Page 2 of 2 At last, some good news
from Iraq By Sami Moubayed
stand against my cousin, while my cousin and I stand against the stranger." In
this case, clearly, the Sunnis are strangers to both Hakim and Sadr.
3) SIIC and Badr have been embarrassed by the Biden-Gelb Plan (approved
by the US Senate) for partitioning Iraq. It sounds identical to what they have
been calling for since 2004; an autonomous 8-province district for the Shi'ites
in southern Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament rejected outright the non-binding
resolution
on October 3. The UIA, headed by Hakim, immediately seconded the rebuttal. This
was not enough, however, for Hakim's opponents (especially among Sunnis) to
come out against him, drawing connections between SIIC's program and that of
the Biden-Gelb Plan.
Ammar Hakim came out in defense of SIIC's federalism project, speaking to Radio
Sawa and saying his father envisioned federalism based on geography, rather
than on ethnic and sectarian grounds. This federalism, he added, would be
determined by the people in a referendum, based on constitutional methods, and
not imposed on them by the United States. SIIC officials complained that some
were "exploiting" the Biden-Gelb Plan to draw parallels with the Hakim
initiative, and SIIC newspapers said that it "gave ammunition" to those wanting
to undermine the Shi'ites of Iraq.
Salih al-Mutlaq, a leading Sunni politician who is strongly opposed to Hakim's
federalism, said that the leader of SIIC and the US Senate had "coordinated"
their federalism project for Iraq. Izzat Shahbandar, a secular Shi'ite loyal to
former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, added that there were "several similar
facts" between both proposals. The Americans call it "partitioning" while Hakim
stresses "federalism", and Salih al-Ukayli, a Shi'ite parliamentarian, noted,
"federalism and partitioning are two sides of the same coin so long as
occupation of beloved Iraq continues".
By allying himself to Sadr - a man famed for his opposition to federalism -
Hakim shakes off the nasty image given to him by the Biden-Gelb Plan - that of
being a puppet for the United States. While many question Hakim's relationship
with Washington, Sadr is above suspicion in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis. An
alliance with Sadr at this stage helps polish Hakim's image, especially on the
issue of federalism.
4) Sadr is looking for a back channel to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
The two men started out as friends in 2006. Maliki protected Sadr from US
harassment and gave him a political platform in the Iraqi government through
several important portfolios like commerce, health, and education. In exchange,
Sadr gave Maliki legitimacy in the Iraqi Street and political weight within the
Iraqi parliament with his 30 deputies. It was a marriage of convenience. The
two men parted over Maliki's relationship with the US and his refusal to call
for a timetable for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Maliki, glad to get rid
of Sadr, who had become a political embarrassment (although he remained a
military asset) started cracking down on Sadr or letting other militias - like
Badr - do the dirty work on his behalf.
Sadr never imagined that US support for Nuri al-Maliki would be this strong and
that despite all the security problems Iraq was facing, the White House was
refusing to let him go - fearing what alternative would replace him. Sadr
expected Maliki to fall within weeks of the Sadrist walk-out. Maliki has
survived. Without a government umbrella, Sadr cannot hold on for long. Funds
are becoming increasingly difficult to raise. All the government institutions
he once controlled are no longer within his authority. He cornered himself into
a tight spot and has found it difficult to make a u-turn. Pride simply got in
the way. Now that it is clear that Maliki is there to stay - at least for the
foreseeable future - Sadr is looking for a way back to the prime minister.
Hakim has Maliki's ear. If Hakim convinces him to change course vis-a-vis Sadr,
then the Mahdi Army might survive and regain its earlier power apparatus.
The Mahdi Army has already sent a positive signal to the prime minister by
declaring a 6-month truce under which it will refrain from fighting both other
militias, Iraqi police, and US troops. Sadr has also personally cracked down on
all armed men performing violence in his name. To date, Maliki's comments on
the Sadr-Hakim alliance have been positive and encouraging to the Mahdi Army.
He has said that the reconciliation "came at the right time" and showed "a high
sense of religious and national responsibility". He did not single out Hakim to
shower with praise, but rather, commended both Shi'ite leaders simultaneously.
If this continues, however, Maliki will have a difficult time convincing the
Americans to stop persecuting the Mahdi Army. He has already stuck his neck out
for the cleric-turned-rebel-turned-politician in the past, and received a lot
of bad publicity in Washington. The US would have to start accepting Sadr as a
partner in Iraq - fighting a common enemy like al-Qaeda. This won't be easy,
given Sadr's history of anti-Americanism and the fact that he carried arms
against the Americans in 2004.
Things are going well in Maliki's direction. In addition to the reconciliation
project, a top Sunni cleric, Abdul-Aziz Bin Abdullah al-Sheikh (the Mufti of
Saudi Arabia), has came out prohibiting young Saudi radicals (who comprise the
bulk of al-Qaeda) from engaging in jihad abroad (in reference to Iraq). Maliki
praised this initiative, saying that it was wise, and he sent a positive signal
to the Sunnis by delaying (though it is unclear if it is going to be called off
completely) the execution of Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid
(Chemical Ali). The prime minister desperately needs a "success story" in
"Maliki's Iraq" to sell to the Americans and the international community. The
Hakim-Sadr rapprochement could be his life-saver.
Maliki now has to wait and bet on Hakim's wisdom and ability to embrace and
accommodate the radical and ambitious Muqtada al-Sadr. Some of Hakim's
entourage will find that difficult, given that many believe Sadr was
responsible for the August 2003 assassination of Hakim's brother, boss, and
founder of SIIC, Mohammad Baqir. They claimed that Sadr wanted to eliminate a
Shi'ite heavyweight who, although opposed to the US invasion, was nevertheless
willing and able to work with it for the sake of Iraq. The Sadrists snapped
back, claiming that Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim fabricated the accusation to strike at
a traditional enemy and gain legitimacy within Shi'ite circles.
That story has perhaps now become history to most observers of Iraq. But in
tribal politics, revenge is never forgotten. To move on, both Sadr and Hakim
have to forget, as both have an equal amount of blood on their hands from many
years of conflict over supremacy among Iraqi Shi'ites.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst. He is the author of Steel
& Silk: Men and Women Who Shaped Syria 1900-2000 (Cune Press 2005).
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