Page 1 of 2 Iran terror label bites deep
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
In the aftermath of the US House of Representatives' recent resolution branding
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as terrorist, the White House is
reportedly poised to formally place it on the terrorist list of the US State
Department, with ramifications to follow, such as a freeze on the IRGC's assets
wherever the US can get its hands on them.
This is considered a small victory by anti-Iran hawks, who know the important
side-effects of this initiative in inching the US closer
to war against Iran. Veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, meanwhile,
has written about a "policy shift" in Washington. This involves a thirst for
confrontation with Iran less on the grounds of Iran's nuclear program and more
as a result of the situation in Iraq, where Iran has gained substantial
influence, to the detriment of US-led coalition forces.
Justifying the anti-IRGC resolution in the name of an attempt to protect US
soldiers, various lawmakers, such as Senator Joe Lieberman and Congresman Tom
Lantos have accused the IRGC of supporting terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied territories. They dismiss the small yet loud
dissent by fellow legislators, such as Senator Chuck Hagel and Congressman
Dennis Kucinich, that this is a misguided initiative that could increase the
possibility of war with Iran.
The case for the designation of the IRGC as terrorists has been built on thin
empirical grounds and even thinner legal grounds, and is bound to complicate
the US's Iraq policy. The arguments against the move can be listed as:
1. Illicit use of the term terrorist: Following the United
Nations' definition of terrorism as the use of violence against unarmed
civilians for political objectives, it is difficult to see how the activities
of the IRGC alleged by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan can be fitted into this
definition. Per the recent testimony of top US commanders, the IRGC,
particularly its elite Quds Force, has been giving arms and explosives to
Shi'ite militias which, in turn, use them against US forces. Assuming this is
true, given the fact that Shi'ite (or Sunni) militias opposed to the US
military presence are not referred to by the US itself as terrorists, but
"insurgents", the question is: Why then brand the Iranian backers of those
insurgents as a step worse than those directly fighting the US, and name them
terrorists?
2. Scant empirical proof: The US has until now failed to lay out
the facts against Iran and that is one reason the senior leadership in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as certain members of the international
community, are not going along with the US's accusations against Iran. A case
in point is Chris Alexander, the deputy UN representative to Kabul, who had
this to say recently: "We are, quite frankly, trying to encourage everyone to
recommit to having a sense of proportion, to putting the reality of the
insecurity of Afghanistan into proportion. That means not saying that Iran is
the principle source of arms shipments to the Taliban. That's simply not true."
In Iraq, the US has reportedly apprehended a number of Iranian operatives
linked to the Quds Force, yet none of those individuals, including the five
doing consular work in Ibril until kidnapped by US special forces nearly a year
ago, has admitted to the crime alleged by the US. Nor has the US military
introduced any documents that corroborate the allegations. The question, then,
is how to justify the IRGC's terrorist labeling in the absence of viable hard
proof?
3. Questionable assumptions about the IRGC: Key to the
designation of the IRGC's designation as terrorists is the assumption that it,
and the Quds Force in particular, are "rogue" or "government-within-government"
operatives. To paraphrase recent articles in the Washington Times and by the
Council on Foreign Relations, they are "mafia-type" institutions. The problem
with this is that, again, there is little about Iranian polity that endorses
it.
The IRGC is very influential and some members of Parliament (Majlis), the
cabinet, government ministries and local administrations have backgrounds in
the IRGC. This actually shows the depth of integration of the IRGC (past and
present) in formal government structures.
The much-scrutinized role of the IRGC in the economy, on the other hand, can be
similarly interpreted as further support for the counter-argument that with the
growing involvement of those guards in the formal and informal economy, their
vested economic interests dictate more and more mainstream, as opposed to
terroristic and subversive, behavior.
4. Questionable designation over Lebanon: Although the IRGC has
played a prominent role in supporting Lebanon's Hezbollah since the early
1980s, calling the IRGC terrorists because of this is problematic. This in
light of Hezbollah's powerful mass base, its political clout and its
participation in parliamentary politics of Lebanon.
Hence, to designate Hezbollah as terrorist because of its occasional face-offs
with the Israelis, is to turn this terminology into a propaganda tool that
ignores important realities in the
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