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3 OPINION The case for pragmatic
idealism By James A Baker
by the ability of our leaders to
generate and sustain domestic political support.
And powerful as we are, we cannot solve
every problem in the world. Iraq, for instance,
has shown a limit to the capability of our
military. I yield to no one in my admiration for
the magnificent performance of our men and women
in uniform.
But it is plain that our
military services - which crushed the
conventional Iraqi Army
within weeks in 2003 - face altogether more
intractable foes in insurgent groups and sectarian
militias. Our task is complicated by divisions
within the Iraqi government and growing
frustration among many Iraqis with the lack of
basic security and services.
Our power is
limited in other areas as well. As strong as our
economy may be, we still need the cooperation of
others in such areas as expanding trade and
investment, and coordinating macroeconomic policy.
The same is true in the diplomatic arena, where
our influence can be constrained when we are
unable to persuade others. Securing the support of
China and Russia, for instance, will be critical
in crafting a tough response to Iran's nuclear
program.
There is an ongoing debate as to
whether the United States should act alone or in
concert with other powers. In the real world, we
must be prepared to do both. Some might argue that
my third and fourth maxims ("Be prepared to act
unilaterally when the situation requires it" and
"Appreciate the importance of allies") are
contradictory. Not at all.
It is
self-evident that it is almost always preferable
to act in concert with others. But when our vital
interests are at stake we must be prepared, if
necessary, to go it alone - although we should
never undertake such action lightly.
It is
no coincidence that the three great global
conflicts of the 20th century - World War I, World
War II and the Cold War - were won by coalitions.
When we have allies, we have partners who allow us
to spread the human and financial costs of any
action. We can create what could be called an
"efficient division of international labor".
Allies also help to create a sense of legitimacy
for our actions.
In the Gulf War of
1990-91, for instance, a military coalition of the
United States, Britain, France, many Arab nations
and others was bolstered by financial support from
Gulf Arabs, the Japanese, Germans and a number of
other western Europeans. Many forget that the Gulf
War cost the United States hardly a nickel because
at our request our allies provided critical
financial support. Moreover, the UN Security
Council's authorization of force promoted support
for action against Saddam Hussein in both the
international community and, just as important,
here at home.
This leads to the fifth
maxim: we need to use all the means at our
disposal to achieve our objectives. One size does
not fit all when it comes to foreign policy. This
is especially true today, as we confront the
threats posed by international terrorism and the
proliferation of WMD.
An effective foreign
policy embodies a continuum of action from private
demarches to military intervention. We saw this in
the campaign to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait
in 1990-91. Military action was a key part of it -
but was not the sole solution. The United States
deployed other tools - including moral suasion,
bilateral talks and multilateralism. Action took
place both through formal institutions such as the
UN and more informal coalitions.
A similar
range of tools was used in the effort to overthrow
the Taliban in Afghanistan - including cooperation
with both Russia and Iran. In recent years, we
have also seen good coordination with other
countries of intelligence-gathering and
law-enforcement assets to combat both al-Qaeda and
terrorism in general.
But when a
particular course of action is not producing
results, we should be prepared to change direction
if necessary (the sixth maxim). As the theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr wrote: "Great nations are too
strong to be destroyed by their foes. But they can
easily be overcome by their own pride."
Consistency, of course, is an important
element of foreign policy. It permits us to move
beyond crisis management and facilitates the
development of long-term strategies. Consistency
can also foster stability by reassuring allies and
setting down clear markers for potential
adversaries.
But when events change, we
must be prepared to change with them. The rise of
Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, for
instance, marked a dramatic shift in the world
view of the Soviet leadership. It was therefore
only right that Washington reach out to Moscow in
ways unimaginable just a few short years before.
We rightly changed course. And we are doing just
that now in our Iraq policy.
My seventh
piece of advice is that we need to recognize and
accept that the United States will sometimes have
to deal with authoritarian regimes.
In a
perfect world, we could perhaps work only with
other democracies. Unfortunately, this is not a
perfect world, and there is no sign that it will
become one any time soon. While freedom may be on
the march, some of the most critical states in the
world for US interests - in terms of their
military or economic power, resource endowments or
geostrategic location - are far from being
Jeffersonian democracies.
To be blunt,
sometimes we have no choice but to work with
governments that fall short when it comes to
democratic practices and protection of human
rights. The most striking example of this was our
World War II alliance with Josef Stalin's Soviet
Union, one of the most murderous regimes in
history. (Given the immediate and deadly threat
posed by Nazi Germany, we had no alternative.)
During the Cold War, we made common cause with
authoritarian regimes in South America, Asia and
elsewhere. We understood that sometimes
policymakers must choose from a range of
less-than-desirable options.
Today, our
allies in the war on terror include countries in
the Middle East and Central Asia that bear scant
resemblance to the free societies we hold out as
the ideal. I cannot pretend that this is a
satisfying state of affairs. But there is simply
no realistic alternative.
This brings me
to the eighth maxim: We must be prepared to talk
with our enemies. I don't say this because talking
per se is a good thing. I do not hold to the
belief that talking solves all difficulties
between nations - although there is something to
be
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