative
organization with a focus on countering
drug-smuggling and terrorism.
Later, the
SCO invited Uzbekistan to join, even though it
does not abut China. In 2003, the SCO broadened
its scope by including
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