Page 2 of
2 The bin Laden needle in a
haystack By Michael Scheuer
that their current enemies have
knowledge of these bases, and so they would not
seek safe haven in places known to those hunting
them.
C. The US government, its NATO
allies, President Hamid Karzai's administration
and scores of Western media reporters and
terrorism "experts" have, over the past six years,
made no secret of their belief that bin Laden and
his leadership team is in Waziristan. The US-led
coalition's military, diplomatic and political
officials repeatedly have said
publicly that they are putting much of their
resources into the Waziristan-focused hunt for bin
Laden and his organization. As a result, bin Laden
would have to be dimwitted to stay in Waziristan
in the face of his enemies' providing him with
credible and detailed intelligence about their
focus and intentions.
While based on the
region's history and informed speculation, the
northeastern Afghan areas of Konar province and
Nuristan and the adjacent Bajaur Agency in
Pakistan lend themselves far better to bin Laden's
security needs:
A. This mountainous region
is one of the most remote and rugged in
Afghanistan; it is the virtually inaccessible area
in which Rudyard Kipling set the events of his
timeless story, The Man Who Would Be King.
Roads are few, the population is scattered and it
hosts nothing like the commercial and smuggling
activity found in Waziristan. Additionally, in
terms of the quality of maps available to bin
Laden hunters, this region is much less
well-documented than the admittedly poorly mapped
Waziristan area.
The
topography, therefore, favors anyone trying to
hide because, once positioned on the high ground,
fugitives will have an early visual warning of any
approaching foe. The terrain likewise favors the
hit-and-run and ambush tactics of insurgent
fighters. During the anti-Soviet jihad, for
example, the communist garrison stationed in
Konar's capital of Asadabad was more or less
marooned. Operations staged from the city were
never a surprise, and were often met by ambushes.
Likewise, convoys bringing reinforcements and
supplies from the south were often
ambushed.
B. The areas of Konar and
Nuristan also were strong mujahideen redoubts
during the Afghan-Soviet war. Indeed, the first
resistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul
originated in Nuristan in 1978, and the region
itself hosted forces belonging to several
prominent mujahideen commanders. The most
important of these, from bin Laden's current
perspective, is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his
Hezb-e-Islami organization.
An early
sponsor and longtime friend of bin Laden - he
helped facilitate the al-Qaeda chief's return to
Afghanistan in May 1996 - Hekmatyar maintains
strong forces in parts of Konar province and most
of adjacent Laghman province to the east. Media
reporting likewise indicates that another al-Qaeda
ally, the Kashmiri Lashkar-i-Taiba maintains a
presence and perhaps training facilities in Konar
province. In terms of jihadi colleagues, the
region appears well-stocked with bin Laden's
allies.
C. The Konar-Nuristan-Bajaur
Agency area also has been a region on which Salafi
missionaries from Saudi Arabia and other Arabian
peninsula states have focused their proselytizing
efforts for several decades. Saudi fighters were
allowed by the population to train in the region
during the war against the USSR, and today it
stands as one of the most - and perhaps the most -
Salafi area in South Asia. As a Salafi himself,
bin Laden would be sure to find the area both
welcoming and religiously comfortable. This shared
Salafism, moreover, would add another measure of
security for bin Laden as his co-religionists are
unlikely to cooperate with those seeking his
apprehension.
D. This region also is one
that bin Laden had his eye on as home since his
1996 return to Afghanistan. When in the spring of
1997 he was preparing to leave his residence in
Nangarhar province after several attempts on his
life, bin Laden's inclination was to proceed north
into the Konar-Nuristan area. He decided against
this plan, however, when the Taliban invited him
to live in its capital at Kandahar. He then
believed it would be politically unwise for
al-Qaeda to turn down an invitation from
Afghanistan's de facto government. No such
consideration is now relevant.
The fourth
and final factor is the lack of resources devoted
to the hunt. Given Afghanistan's sheer size and
extraordinarily mountainous terrain, the current
level of forces available to the US-led coalition
appears inadequate to perform all the tasks it has
been assigned. In addition to eliminating bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda, for
example, the coalition's forces are being asked to
keep President Karzai's government in power,
rebuild the country's economy and transportation
infrastructure, help organize a democratic
political system, defeat the growing Taliban-led
insurgency and eliminate the world's largest
heroin industry.
Of the 50,000 total
coalition troops at their command, it seems
unlikely that US and NATO commanders can field
more than half of that total as combat forces;
indeed, some NATO contingents are forbidden by
their governments from performing combat duties.
That force seems inadequate for the tasks assigned
to it, and may well be outnumbered by the manpower
involved in the growing Islamist insurgency.
Michael Scheuer served as the
chief of the bin Laden Unit at the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
